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As natural disasters have increased in frequency and intensity in the Pacific, so too has the New 
Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF’s) involvement in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
(HADR). This has made effective civil-military coordination crucial, particularly due to the 
severity and scale of resulting humanitarian needs. Yet despite the Government of New Zealand 
Government’s (GoNZ’s) publicised intentions to improve the military’s interoperability and 
HADR capabilities, this study presents the first independent examination of the NZDF’s civil-
military coordination in the context of Pacific HADR.  
Findings were drawn from a comparative analysis of the NZDF’s involvement in the 2015 
Tropical Cyclone (TC) Pam response in Vanuatu and the 2016 TC Winston response in Fiji. These 
report how stakeholders perceived the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts, identify the 
major obstacles to coordination and discuss how these impacted the HADR provided. Data were 
triangulated from grey literature and sixty-eight interviews with participants from; the NZDF, 
GoNZ, international and local humanitarian agencies, affected governments and community 
representatives. Notably, this is the first time feedback on the NZDF has been collated from 
Pacific Island governments, humanitarians and populations. 
Substantial similarities emerged when stakeholders’ views of the NZDF’s coordination were 
compared. Although the majority of interviewees perceived the NZF’s overall civil-military 
coordination efforts in a positive light, several previously unreported tensions were reported. 
Obstacles to coordination also had serious negative impacts on HADR, which indicate that 
stakeholders did not meet the priority needs of affected populations, in either HADR response. 
A new model was also developed to summarise thesis findings. This explains how variables, 
such as stakeholder perspectives, obstacles and mechanisms, interact to produce positive or 
negative outcomes. The diagram can also be used to evaluate past civil-military coordination 
efforts and anticipate future challenges. This is a significant benefit to stakeholders, as it 






I sat cross-legged on the grass, opposite a community representative. We were talking about 
our experiences of natural disasters and discussing the differences between my childhood in 
the Cook Islands and the interviewee’s own in these isolated Pacific islands.  
A long silence followed, and I wondered if they were deciding to trust me. It was time to explain 
why I was visiting an island still bearing the scars of a Category 5 cyclone. I described the 
purpose of my research project and how I previously worked for both the New Zealand Defence 
Force (NZDF) and humanitarian agencies. I also spoke of my involvement in disaster relief 
responses, and how I had seen these affect people. Handing over my research information 
sheet, I finished with the truth, 
“I’m here because I want to know how you feel things went after the cyclone. 
If you’re willing to share, I would like to hear how you and this village felt… 
about the New Zealand military’s coordination and assistance.”
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The interviewee received this statement with an encouraging smile. They talked for over an 
hour about the NZDF, how personnel had interacted with villagers, and the assistance they 
received. The interview began with a description of how friendly and hard-working NZDF 
personnel were. Laughter punctuated stories of soldiers playing rugby with the local children 
and learning how to shuck coconuts. Suppressing a chuckle, they recounted, 
“[NZDF personnel] were using… the toilets in the school building. Then they 
FILLED up the septic tanks aye? [Laughter] Next thing, we heard they… didn’t 
only fix it… they EMPTY all the septic tanks! They were really flexible. It’s the 
first time that the whole island have seen [the septic tank] emptied. [Louder 
laughter]… The [affected] government… didn’t have that equipment… That 
was really nice. We owe a lot to [NZDF personnel] for what they’ve done.” 
We set out to walk through the grounds of a small school. 
“[The NZDF] come and build those three houses [pointing]. They just came 
and did the ruling… then they start building...  If they had asked us where to 
put the house, we could have shown them… You might need to put it back 
there [pointing further away]… we know this place... it would have been 
better [voice trails off]. The house WAS good, but … the [chief] was never 
here when the New Zealand Army was… the [local officials] were doing their 
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preserve the participant’s anonymity. Ethical considerations are detailed in the thesis Introduction below.  
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own stuff... [The NZDF] had their own commander there who’s making the 
call… We didn’t know who to talk to.” 
The community representative pointed to a large hole nearby. It was an open pit, which the 
NZDF made to discard rubbish and unused building materials. In an embarrassed tone, they 
explained that this pit had accidentally been dug in the middle of the community vegetable 
garden.2  Post-disaster, this had been feeding two villages and was one of the only remaining 
cassava sources on the island.3 Continuing apologetically, they stated, 
“The people thought… maybe [the discarded materials] should have been… 
given to the people. To take the timber and use it for their houses?... It was 
okay… because [the NZDF] wanted to do the job FAST. But they could have 
just asked… Rather than go and put it in the pit.” 
Some villagers lost everything in the disaster. I learned that most of them could not afford to 
buy or transport necessary building supplies to rebuild. After restating how grateful the village 
was for the NZDF's help, the community representative reflected, 
“But to come and fix the staff quarters?… They are PAID workers... they can 
fend for themselves… but the villagers can’t. It’s just where [the NZDF] put 
the priority on WHO to help… To me, it was a bit unfair… I don’t know how 
the [affected] Government and New Zealand Government did it… maybe they 
communicated that they needed to do this?…  But it would have been better 
if they [helped] everyone.” 
We then walked to where NZDF vehicles had made large ruts that blocked a creek by the 
garden. The representative recounted how the pit quickly filled with water in the rainy season. 
This pool became a breeding ground for mosquitoes. As a parent, the interviewee worried 
about mosquitoes biting their children. Dengue fever and the Zika virus are health concerns and 
the mainland’s healthcare system was far from the island.4  
It was sunset and getting late. So I asked my final questions. Was there anything else the 
interviewee wanted to comment on, and had they been hesitant answering anything?  
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 NZDF personnel later reported the position of these buildings and pit had been pre-approved by the New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and local officials. This miscommunication is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
3
 Cassava is a root vegetable, also known as manioc. It is a staple food in many Pacific islands and was one of the only crops 
which can survive Category 5 cyclones. After the NZDF left, the community replanted a new vegetable garden. 
4
 Dengue fever and Zika virus are spread via day-biting mosquitos. There are no preventive vaccines or antiviral treatment. 
Dengue fever causes a feverish illness, headache, and severe muscle pains, which require medical care. Danger signs include 
prolonged vomiting, blood in the vomit, and a blotchy rash. Zika Virus symptoms include mild fever, headache, muscle and joint 
pain, nausea, vomiting, and general malaise.  The virus can also be transmitted from a pregnant woman to her foetus. 
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The community representative avoided my eyes and stared at the ocean. I guessed this meant 
there was something else but I was only there to record what stakeholders were willing to 
share. They then told me many things I did not expect to hear. These disclosures seemed to 
occur at the end of most interviews. The representative stated quietly, 
“The things that [the NZDF] brought… they left it there for [local officials] to 
finish the rebuilding… [Locals] were supposed to use it for the school [long 
pause]… It would have been better for [the NZDF] to give it to the locals or… 
the school principal, who would have been in the right position to distribute 
it. They gave it to the wrong person. [Expression implies a misuse of aid].” 
Although I always tried to be impartial, this was hard to hear. I found the following comments 
even more challenging, 
“It is the New Zealand people’s money that should have been used for these 
people who were affected… Then these guys came and took it back to the 
mainland? [Frustration expressed in voice] It was not used in the RIGHT way. 
That’s taxpayer’s money. The New Zealand people’s money.” 
Despite all this community had experienced, the representative was angry because they felt an 
injustice had been done to New Zealanders and the NZDF personnel who provided them 
assistance. 
The representative thanked me and asked that I relay the village's sincere gratitude to the New 
Zealand Government and Defence Force for their assistance. To my embarrassment, this 
occurred after most interviews. Affected communities often reflected that I was the first to 
return and ask them how they really felt about coordination and this assistance. 
In the course of my field research, I heard many similar stories. Two years—and two cyclone 
seasons—following these disasters, some families were still living in tents or under tarpaulins. 
Many of them lived in the most impoverished or severely affected areas. When they spoke of 
their experience of the disaster, it was often with fear and concern for their future. These 
conversations almost always finished on a positive note and with a smile. The military came 
once, they noted, 
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Thank you for these verses in particular, may they speak for themselves: 
“Is not this the kind of fasting I have chosen: to loose the 
chains of injustice and untie the cords of the yoke, to set the 
oppressed free and break every yoke? 
Is it not to share your food with the hungry and to provide 
the poor wanderer with shelter - when you see the naked, to 
clothe them, and not to turn away from your own              
flesh and blood? 
Then your light will break forth like the dawn, and your 
healing will quickly appear; then your righteousness will go 
before you, and the glory of the Lord will be your rear guard. 
Then you will call, and the Lord will answer; you will cry for 
help, and he will say: Here am I. 
If you do away with the yoke of oppression, with the pointing 
finger and malicious talk, and if you spend yourselves in 
behalf of the hungry and satisfy the needs of the oppressed, 
then your light will rise in the darkness, and your night will 
become like the noonday. 
The Lord will guide you always; he will satisfy your needs in a 
sun-scorched land and will strengthen your frame. You will 
be like a well-watered garden, like a spring whose waters 
never fail. 
Your people will rebuild the ancient ruins and will raise up 
the age-old foundations; you will be called Repairer of 
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Introduction: Big Waves in the Pacific 
 
The New ‘Normal’ 
On 12 March 2015, Tropical Cyclone (TC) Pam struck the Republic of Vanuatu. The Category 5 
storm left a trail of destruction across the archipelago, impacting over 70% of the country’s 
population (GoV, 2015a).6 TC Winston struck the Republic of Fiji less than one year later. Similar 
levels of destruction were encountered by over 60% of Fiji’s population (GoF, 2016b). Both 
cyclones were among the strongest storms ever recorded in the South Pacific.  
Major humanitarian needs emerged in the aftermath of these disasters. Shelter, food security 
and water shortages were immediate priorities. In some areas over 80% of crops and housing 
were also destroyed, leaving many communities with little to survive (GoV, 2015a, GoV, 2015c). 
This placed a heavy burden on affected Governments, which had limited resources and 
logistical capability to reach isolated islands.7 In response, both Governments quickly appealed 
for international assistance.  A large number of actors responded, resulting in the biggest 
examples of civil-military coordination ever seen in the context of Pacific humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HADR). 
Of the foreign militaries deployed in both disasters, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) 
made one of the most significant contributions. Over 300 NZDF personnel provided assistance 
and repaired infrastructure in Vanuatu, while nearly 500 were involved in Fiji (NZDF, 2016g). 
Aircraft and naval vessels also supported these international responses, which were led by the 
Government of Vanuatu (GoV) and Government of Fiji (GoF). These NZDF assets enabled civilian 
actors to complete needs assessments and transport vital aid to communities. These 
deployments would also be the Force’s largest since World War Two, as well as the most 
complex HADR responses in NZDF history. 
For a number of reasons, civilian and NZDF personnel worked in closer proximity than ever 
before in these responses. This was partly due to the military deploying within a civilian-led 
Whole of Government (WoG) approach, which was led by New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (MFAT).8 This led to Other Government Agencies (OGAs) being deployed 
alongside or embedded in NZDF teams for the first time, while close interaction was 
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 Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale describes a cyclone with winds of over 252 kilometres an hour. This suggests 
catastrophic damage will occur, including a high percentage of framed homes being destroyed and power outages which may 
last for weeks to months. Most affected areas would be expected to be uninhabitable for weeks or months after the disaster. 
7
 Cyclone damage had, for example, reduced Vanuatu’s logistical capacity to one patrol boat, one private helicopter and 
commercial vessels, with twenty two islands needing assistance. Although the Government of Fiji had a greater number of air 
and maritime vessels available, these were unable to rapidly reach the one hundred and sixty seven affected islands. 
8
 The acronym ‘WoG’ is used throughout this thesis, while the term ‘All-of-Government ‘(AoG) is interchangeable the former 




encouraged between the military and affected Governments.9 A new military model called the 
Deployable Joint Interagency Task Force (DJIATF) was also applied for the first time in the TC 
Pam and Winston responses. This model had been intentionally adopted to mitigate previous 
civil-military coordination issues and enhance the NZDF’s inter-agency cooperation. 
Discrepancies among stakeholder perspectives 
Post-disaster literature which was published by the Government of New Zealand (GoNZ), NZDF 
and United Nations (UN) consistently praised NZDF civil-military coordination efforts. For 
example, UN stakeholders suggested foreign militaries set a “new global standard in military 
support to humanitarian operations” during the TC Pam disaster response (UNDAC, 2015a, p.5). 
NZDF sources also reported that the Force’s civil-military coordination had improved in the TC 
Winston response. NZDF personnel in one article reflected,  
“Coordination across the different New Zealand agencies… has been effective 
and can be the model for future missions… We did this in Vanuatu and we 
developed this further in Fiji” (Baguioro, 2016, p.9). 
In contrast, non-governmental stakeholders identified obstacles to civil-military coordination in 
both responses. These included communication issues, militaries not adhering to local systems 
and a lack of understanding about the roles and responsibilities of military and civilian actors 
(GoV and SPC, 2015, GoF and SPC, 2017). This was described by one humanitarian 
representative, who gave their impressions of the NZDF as follows: 
“Australia and New Zealand had no idea how [coordination] works at the 
local level. At the [GoF’s] lessons learnt workshop – it became clear that the 
Australia and New Zealand military hadn’t been briefed but no one realised. 
They flew in and operated within their own terms of reference. No one 
thought to ask. You need to find out what are the local systems before you 
go” (Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15). 
A previous study completed by the researcher also suggested that stakeholder perspectives 
within grey literature were more favourable than those actually held by  humanitarian and 
community stakeholders (Roddis, 2016).10 For example, interviewees reported that obstacles to 
coordination appeared to impede the NZDF’s ability to meet humanitarian needs. This was 
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 These agencies included the New Zealand Medical Assistance Team (NZMAT) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR). 
10
 As part of the researchers’ unpublished Honours dissertation, interviews were completed with TC Winston stakeholders. 
While this study focused on the application of the DJIATF model, it also collated perceptions of the NZDF’s TC Winston response 
from desk based literature and twelve semi-structured interviews with stakeholders who were involved in the response. These 




described by a community representative who interacted with the NZDF during the TC Winston 
response, they reflected, 
“If there was more interaction between us, [the NZDF] would have known 
what needs we had and maybe they would have helped in that way?” 
(Roddis, 2016, p.26) 
Yet despite these contrasting stakeholder perspectives, few studies have examined the NZDF’s 
civil-military coordination in the Pacific HADR context. Most existing reports are also published 
by the NZDF or GoNZ, and have not included the perspectives of key civilian actors, such as 
affected individuals. These factors raise concerns around publication bias and pre-conceptions. 
Considering the major role the NZDF plays in Pacific HADR responses, independent research 
must be undertaken to verify whether or not civil-military coordination issues have occurred 
and if so, how these may have impacted the assistance provided. Answering these questions is 
crucial for the development of future government and humanitarian policy, as well as to ensure 
actors are best able to meet the needs of affected populations in Pacific HADR responses. 
 
i. Research Aim and Questions 
 
This thesis, therefore, presents the first independent analysis of the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination in a Pacific HADR context. Within this study, the term ‘civil-military coordination’ is 
defined as any interaction taking place between civilian and military actors, which aims to 
provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.11 
The study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
1. How did stakeholders perceive the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts in past 
Pacific HADR responses? 
2. What, if any, were the obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in past Pacific 
HADR responses? 
3. How do stakeholders believe obstacles to civil-military coordination impacted the HADR 
provided? 
Answers to these questions are urgently needed for several reasons. One of these is that Pacific 
island countries are among the most vulnerable States in the world to natural hazards (United 
Nations, 2014). Coordination during initial responses is frequently impeded by the geographical, 
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 This definition is intentionally broad, as UN OCHA and military definitions of the term detail the aims of civil-military 




logistical and infrastructure challenges in the region. Climate change is also contributing to the 
increased frequency and scale of these disasters in the Pacific (Knutson et al., 2015).  
The GoNZ has also acknowledged the need for the NZDF to adapt to changes in climate, as well 
as human and environmental security in the Pacific region. These factors were discussed in the 
‘Climate Crisis: Defence readiness and responsibilities report’ (2018) produced by the GoNZ. 
This stated that the NZDF needed to enhance its HADR capabilities and make changes to the 
way the force operated to: “further increase the credibility of Defence within New Zealand, with 
South Pacific partners, and at a global level” (GoNZ, 2018, p.3). 
While some stakeholders feel these factors justify the use of the NZDF and foreign militaries as 
a ‘first line’ of response, others suggest this is contrary to international civil-military guidelines 
and the principles behind HADR. Consequently, stakeholders have increasing called for actors to 
“address the civil and military relationship in the Pacific” (PHT, 2014, p.28, UN OCHA, 2014). 
These challenges and divergent perspectives suggest past Pacific HADR responses and civil-
military coordination must be examined, to address these concerns. 
Research findings are further valuable to Pacific stakeholders, as the NZDF’s role in HADR is only 
likely to increase. GoNZ intentions to enhance the military’s interoperability were publicised in 
the 2010 and 2016 Defence White Papers, as well as the Future 35 Strategy (NZDF, 2011).12 The 
need for the NZDF to operate and undertake HADR operations in New Zealand and the Pacific 
was also listed as one of the GoNZ’s highest priorities in the 2018 Strategic Defence Policy 
Assessment (MoD, 2018, sect 172). This stated that interoperability was “critical” to the 
conduct of these operations and maintaining New Zealand’s “strong international reputation as 
a valued and credible defence partner and ally” (MoD, 2018, sect 16). 
The GoNZ’s ‘Pacific Reset’ WoG strategy and recent budget announcements also reveal 
increased defence expenditure, as well as funding in the South Pacific (Sachdeva, 2018).13 This 
means the New Zealand public and Government have a vested interest in ensuring Pacific HADR 
and the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts are as effective as possible in the future. 
Finally, stakeholders need to be reassured that the assistance being provided in Pacific HADR is 
meeting affected population needs. The GoNZ, NZDF and relief agencies have all publicised 
their adherence to the international legal and humanitarian obligations in HADR contexts 
(MFAT, 2012b, GoNZ, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2019a).14 Examination into civil-military coordination 
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 The Future 35 Strategy describes the NZDF’s capability outlook to 2035. 
13
 The announcement stated that NZD$714 million would go toward an increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
Currently 59% of the country’s ODA is spent in the Pacific. This includes expenditure under the New Zealand Aid Programme 
and some humanitarian activities undertaken by the Ministry of Defence. 
14
 These include the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015 and 
others which New Zealand is a signatory to. This means humanitarian assistance under the New Zealand Aid Programme will be 




efforts and actors’ assistance is, therefore, crucial, as the scale and severity of humanitarian 
needs are intensifying in the region. This is even more vital in the initial phase of disaster 
responses, when assistance can be a matter of life or death for those in need. 
 
ii. Research Design and Methodology  
 
As few researchers have examined civil-military coordination in the context of Pacific HADR or 
focused on the NZDF’s coordination, an exploratory study was selected for this thesis. A 
qualitative methodology was also used, with an emergent, inductively grounded approach to 
gathering data.15 A key advantage of this approach is that conclusions are derived from data 
which is systematically gathered and analysed during research (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). This 
helps mitigate any researcher pre-conceptions or bias.  
The approach used also contains elements of phenomenological or ethnographic studies, which 
examine the perceptions, perspectives, understandings, and feelings of individuals. This design 
is recommended for research exploring different cultures, understudied phenomena or 
complex social phenomena (Miles and Huberman, 1994). It also enables participant 
perspectives, coordination, obstacles and outcomes to be investigated in a great deal of depth 
(Davidson and Tolich, 1999). These factors have led many authors to conclude that qualitative, 
inductive approaches are the most appropriate way to examine civil-military interaction, as the 
field is considered “too complex to be approached with explicit conceptual frames or standard 
instruments” (Rietjens, 2014, p.129). 
Case studies and their selection 
Two case studies were selected for comparative analysis in this thesis. This methodology 
enabled the NZDF’s civil-military coordination, possible obstacles and their impact to be 
examined in real-life contexts, through interviews, observations and document analysis (Tellis, 
1997, Yin, 2014). Comparative analysis also meant findings could be compared between HADR 
responses and stakeholder groups. This strengthened the depth of analysis and internal validity, 
which is vital if findings are to inform actors’ future Pacific HADR responses. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
vulnerable), impartiality (which is based on need and without discrimination), neutrality (meaning actors do not favour any side 
in an armed or other dispute), and independence (actors must be autonomous from political, economic, military or other 
objectives). 
15
 In this approach, a theoretical concept materialises slowly during research. Important questions can also become clear 
gradually, while instruments are derived from the context and actors’ views. The term ‘grounded theory’ was developed by 
Corbin and Strauss, this is applied in inductive research. It uses a bottom-up approach, which derives conclusions from data 




The case studies selected were the 2015 TC Pam disaster response in Vanuatu, and the 2016 TC 
Winston response in Fiji. These were identified via a ‘most similar systems’ design. This aimed 
to reduce the number of research variables, by comparing disaster responses which were as 
similar as possible (Anckar, 2008). Some justifying factors included physical and cultural 
similarities. For example, Vanuatu and Fiji are both archipelagoes, which experienced Category 
5 cyclones. They also have a number of cultural similarities, due to having both Melanesian and 
colonial influences (Burley, 2013).16 
A similar range of stakeholders also responded to the TC Pam and Winston disasters. NZDF 
responses to these events were also undertaken within a civilian-led WoG approach, which 
applied the new DJIATF model. This meant the same or comparable humanitarian and civilian 
actors interacted with the NZDF in both responses. 
There were also many in-country similarities, with respect to civil-military coordination. For 
example, New Zealand High Commissions existed in both country capitals (MFAT, 2019). MFAT 
therefore had pre-established relationships with affected Governments and a local base, where 
civil-military coordination hubs were established. Both disasters also happened to occur in the 
lead up to domestic elections in both Vanuatu and Fiji (Radio New Zealand, 2015, ABC News, 
2016, Round, 2016b). Grey literature suggests this heightened political tensions in these 
disaster responses, which may have impacted coordination, obstacles and the assistance 
provided (Radio New Zealand, 2015, Round, 2016b).17  
While the similarities described above strengthen internal validity, they can also present 
challenges when findings are generalised. Conclusions may therefore be less applicable if 
applied in dissimilar contexts, such as in Micronesian cultures, or in different natural disasters, 
such as earthquakes.  
As no two disaster responses are the same, a number of differences also existed between case 
studies, which created variables. For example, while New Zealand-Vanuatu relations were 
relatively warm prior to the NZDF’s HADR response, historic diplomatic tensions existed 
between the GoNZ and GoF. These related to GoNZ sanctions and severed relations between 
the NZDF and Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF), following the 2006 Fijian coup (Prujean, 
2011, Collins and Fraenkel, 2012).18 While these variables likely impacted civil-military 
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 While there are cultural divisions within both Vanuatu and Fiji, Vanuatu’s affected population was largely Melanesian. Fiji is 
the furthest east of the ‘Melanesian’ countries, affected communities were therefore both Melanesian and Polynesian, with 
some Indo-Fijians. Both countries also have British colonial histories, prior to independence.  
17
 These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter two and Four. 
18
 Bilateral relations soured between the GoF, GoNZ and Government of Australia (GoA) after Commodore Josaia Voreqe 
Bainimarama overthrew Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase's government in December 2006. The GoNZ condemned the coup, 
reduced foreign aid to the country and placed sanctions on Fiji. NZDF engagement with Fiji and the Republic of Fiji Military 




coordination, relationships and the level of trust between actors, they could only be mitigated 
by applying controls in the research design. These are described below.  
 
iii. Data Collection 
 
To produce robust research findings, multiple data collection methods and sources of evidence 
were used.  Data was therefore collected through semi-structured interviews, the researcher’s 
journal, observations, documents and archival records. 
Grey literature 
Data collection began with a desk-based review of grey literature. Documents included 
published stakeholder reports, press releases, news media and interviews. Post-disaster lessons 
learned reports were also used. Some of these collated the perspectives of a range of 
stakeholders, in workshops held in Vanuatu and Fiji (GoF and SPC, 2017, GoV and SPC, 2015).19 
Internal NZDF and Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQ JFNZ) lessons learned reports 
and after-action reviews were also obtained via an Official Information Act (OIA) request.20  
This grey literature then served two purposes. It was firstly used to present an overview of each 
disaster and the NZDF’s HADR response. These data were also triangulated and collated, to 
report findings to the posed research questions (Yin, 2014).21 A broad range of military and 
civilian sources was intentionally used. This aimed to balance any tendencies toward 
publication bias, which may have existed in reports published by New Zealand, Pacific and 
international stakeholders.  
Semi-structured interviews 
Sixty eight semi-structured interviews were completed with disaster relief stakeholders from 
five key sectors. These were: i) the GoNZ and NZDF, ii) New Zealand civilian stakeholders, iii) 
international and local humanitarian actors, iv) affected governments, and v) affected 
populations (see Table 1). The use of in-depth interviews is considered an appropriate data 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of Prime Minister following the coup) allow a return to democracy. Diplomatic tensions only began easing after Bainimarama 
was elected in 2014, following a reportedly diplomatic election. NZDF-RFMF interaction was also re-established after this date. 
19
 Both the TC Pam and Winston lessons learned workshop reports collated the perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders. 
These included locally-based representatives such as those from affected Governments, Ministries, National Disaster 
Management Offices, and local humanitarian organisations. Representatives from UN and humanitarian agencies, INGOs, 
foreign States, civilian agencies and academic institutions were also involved in workshops. 
20
 Internal NZDF reports were obtained via OIA. They included the HQ JFNZ J8 (Continuous Improvement) Branch TG 651.3 – OP 
Pacific Relief Tropical Cyclone Lessons Collection Synopsis, Lessons Learned OP Pacific Relief (Tropical Cyclone Winston), CIMIC 
Post Activity Report: Op Pacific Relief – TC Winston 2016 (FIJI), and a DJIATF Post Activity Report: Op Pacific Relief – 01-16. 
21
 Stakeholder perceptions, obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-military coordination, and the impact these may have had on the 




collection method, particularly to better understand participant perceptions (Soeters et al., 
2014). The method also means findings emerge organically from the views of those who have 
experienced the phenomenon studied, which further mitigates researcher pre-conceptions or 
bias. 
In each case study, seven participants were sought to represent each sector. This number was 
achieved in all but one sector, as only five GoF interviews were able to be analysed.22 
Participants were selected via theoretical sampling and snowball referral (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008, Davidson and Tolich, 1999).23 Interviewees were selected for their relative expertise, 
experience and close contact with the NZDF, with different ages, gender and rank sought in 
each sector.24 Authors consider this diversity and the triangulation of a large number of 
participants a strength, as this strengthens the validity of findings and enables the views of a 
collection of communities to be canvassed (Davidson and Tolich, 1999).  
 
Sector Examples of organisations and positions 
i. GoNZ and NZDF MFAT, New Zealand High Commissions, NZDF deployed forces, 
DJIATF staff and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams. 
ii. New Zealand civilian 
stakeholders 
New Zealand humanitarian agencies, civilian companies, OGA 
representatives such as from the New Zealand Medical Assistance 
Team (NZMAT) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR). 
iii. International and local 
humanitarian actors 
(INGOs, NGOs, UN Agencies, local humanitarian and volunteer 
organisations. 
iv. Affected governments Ministry, Divisional and Provincial officials, public servants, 
National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) staff and Liaison 
Officers (LOs). 
v. Affected populations Chiefs, village headmen, male and female community 
representatives. 
Table 1. The five interview sectors and examples of interviewee roles.25 
 
Where practicable, interviews were completed face-to-face, in New Zealand, Vanuatu and Fiji.26 
This enabled body language and facial expressions to be observed, which provided greater 
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 This reduced the original seventy intended interviews to sixty eight. This occurred as one GoF official was unable to conduct a 
planned interview in Fiji. The other participant could not be contacted to confirm whether or not their interview transcript was 
accurate and could be used in this study. 
23
 Snowball referral means that participants themselves also recommended other suitable candidates. This is considered 
appropriate when investigating sensitive topics in small communities, where trust is important. This was the case in the NZDF, 
affected nations, as well as in the Pacific and New Zealand disaster relief sectors.  
24
 While female perspectives were sought in this research only nine interviewees in each case study were female. This may 
reflect the higher ratios of males represented within the NZDF, Pacific governments and some disaster relief positions. It may 
however also mean that findings do not fully encapsulate female perspectives within each sector. 
25




insight into stakeholder perspectives. Field research was also crucial in the outer islands of 
Vanuatu and Fiji, to collate the perspectives of community representatives. This was because 
NZDF assistance was provided in isolated and often impoverished areas, which lacked reliable 
communication and transportation.  
An interview guide was also used (see Annex 1). This directed conversation around ten topics, 
using open-ended questions. This method provided flexibility as it meant the researcher could 
gain new insight and investigate topics as research progressed (Tolich and Davidson, 1998). All 
interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. Transcriptions were then returned for 
verification in all but a few cases, where participants were either inaccessible or asked not to 
have these returned. 
Coding and analysis 
Grey literature and interview findings were triangulated and analysed independently. The 
separation between these data collection methods meant grey literature findings could be 
compared with those which emerged from actual stakeholder interviews. This design aimed to 
identify where there were discrepancies among data or perspectives diverged. It was hoped 
this might explain why grey literature and actual stakeholder perspectives appeared to vary. 
Due to some considerable gaps in grey literature, stakeholder perspectives, obstacles to the 
NZDF’s civil-military coordination and their impact were reported in a semi-chronological 
sequence, according to how these HADR responses unfolded. This provides a more logical 
examination of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination. 
In contrast, thematic coding was undertaken on interview data, to identify stakeholder 
perspectives, obstacles to civil-military coordination and their impact (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008). This was undertaken until the point of saturation, when no new codes, patterns or 
themes emerged (Urquhart, 2013, Soeters et al., 2014). Obstacles were then ranked according 
to the total number of interviews in which they were mentioned.27  
To enhance internal validity, participants were also sent a copy of preliminary research findings. 
This aimed to ensure that interviewee perspectives were accurately portrayed and, if desired, 
these stakeholders could provide further comments for analysis. 
Methodological advantages and limitations 
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 Interviews took place within New Zealand, (April 2017 - February 2018), Fiji (14 -27 August 2017) and Vanuatu (27 August – 
08 September 2017). Where interviews were not possible in person they were conducted via Skype and telephone. 
27
 These findings are presented in tables within Chapter Two and Four, according to the total percentage of case study 




The author was considered an ‘insider-researcher’ within most interviews (Unluer, 2012). This 
was because the researcher has been involved in national and international HADR responses.28 
She also grew up on a small island in the Pacific, previously served in the NZDF, and with INGOs 
and NGOs in the humanitarian sector.29 
The advantages to being an insider-researcher are well documented and include: 1) having a 
greater understanding of the culture being studied; 2) not altering the flow of social interaction 
unnaturally; and 3) having an established intimacy which promotes the telling and the judging 
of truth (Bonner and Tolhurst, 2002). Insider-researchers also know the politics of institutions, 
such as the formal hierarchy and how things ‘really work,’ which enables them to approach 
others receptively (Unluer, 2012). They also often have a great deal of knowledge, which would 
otherwise take an outsider a long time to acquire (Smyth and Holian, 2008). Collectively, these 
factors aided in the interview and data collection process, as well as in analysis. 
This role duality, however, can have disadvantages. These include participants making 
assumption about the researchers knowledge, “closeness to the situation hindering the 
researcher from seeing all dimensions of the bigger picture” and susceptibility to making 
assumptions, without seeking clarification (Unluer, 2012, p.6). A preventative approach was 
used to mitigate these, which applied a robust methodology, triangulated data and used 
feedback from external sources. This involved the researchers’ supervisor providing feedback 
on findings and analysis.30 Preliminary research findings were also discussed with different 
stakeholders from these key sectors, prior to final publication.31 
A further limitation of this study relates to its qualitative methodology (Soeters et al., 2014). 
Findings are specific to the NZDF and Pacific HADR context, meaning they may not be 
transferrable to other foreign militaries or regions. Interview data also only reflect the 
perspectives of the sixty eight selected participants.32 While generalisability is not the objective 
of qualitative research, other State and defence actors may consider research findings helpful 
to inform their own Pacific HADR responses. Stakeholder perspectives and feedback may also 
be useful for civilian actors who want to enhance their own civil-military coordination efforts. 
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 HADR responses included the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and New Zealand Rena oil spill disaster, when serving in the NZDF. She 
also resides in Christchurch, New Zealand, which experienced a large earthquake in 2011. 
29
 The researcher grew up in the Cook Islands. She also served as a Navigation and Warfare officer in the Royal New Zealand 
Navy (RNZN). She then left the NZDF to serve in the humanitarian field, supporting development projects in the United 
Kingdom, Europe and Asia Pacific. 
30
 Dr Anna Powles' is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University. Her expertise 
includes: Pacific islands regional security and politics, women and peace studies, and New Zealand defence and foreign policy. 
31
 Stakeholders at this briefing included representatives from: the NZDF, MFAT, INGOs and academic institutions. 
32
 While selecting a broad range of stakeholders aims to mitigate this, participant views are unlikely to encapsulate the entirety 
of stakeholder perspectives. Participants may also be subject to bias or false recollections, which could impact findings. 
Wherever possible the researcher used grey literature to eliminate any suspected inaccuracies, particularly as some 





iv. Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical considerations are especially important in contexts which involve both military 
personnel and vulnerable populations, such as in HADR responses (Soeters et al., 2014). Author 
motivations must also be evaluated, as “prior commitment to either making the military more 
effective or critiquing its actions may actually blind researchers to important questions: both 
political and analytical” (Ben-Ari, 2014, p.33). The researcher was therefore conscious of ‘doing 
no harm’ throughout data collection, while remaining as impartial as possible. 
Prior to commencing interviews, low risk human ethics approval was obtained from Massey 
University's Human Ethics Committee.33 Ethical processes were adhered to, which ensured that 
participation was voluntary, interviewees were treated respectfully, and that information and 
data was securely stored. Participants were also given research information sheets (see Annex 
2) and signed consent forms (Annex 3) prior to commencing interviews. All of these documents 
and interview questions were translated into the native languages of Bislama and Fijian, to 
ensure participants gave their informed consent and understood all interview questions.34  
Authors note the importance of ensuring the confidentiality of participants and their 
institutions, when investigating sensitive research topics (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, Soeters 
et al., 2014). Interviewees are therefore identified by number and sector within chapters. 
Where necessary and with participant approval, some quotes and details have been altered to 
ensure anonymity.35 
Approval to conduct interviews was also obtained from institutions and state entities, which 
agreed to respect participant confidentiality. Permission was therefore granted by the NZDF, 
GoNZ, GoV and GoF prior to conducting interviews.36 These entities expressed their support for 
this study and the desire to receive open and honest feedback on their involvement in these 
HADR responses.  
Although being an insider-researcher presents valuable data, it can also pose dilemmas in the 
final write up stage (Unluer, 2012). While determined not to play down certain aspects findings, 
the researcher has taken into account the sensitivity around some findings. Some information 
has therefore been omitted and will be used in policy briefs for specific stakeholders, post 
publication. 
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 This was obtained on 03 April 2017 for the duration of research. The ethics notification number was: 4000017266. 
34
 In Fiji the most common dialect among indigenous Fijians is Bauan, while it is commonly termed ‘Fijian.’ In Vanuatu and Fiji 
most participants chose to conduct interviews in English, as they had learned this in school. While translators were available, 
any unfamiliar terms or misunderstandings were clarified during interviews, or when transcriptions were returned. 
35
 Locations, names and other identifying details have been removed so that participants or intuitions cannot be identified. 
36




v. Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One provides a review of relevant literature 
and studies concerned with civil-military coordination. This also describes the key coordination 
mechanisms and models adopted in the Pacific and by the New Zealand Government and 
Defence Force. 
Chapters Two and Three focus on the 2015 TC Pam case study. In Chapter Two the context of 
the disaster and NZDF response are described. Grey literature findings are also reported, as 
they relate to the three research questions. Chapter Three then reports how interviewed 
stakeholders perceived the civil-military coordination, obstacles and their impact. Chapters 
Four and Five mirror this same structure, instead focusing on the 2016 TC Winston case study. 
A comparative analysis of both case studies is then presented in Chapter Six. This discusses the 
implications of findings and their contribution to previous literature. A new model is also 
proposed, which aims to help stakeholders better understand the complexities of the NZDF’s 
civil-military coordination. Following this, Chapter Seven concludes with a summary of the 





Chapter One: The Shaky Foundations of Civil-Military Coordination 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the literature relevant to this thesis. Previous research 
and theories are reviewed in four parts. These provide an understanding of contribution this 
study makes in the academic field. Civil-military, as well as Pacific HADR mechanisms are also 
described, to help readers understand the context and findings of the following chapters. 
Part One explains the theoretical background behind this research. In this section, civil-military 
relations theories are examined, along with authors’ critiques. Part Two then explores the 
international literature focused on civil-military coordination. Gaps and weaknesses in research 
are examined, along with the most commonly discussed obstacles to civil-military coordination. 
Narrowing the field, Part Three investigates civil-military coordination in the context of Pacific 
HADR. Recent literature focused on the region is examined, along with the mechanisms which 
aim to enhance coordination. Part Four then explores the documents which detail the NZDF’s 
civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR. The newly established GoNZ and NZDF coordination 
models and mechanisms are also examined, at the close of the chapter. 
 
Part One: Civil-Military Relations Theories 
i. Theoretical foundations and civilian control 
 
Although coordination in modern HADR contexts has become increasingly complex, civil-
military relations theories serve as the foundation of this research. Historically, most authors in 
this field aim to address what is termed the “civil-military problematique” (Feaver, 1996, p.149). 
This dilemma raises the question of how States can best maintain a military that is both 
effective and subordinate to civilian rule. 
 
Most critiques of these traditional theories suggest they were “narrowly conceived” or “too 
bound by the culture and national politics” of their predominantly American authors (Bland, 
1999, p.8).37 Yet despite these weaknesses, many theories remain relevant in the modern 
context of civil-military coordination (Huntington, 1957, Janowitz, 1960). This is because 
Western militaries, such as the NZDF, often deploy under civilian control in Pacific HADR 
responses. This leadership must also be balanced with the need for military effectiveness, as 
well as achieving State objectives and meeting humanitarian needs. 
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 These criticisms relate to traditional civil-military relations theories narrowly focusing on national security aims. They also 




Two streams of thought 
In response to the ‘problematique,’ two opposing theories emerged to explain how civil-
military relations should best be structured. The first theory was proposed by Huntington, in 
The Soldier and the State (1957). The author argued that a clear divide or separation should be 
maintained between the military and policymakers, to maximise military professionalism and 
effectiveness. In contrast, Janowitz endorsed an integrated approach in The Professional Soldier 
(1960). This theory suggests that military personnel should develop political understanding and 
sensitivity, to establish civilian control through “self-imposed professional standards and 
meaningful integration with civilian values” (Janowitz, 1960, p.420). 
The debate over separation or integration 
These opposing theories raise crucial questions of relevance to this study. One concerns 
whether the ‘separation’ or ‘integration’ of civilian and military actors is more appropriate in 
Pacific HADR and likely to ensure civilian control. These subjects continue to be debated by 
academics and humanitarians (Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2016, Gordon and Donini, 2016, 
Harris, 2016a). This suggests the debate over how civil-military relations should best be 
structured, remains unresolved. 
 
Another question surrounds how civil-military arrangements may have impacted actors’ 
relationships, coordination and ability to meet HADR needs. Considering that the GoNZ and 
NZDF have adopted increasingly integrated approaches in Pacific HADR responses, findings in 
this thesis presents a valuable opportunity to build on existing civil-military relations literature.  
 
ii. Contemporary civil-military relations 
 
Several contemporary civil-military relations theories were also developed after the Cold War. 
These aimed to address weaknesses and gaps in Huntington and Janowitz’s work and, in doing 
so, introduced a range of new considerations in the field. Many of these factors remain relevant 
in the modern context of civil-military coordination and should be accounted for in analysis. 
The impact of national principles and norms 
Bland (1999), for example, proposed a ‘unified theory,’ which aims to explain civil-military 
relations across times of peace, crisis and war, as well as in different countries. The theory 
suggests that civilian control and relations are impacted by nationally evolving principles, norms 
and decision making procedures. The dangers of generalisation were also discussed by Bland, 
who argued that the differences between countries and actors had a significant impact on civil-




The impacts of civilian society and culture 
Schiff’s (1995) ‘concordance theory’ also evidenced how human, cultural and historical 
dimensions significantly impacted relations in different States. She also argued that previous 
conclusion, which proposed that military and political institutions should remain separated, 
might be inappropriate for other nations. This was because these findings were primarily drawn 
from the historical and cultural experiences of the United States (US). In contrast, Schiff 
suggested that “cooperative relationships” should be encouraged between military and civilian 
actors, which did not necessarily require separation (1995, p.7). Her work also introduced 
important factors, such as the influences civilian society, in civil-military coordination.  
Policy, the environment and culture 
Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996) also explored how national security policy is shaped 
by the global or domestic environment, as well as culture and identity. This work led other 
authors to call for further research into modern, integrated civil-military operations and actors 
policies. Mychajlyszyn (2007),  for example, suggests this is critical, because civil-military 
relations are likely to be impacted by the culture, norms in these new contexts. This suggests 
that changes in the Pacific HADR context, such as the increasing levels of civil-military 
integration, should be accounted for in stakeholder and national security policies.  
The works above highlight the suitability of the research design and the valuable contribution 
this thesis could make to academia. These relate to the narrow focus of this study on specific 
actors, such as the NZDF and key HADR stakeholders, in the relatively unstudied field of Pacific 
HADR. Schiff and Bland’s work also reinforce the value of collating data from a broad range of 
civilian perspectives, to ensure that valid conclusions are drawn. 
 
iii. The changing nature and roles of defence forces 
 
Since the 1990’s militaries have come under increasing domestic and international pressure to 
adapt and evolve their capabilities. Authors suggest factors such as globalisation, human rights 
and norms have expanded military roles, to include non-combat capabilities, such as HADR 
(Dandeker and Gow, 1999, Kümmel, 2002, 2004).  
As the interoperability between civilian and military actors has increased, so has research into 
how this is impacting military structures and culture. Moskos, Williams, Segal and other authors 
have, in particular, made significant contributions in the field of military sociology. These 
authors were among the first to propose the theoretical concept of a ‘postmodern military.’ 




multipurpose, with “greater permeability with civilian society” (Moskos et al., 2000, p.1). This is 
supported by case studies, which suggest increased involvement in international operations has 
democratised, liberalised, and civilianised some armed forces. 
The multidimensional impacts of civil-military integration 
Some authors argue that postmodern factors, such as increased integration and civilianisation, 
have had positive impacts on civil-military coordination. Egnell’s (2006) comparative case study, 
for example, concluded that the British military’s ‘Janowitzean’ (or integrated) approach 
enhanced coordination in their 2003 Iraq deployment. In comparison, the US military’s 
‘Huntingtonian’ (or separated) approach, was less effective. More recent research by Hajjar 
(2014) argues that postmodern factors38  have contributed to an emerging ‘peacekeeper-
diplomat’ cultural orientation in the US military. This has reportedly resulted in the military 
working more effectively with civilian society, the national government, other agencies and 
NGOs. 
In contrast, some authors argue that integration impedes civil-military relations and 
coordination. For example, Dandeker’s work suggests the blurring of political and military 
spheres has resulted in “more frequent opportunities for political-military conflict” (2001, p.42). 
Sotomayor’s (2010) research also concluded that increased interaction in peace operations had 
magnified, rather than reduced, civil-military differences in South America.  
Other authors, such as Malešič (2015), highlight the dynamic outcomes of closer civil-military 
interaction in HADR. The authors own literature review concludes that integration can foster 
both cooperation and the “mutual transfer of values,” or “competition, conflict and a clash of 
organisational cultures” (2015, p.981). These seemingly contradictory conclusions, suggest 
further research is needed to determine how integration may be impacting civil-military 
relations, such as the NZDF. 
 
iv. Cultural and structural change in the NZDF 
 
To enhance the  NZDF’s effectiveness and interoperability, the force has undergone major 
structural changes over the last two decades. These have included a defence-wide restructure 
and civilianisation process, which were initiated by the GoNZ in 2010.39 After these measures 
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 Hajjar argues that military culture has been modified by postmodern factors such as the global growth of ambiguity, the 
movement towards greater multiculturalism, the impact of the information age, the growth of military civilians, increasing 
questioning of authority and ideas and the emergence of a multi-mission military. 
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were introduced, reports concluded that they had negatively impacts through reducing defence 
expenditure, morale and the retention of personnel (Office of the Auditor-General, 2013).  
Yet despite these significant changes, minimal research has examined how increased civil-
military integration has impacted the NZDF’s culture or coordination. Considering that Hajjar’s 
research implies that postmodern factors, like civilianisation, enhance coordination, this thesis 
provides a valuable opportunity to explore how these may have impacted the NZDF. 
Stakeholder perceptions of the NZDF’s culture and interoperability 
Within literature, only a small number of academic studies have investigated how stakeholders 
perceive the NZDF’s culture and interoperability. Most of these are also focused on 
peacekeeping deployments, rather than HADR contexts.  
Morris (2017), for example, examined how the military’s identity through interviewing NZDF 
personnel, who had been deployed to Afghanistan. These personnel described the NZDF as 
having a distinct ‘ANZAC’ or ‘professional’ identity, when operating with other actors. This was 
demonstrated by doing things in a “Kiwi way” or with a “can-do attitude” (Morris, 2017, p.89). 
NZDF personnel also felt the force was perceived as friendly, approachable, flexible and 
respectful. These traits were linked to the culture, small size and budget of the NZDF. While 
personnel reported that these factors had enhanced interaction with the local population, 
Morris concluded that these self-perceptions did not “automatically make [NZDF personnel] 
good at development work” (Morris, 2017, p.91). 
Greener (2017) completed a similar study, which explored how external stakeholders perceived 
NZDF personnel, during overseas deployments. Data were drawn from interviews with 
representatives of International Stabilisation Forces, the UN, Multinational Forces and 
Observers.40 Four positive themes emerged to describe the NZDF. These included 
professionalism,41 personal qualities,42 cultural appreciation43 and attitudes.44 Greener 
concluded that these stakeholder perceptions were closely aligned with how NZDF personnel 
viewed themselves.  
‘Areas for further development’ were, however, also identified from Greener’s data. These 
included a clear differential between NZDF senior officers and more inexperienced soldiers. 
Several interviewees reported difficulties either working or communicating with soldiers or 
young personnel. This led to recommendations that the NZDF deploy personnel conversant 
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with the local language in the area of operations. ‘Kiwi humour’ was, at times, also 
misunderstood and personnel behaviour considered disrespectful or inappropriate.  
Overall, these previous examinations of NZDF culture and interoperability imply that despite 
the NZDF generally being perceived as positive, there still appear to be communication, cultural 
challenges and misunderstandings impeding coordination. 
Gaps and limitations in NZDF-focused research  
Despite the recent publication of these studies, an examination of their methodologies reveals 
some limitations. Morris’s (2017) study, for example, collated data from only ten NZDF 
participants. It also focused on NZDF development efforts in Afghanistan and a complex 
environment, rather than in the Pacific or HADR. In contrast, many of the participants in 
Greener’s (2017) research were foreign military personnel, rather than civilians, and only one of 
the thirty was a female. Greener was also employed by the NZDF during his research, which he 
acknowledged could create a “context within which certain views might be more or less likely to 
be expressed” (Greener, 2017, p.99).  
These concerns highlight a number of research weaknesses, which the methodology used in 
this thesis aims to address. These surround the need to interview a large number of civilian 
representatives, from different sectors and of both sexes, to better understand stakeholder 
perspectives. The fact that the author was considered an ‘insider researcher’ and ensured 
participant confidentiality, also aims to mitigate any interviewee hesitancy about openly 
expressing their views. 
 
Part Two: Civil-Military Coordination and its Main Obstacles 
i. International literature and gaps in the research 
 
In contrast to civil-military relations theories, which largely focus on national-level interaction 
between military and civilian actors, the field of civil-military coordination encompasses a broad 
range of stakeholders and operating environments. An examination of the literature, however, 
reveals a number of weaknesses and gaps in existing research. These are examined below. 
A focus on conflict and complex environments 
A major gap in literature concerns the lack of research in the context of natural disasters. This is 
because the majority of studies have investigated coordination in peacekeeping or politically 
complex environments, rather than in HADR. For example, authors have examined civil-military 




2005) Kosovo (Mockaitis, 2004) and Afghanistan (Rietjens et al., 2009). In general, these works 
suggest that civil-military coordination efforts are often improvisational, pragmatic and ‘ad 
hoc,’45 in international responses (Rietjens, 2006, Metcalfe et al., 2012, Soeters et al., 2014). 
The conclusions drawn in these studies have, however, been critiqued by some authors 
(Rubinstein et al., 2008, Ferris, 2012, Rubinstein, 2014). These suggest that research is often 
narrowly focused on the US or British military, and their interaction with UN agencies or 
Western NGOs. This has led authors, such as Slim (1996), to caution against generalisation, as 
there are often significant divergences between different militaries and actors.  
Other authors question the relevance of these findings for the HADR context. Ferris (2016a), for 
example, argues that civil-military coordination after a natural disasters is less contentious than 
in a conflict scenarios. She suggests this is because there are fewer political tensions. While this 
is a contested assertion, the critiques above reinforce the need to examine civil-military 
coordination in the Pacific HADR context. 
Research weaknesses and publication bias  
Although most case studies which examine civil-military coordination collect data from 
interviews, many of these display methodological weaknesses. Pramanik’s (2015) research, for 
example, examined the civil-military coordination efforts of the Swedish military. Data was, 
however, collated from only twelve interviews, with Swedish Government or military officials. 
Three participants were also military trainees, with limited experience. Others studies include 
larger interview samples, but limit civilian participation to either Government or specific 
humanitarian actors (Minear et al., 2000).46 These weaknesses call into question the validity of 
previous studies, particularly surrounding their portrayal of stakeholder views. 
Most stakeholder perceptions about civil-military coordination are also drawn from grey 
literature, rather than academic or peer-reviewed sources.47 This raises questions about 
publication bias, as documents are often produced by political actors, militaries or 
humanitarian agencies, which have a vested interest in findings (Pramanik, 2015).  
The general lack of empirical research  
In general, there is a lack of robust, academic research in this field. Egnell argues that most 
works are based on “weak historical, empirical and theoretical foundations” (2013, p.238). He 
                                                      
45
 The definition of ‘ad hoc’ according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary is: “for the particular end or case at hand without 
consideration of wider application.” Ad hoc used as an adjective can be 1) concerned with a particular end or purpose, 2) 
formed or used for specific or immediate problems or needs, or 3) meaning improvised or fashioned from whatever is 
immediately available. 
46
 One example of robust research was completed by Minear and colleagues. These conducted over 200 interviews to produce 
findings for their study into civil-military coordination within the Kosovo crisis. 
47




suspects this is due to authors undertaking research with the ‘assumption’ that integration and 
civil-military coordination are positive or will enhance effectiveness. Researcher bias also 
remains a major concern in qualitative research, as analysts often fail to apply measures to 
protect against self-delusion or drawing invalid conclusions (Soeters et al., 2014). 
Pramanik’s (2015) systematic literature review substantiates the lack of empirical research. This 
concluded that only 15% of all civil-military literature was published in scientific peer-reviewed 
journals. Obstacles to civil-military coordination were also only identified in 16% of the 
academic research surveyed.48 This scarcity of empirical research is concerning, as obstacles to 
coordination must first be identified, before stakeholders can consider how these might be 
mitigated. Common obstacles to coordination are now examined in the section below. 
 
ii. The tension and challenges of civil-military coordination 
 
Contrasting principles and pursuits 
The different values and principles of military and civilian actors are, perhaps, the most 
discussed obstacles to civil-military coordination. These often relate to the concern that 
militaries are pursuing political or military interests, rather than aiming to meet humanitarian 
needs in deployments (Metcalfe et al., 2012, De Siervo, 2012). Authors suggest this tension is 
further compounded by the politicisation and militarisation of HADR (Pelling and Dill, 2010, 
Pulu, 2014, Martinez, 2016). 
Politics and State sovereignty  
Stakeholders’ interests and political motives can also negatively impact coordination. Katoch 
(2006), argues that developing or small nations are, in particular, suspicious of foreign 
assistance, as this can be interpreted as an affront to State sovereignty. He suggests this can 
lead governments to “zealously guard their ability to act autonomously,” which undermines 
coordination (Katoch, 2006, p.156). Case studies by Barber (2009) and Seekins (2009) 
demonstrate that affected Governments have refused HADR assistance from military and 
humanitarian actors in the past.49 They also suggested that this had serious negative 
implications for the affected population. 
Within the emerging field of ‘disaster politics,’ authors have identified several factors of 
relevance to civil-military coordination and Pacific HADR.50 Pelling and Dill (2010), highlight that 
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national political systems “do not operate in isolation from international pressures,” which can 
complicate relationships and coordination efforts (Pelling and Dill, 2010, p.25). Corruption can 
also impede coordination between foreign actors and affected governments. For example, 
Pelling (1998) concluded that local political elites in Guyana presented themselves as local 
voices to capture external funds.  
While no research has explored how these factors may be impacting civil-military coordination 
in Pacific HADR, authors suggest they must be taken into account when analysing data (Pelling 
and Dill, 2010). 
The humanitarian imperative and principles  
The tension between politics and both the ‘humanitarian imperative’ and ‘humanitarian 
principles’ is another reason why military-humanitarian coordination, remains particularly 
contentious (ICRC, 1994, Sect 1).51  The latter principles include humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality and independence (ICRC, 1994).52 These require stakeholders to implement HADR 
independent from any political, military, commercial or other objectives.  
Historically, many authors have raised questions around whether militaries, which are 
ultimately trained to kill, are appropriate HADR actors (De Coning, 2005, Gordon and Donini, 
2016, Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2016). Some also argue the pursuit of political objectives is 
“fundamentally incompatible” with the principles most humanitarian agencies and responses 
are founded on (Weir, 2006, p.26). 
The dilemma faced by militaries deployed for HADR 
These obligations reportedly pose a dilemma for militaries. This is because, on one hand, they 
are extensions of the State and, therefore, are controlled by Governments and driven by 
political interests. On the other hand, most militaries are obligated to adhere to the principles 
within HADR guidelines, as well as UN General Assembly Resolutions 46/182 (1991) and 58/114 
(2003).53 This tension has led to considerable debate over whether, or not, militaries can 
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actually adhere to the humanitarian principles in HADR (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2009, Gordon and 
Donini, 2016, Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2016). 
Humanitarian agencies also reportedly fear their ‘neutrality’ or ‘independence’ will be 
undermined if they coordinate with militaries (Byman et al., 2000, Abiew, 2003, 2012). These 
factors are perceived as crucial for humanitarians, which feel they are needed to gain affected 
government approval to carry out HADR (1999, Metcalfe et al., 2012, Harris, 2016b). In 
particular, these concerns have led humanitarian stakeholders to be either hesitant or refuse to 
interact with military personnel during deployments. 
Diversity in stakeholders’ perspectives 
Despite most academic literature concluding that military-humanitarian coordination is 
contentious, some research contradicts these findings. For example, some studies evidence 
extreme diversity among the perspectives of humanitarian actors, particularly over adherence 
to the humanitarian principles and views on civil-military coordination (ACMC, 2012, Ruffa and 
Vennesson, 2014, Harris, 2016b).  
Madiwale and Virk’s (2012) examination of the 2010 Pakistan floods also concluded that 
national humanitarian agencies and local actors were less concerned with their neutrality and 
more likely to coordinate with militaries, than INGOs and the UN. These findings raise questions 
about how humanitarians view the NZDF and whether, or not, they are willing to coordinate in 
Pacific HADR.   
 
iii. Common barriers and obstacles to civil-military coordination 
 
Cultural and organisational differences 
Across the literature, the organisational differences between military and civilian actors are also 
discussed as obstacles to coordination. Within this broad category, a range of key differences 
are discussed in studies. Abiew (2003) and Franke (2006), for example, focus on differences in 
‘organisational structure.’ They stress how the centralised and hierarchical structure of military 
forces contrasts with the horizontal and consensus-based decision-making procedures of 
civilian and humanitarian organisations. Differences in ‘organisational approaches’ are also 
discussed by Gourlay (2000). His work suggests that militaries often focused on short-term, 
decisive action, in contrast to the long-term developmental concerns of civilian organisations.  
Despite many studies identifying organisational differences as an obstacle, some authors 
question the validity and generalisability of these findings. Rubinstein (2014), for example, 




which can skew findings. Slim (1996) and Rubinstein (2014) also stress that most case studies 
have focused on interaction between humanitarian actors and the US military. Consequently, 
they question the relevance of these conclusions for other military and civilian actors. 
A lack of understanding between actors 
Another well documented challenge concerns the lack of understanding between military and 
civilian actors. Byman’s (2000) research describes examples of these, which often surround 
misunderstandings about institutions, operational procedures and capabilities. These include 
humanitarian representatives making unrealistic demands of the military, while military 
personnel overestimate the capabilities and resources available to humanitarians. These 
misunderstandings then foster frustration and confusion, which impede coordination.  
Research also suggests that, in general, military personnel lack HADR knowledge and 
experience (Metcalfe et al., 2012). An extra layer of misunderstanding can also be fostered 
between the political officials controlling WoG responses and the military personnel they are 
directing (Miller and Barbera, 2014). This can impede decision-making and the determination of 
military tasking, as well as coordination with civilian or humanitarian actors (Ray, 2012).  
The impact on the assistance provided 
This obstacle can also lead militaries to deliver inappropriate HADR or not meet humanitarian 
needs. Authors often criticise militaries for providing goods and services “without considering 
the impact on local merchants and workforces” (Miller and Barbera, 2014, p.145).54 Some link 
this lack of understanding to the fact that military training and tasks are usually combat-
focused, rather than taking into account development or humanitarian factors (Heaslip et al., 
2016, Dandeker and Gow, 1999, Gibb, 2015, Miller and Barbera, 2014). 
Some authors also suggest that the military’s lack of understanding is institutional (Byman et 
al., 2000). This is, reportedly, due to knowledge being retained by certain personnel or civil 
affairs officials, but not shared throughout the ranks. Byman also argues this is a consequence 
the ‘sporadic’ and ‘uneven’ attempts of Western militaries to engage with the relief 
community. These assertions highlight factors to consider in this study, particularly surrounding 
how pre-deployment interaction may have impacted the NZDF’s coordination. 
Cultural misunderstandings 
A small number of studies have also evidenced cultural misunderstandings between militaries 
and affected populations. One of these was completed by Rubinstein and colleagues (2008) and 
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drew data from local interviewees. These reported that US military personnel lacked an 
understanding of local culture and were unaware when their actions were considered 
disrespectful by local actors.  
While some studies into the NZDF’s culture suggest the military is more culturally aware than 
other militaries, others stress the likelihood of cultural misunderstandings (Morris, 2017, 
Greener, 2017). Lanier’s (2000) work, for example, highlights that misunderstandings often lead 
to frustration and confusion, when opposing cultural features clash. In particular, her work 
describes the significant differences between cold-climate cultures, such as New Zealand, and 
hot-climate cultures, including most Pacific islands.55  
While not discussed in Lanier’s research, some of these opposing factors, including ‘task 
orientated vs. relationship focused cultures’ and ‘concepts of time and planning,’ may be 
compounded by the characteristics of military culture. These factors highlight the need to 
interview Pacific-based stakeholders, to determine whether or not cultural misunderstandings 
may be impeding the NZDF’s civil-military coordination.  
Information sharing and poor communication 
Communication is also a common obstacle to coordination, within which sub-themes emerge. 
These include the incompatibility of actors’ systems (Arancibia, 2016), poor information sharing 
(Rietjens et al., 2009) and the actual language and terminology used by actors (Pramanik, 
2015). In addition, the military’s classification of materials or security restrictions have 
reportedly hindered information-sharing (Mockaitis, 2004, Rietjens et al., 2009).  
Communication challenges also surround stakeholders’ willingness to openly discuss issues 
about coordination and assistance. This issue is well documented in the book ‘Time to Listen: 
Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid,’ which produced findings from over 
6,000 interviews, across different contexts and continents (Anderson et al., 2012). These 
authors concluded that people’s experiences with international aid were remarkably consistent, 
with several key messages emerging from this research. One key finding was that participants 
often began interviews by citing positive experiences and expressing their appreciation for 
assistance. This was, however, consistently followed by a deeper analysis of how this aid had 
not worked and they believed it could be improved.  
Generally, aid recipients were also disappointed by the assistance provided. They often called 
for ‘smarter’ aid, perceiving that ‘too much’ assistance was given ‘too fast,’ which was viewed 
as a waste of money and resources. The authors suggested these outcomes were the result of 
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both unrealistic community expectations and the “processes and systems of the international 
aid system [undermining] its intended effectiveness” (Anderson et al., 2012, p.2). This led to the 
conclusion that, globally, aid providers need to listen and engage more with recipients.  
In particular, these observations reinforce the need to interview affected populations in the 
Pacific, to better understand how they views the NZDF’s coordination efforts and actors’ 
assistance. They also highlight the need for trust between the researchers and interviewees, so 
that critical, not just positive feedback is included in analyses. 
Part Three: Pacific HADR and the involvement of foreign militaries 
i. Gaps and weaknesses in Pacific-based research 
 
Surprisingly, despite the increasing role foreign militaries in the Pacific HADR, few studies have 
examined the mechanisms introduced to enhance civil-military coordination. For example, only 
one peer-reviewed journal article has investigated military involvement in South Pacific HADR 
(Reaves et al., 2014). This focused on the US military and identified a number of weaknesses in 
the engagement model applied by the force. Most of these were aligned with the obstacles to 
coordination, described above.56 The article further concluded that poor communication and 
coordination between the military and local actors, in particular, had negative impacts on the 
assistance provided. 
As with international literature, this means the majority of stakeholder perspectives and 
conclusions have been drawn from grey literature. This material is, therefore, subject to the 
same concerns which relate to publication bias and the validity of findings.  
Most studies focus on the Australian Defence Force’s coordination 
Within civil-military coordination grey literature, most reports focus on Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) coordination efforts, rather than the NZDF. Lipner and Henley’s (2010) study, for 
example, explored how NGOs perceived Australia’s coordination in HADR (Lipner and Henley, 
2010). This illustrated poor communication between the ADF and NGOs, and that coordination 
often relied on personal relationships. Humanitarian stakeholders also felt these obstacles 
reduced the effectiveness of Australia’s WoG response, describing this as a “missed 
opportunity” to create a more cohesive civil-military response (Lipner and Henley, 2010, p.19). 
More recent analyses have also been published by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (GoA, 2017b) and the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) (2018). Although all 
conclude that the ADF’s civil-military coordination efforts were successful, barriers to 
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coordination are also identified (ACMC, 2018).57 These reports highlight the need for further 
research, to determine whether, or not, the same issues are impacting the NZDF’s coordination. 
Methodological weaknesses 
An examination of these reports, however, exposes some conflicts of interest. This is because 
almost all of the reports above were either State-funded or undertaken by Government and 
military personnel (GoA, 2017b, GoA, 2017a, ADF, 2016). Even Lipner and Henley’s (2010) 
report was undertaken by the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID)58  and 
ACMC,59 which are, on inspection, institutions funded by the GoA. 
In addition, most lessons learned workshops undertaken after Pacific HADR responses are 
sponsored or co-hosted by the GoA, UN or Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). This 
could hinder open discussion, as many of the INGOs and stakeholders in attendance receive 
substantial funding from these donors, during HADR or WoG responses. As discussed in 
Anderson’s (2012) work, these considerations may  reduce stakeholders willingness to critique 
State or military efforts.  
Local stakeholder and affected population perspectives are also often not included in studies, 
despite their importance. In contrast, most State-funded reports often draw findings from 
interviews with Government, military personnel and INGOs (GoA, 2017b, ADF, 2016, HQ JFNZ, 
2016). This gap in research is concerning as it means vital feedback from key HADR stakeholders 
is not being included in reports.  
 
ii. Critiques of coordination in Pacific HADR 
 
Within grey literature, stakeholders in the Pacific have raised general concerns about how 
foreign actors plan and provide assistance in HADR. Organisations such as the Fiji Women’s 
Crisis Centre (FWCC) and Pacific Women’s Network Against Violence Against Women have, for 
example, reported that local leaders frequently accept foreign aid without question, due to a 
shortage of resources (FWCC, 2018, Radio New Zealand, 2018). In some cases, this aid 
reportedly does “more harm than good,” as it fails to meet community needs or result in 
positive development progress (FWCC, 2018).  
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Donors and INGOs have also been accused of competing and coordinating poorly in Pacific 
HADR responses. These issues are linked to foreign actors failing to communicate with local 
agencies, affected communities and women (FWCC, 2018, Radio New Zealand, 2018).  
Collectively, these issues have led to calls for improved coordination between local and foreign 
agencies, as well as between the military and civilian actors (WHS Regional Consultation for the 
Pacific, 2015, FWCC, 2018, Dateline Pacific, 2016b). 
Severe humanitarian and gender-based needs 
Stakeholders also suggest that poor coordination in HADR has meant issues, such as violence 
against women, gender inequality and human rights, are not being appropriately addressed 
(Dateline Pacific, 2016b, FWCC, 2018). Sagar’s (2015) work discusses how these issues are 
compounded by disasters, in a region with already unacceptably high levels of poverty and 
gender-based violence.60 These factors also mean that vulnerable sectors of populations’ are 
often disproportionately affected in the aftermath of disasters. 
Allegations are also made about donors and foreign actors are not adhering to their 
international obligations. Several reports, for example, indicate that the requirements of UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on ‘Women Peace and Security’ (2000) are not being 
met by assisting actors (CARE International, 2017, Oxfam, 2018, FWCC, 2018). This resolution 
requires all UN member States and supporting actors to engage women in relief and recovery 
processes, provide assistance which is informed by gender analysis, and address the unique 
needs of females in HADR. Yet despite the most actors, including the GoNZ ratifying UNSCR 
1325, women continue to be excluded from the development planning and, at times, 
distribution of certain donors (CARE International, 2017, Oxfam, 2018). 
The recent application of UNSCR 1325 in military models 
Although no research has examined the NZDF’s application of UNSCR 1325, one publication 
implies that the ADF used a ‘Women Peace and Security’ approach in the TC Winston response 
(HQ JOC, 2016, p.1).61 ADF literature stated that this was the first time the military had applied 
a gender-inclusive approach.  
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The model reportedly enhanced civil-military coordination between the ADF, civilian agencies 
and women (HQ JOC, 2016).62 Officials stated that the relationships established by the Gender 
Advisors resulted in:  
“improved civil-military cooperation, coordination and understanding. In 
particular, [NGOs] have been willing to share their Gender Analysis with 
[ADF] Gender Advisors to plan future crisis response” (HQ JOC, 2016, p.4). 
While these outcomes were positive, some factors suggest the model remains in its infancy. For 
example, two of the three Gender Advisors deployed were not appointed until approximately 
day-nine of the response (HQ JOC, 2016).63 This late appointment may suggest that the 
approach was improvised as the response developed. 
The recent introduction of UNSCR 1325 into military models does, however, highlight another 
valuable contribution this research can make to scholarship. This relates to how the NZDF has 
coordinated with female stakeholders, in Pacific HADR responses.  
 
iii. Civil-military coordination mechanisms in the Pacific  
 
Over the last two decades, many mechanisms have been adopted to regulate and improve civil-
military coordination in Pacific HADR. Yet surprisingly, minimal research has focused on how 
these mechanisms impact coordination and actors’ assistance. Where available, analyses of 
these models are discussed below, alongside brief descriptions of how they function. 
UN guidelines for the use of military assets 
Without a doubt, the ‘Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in 
Disaster Relief’ are the most discussed mechanism in scholarship (UN OCHA, 2007). These were 
created by the UN in 1994 and are commonly known as the ‘Oslo guidelines’ (UN OCHA, 2007, 
p.4).64 Although these guidelines are voluntary and non-binding, all UN member States have 
agreed to adhere to them (MFAT, 2012b).65 
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Despite this State endorsement, debate continues to surround key principles in the Oslo 
Guidelines. These include the principle of “last resort,” which states that military assets should 
only be requested and deployed when no comparable civilian alternative exists and these are 
necessary to meet a critical humanitarian need (UN OCHA, 2007, para 5). Other contested 
principles include one which states that militaries should, to the extent possible, not provide 
‘direct assistance’ to the affected population.66 These and other rules ultimately aim to ensure 
a separation is maintained between militaries and civilian actors. 
The applicability of the Oslo guidelines in the Pacific  
While the UN, most humanitarian agencies and States reportedly support the use of these 
guidelines, other stakeholders question their applicability in the Pacific (Salmon et al., 2011, UN 
OCHA, 2015b, Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2016, Gordon and Donini, 2016). Pacific-based 
reports suggest international processes may not be an appropriate ‘fit’ for the region (Barber, 
2015, Australian Red Cross, 2017). Foreign militaries are also observed to be the first assets 
deployed in the Asia-Pacific, which suggest is because they are viewed as a valuable or 
necessary contribution to HADR (Powles, 2016, Ear et al., 2017). These views raise questions 
about how stakeholders in the Pacific perceive the Oslo Guidelines and military involvement in 
HADR. 
The Asia-Pacific regional guidelines 
Following these observations, the ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign 
Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations’ (APC-MADRO Guidelines) were created 
(UN OCHA, 2014). These were adopted in 2014 and, conspicuously, do not discuss the principle 
of ‘last resort’ in the text.  
While no independent literature has examined the effectiveness of the Oslo or APC-MADRO 
Guidelines in the Pacific, Bollettino (2016) investigated their use in the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan 
response.67 His study concluded that less than half of the humanitarians interviewed were 
“familiar” with the Oslo guidelines and only 12% used these to guide civil-military interaction 
(Bollettino, 2016, p.8). Findings in this thesis are, therefore, valuable as they may clarify how 
the Oslo and APC-MADR guidelines have impacted coordination in past Pacific HADR responses. 
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UN Civil-Military Coordination mechanisms 
Several UN civil-military coordination mechanisms are also discussed in this thesis. These were 
established by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Regional 
Office for Asia and the Pacific (OCHA ROAP), which maintain their application.68 All are 
deployed at the request of affected governments and are, therefore, voluntary. 
Keynote mechanisms include the Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT)69 and UN Civil-Military 
Coordination (CMCoord) officers (Reario, 2015, OCHA ROP, 2016).70 Humanitarian coordination 
is also often organised within a regional ‘Cluster Approach,’ which is based on the UN Cluster 
System model.71 Together, these structures pool PHT and humanitarian partner resources into 
thematic ‘clusters.’ These then work with the UN CMCoord officer who facilitates 
communication and, at times, interaction between military LOs and humanitarian agencies. 
Divergent stakeholder perspectives on UN mechanisms 
While most UN-initiated studies and officials report that these mechanisms enhance 
coordination efforts, some stakeholder perspectives challenge these views. For example, UN 
post-disaster reports suggest these mechanisms have provided “indispensable liaison support” 
in Pacific HADR (UNDAC, 2015a, Lacey-Hall, 2015, p.1). In contrast, an independent evaluation 
of OCHA’s role in civil-military coordination concluded that stakeholder opinions were “mixed” 
concerning the and suitability of OCHA to carry out CMCoord (Universalia Management Group, 
2012, p.52).72 Wolf (2017) also reports that some humanitarians consider the UN’s CMCoord 
role in HADR as “intrusive and unnecessary,” while national governments can feel this is a 
challenge to State sovereignty. 
These concerns have been acknowledged in recent conferences. One UN official, for example, 
stressed the need to ‘rethink’ how current models are applied, as behaviour could inadvertently 
suggest actors were trying to “replace, rather than augment” national HADR responses (Lacey-
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 OCHA has administered the Regional Office for the Pacific (OCHA ROAP) since 1999, which is based in Fiji and exists to 
support 14 Pacific nations. These UN agencies work with Governments, National Disaster management Offices (NDMOs) and 
humanitarian actors, to support HADR efforts and emergency coordination in the Pacific region. 
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 The Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT) was established in 2008. It is a network of humanitarian partners which can support 
government-led responses, when requested. PHT members include the UN agencies, NGOs, the IFRC and other humanitarian 
agencies with the capacity to respond to disasters in accordance with the PHT Code of Conduct. 
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 These facilitate communication and, at times, interaction between humanitarian and military actors. These efforts are mostly 
limited to humanitarian or civilian Requests For Assistance (RFAs) and logistical support. The RFA system and forms aim to 
streamline humanitarian requests for the use of foreign military assets. 
71
 The Cluster Approach was an outcome of the UN’s humanitarian reform in 2005. This sought to strengthen the capacity of 
the humanitarian response system. Generally, the approach is a mechanism employed by the UN and broader aid community to 
address identified gaps in response and enhance the quality of humanitarian action. The basic idea of the approach is to 
organise humanitarian actors into sectors or ‘clusters,’ each focused on a separate humanitarian need. Each cluster is led by a 
designated lead agency which has responsibility for the coordination of that cluster, as well as to act as ‘provider of last resort.’ 
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Hall, 2015, p.3). This critique was similarly reflected in Barber’s  (2015) analysis of the TC Pam 
response, which implied there was a ‘default assumption’ that international mechanisms would 
be used by the GoV.73  
The contrasting views above suggest that an in-depth investigation into stakeholder 
perspectives would be valuable, to better understand how these view UN CMCoord structures. 
The FRANZ Agreement  
The ‘France, Australia and New Zealand Agreement for the South Pacific Region’ (FRANZ 
Agreement) is also a longstanding framework in the Pacific, which has been used since its 
establishment in 1992. This enables military assets from FRANZ partners to provide HADR to 
twelve Pacific island countries (MFAT, 2014).74 This coordination is undertaken by the 
respective FRANZ Foreign Affairs departments of these militaries.  
As with UN mechanisms, stakeholder perspectives vary surrounding the application of the 
FRANZ Agreement. Government press releases and articles often report how the agreement 
fostered civil-military coordination. They also reiterate that FRANZ States and militaries are 
committed to respecting the “sovereignty and leading role” of affected countries in HADR, as 
well as the principles within the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative (MFAT, 2014, 
p.1).  
In contrast, Vachette’s (2013) work discusses the relative power differences between FRANZ 
partners and small Pacific island countries. She also reports that Pacific-based stakeholders are 
often suspicious of these ex-colonial nations, and being subjugated in HADR contexts. This 
disparity between FRANZ and stakeholder perspectives raises questions relevant to this thesis. 
In particular, these surround how affected Governments may view the assistance of FRANZ 
militaries, including the NZDF. 
National coordination structures  
According to international law, the affected State should maintain primary responsibility for the 
“initiation, organisation, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within 
its territory” (UN General Assembly, 1991, Annex 1.4). This responsibility can, however, also 
have negative impacts on civil-military coordination. Authors suggest this is because 
infrastructure and national structures are often weakened by natural disasters, which can 
reduce the State’s capacity to coordinate (Ferris, 2012).  
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 These Pacific nations are: the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, 




In general, national coordination structures in the Pacific are strained in the aftermath of 
disasters. For example, National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs) frequently experience 
leadership, communication and coordination challenges due to a lack of capacity (Connors and 
Ayobi, 2016).75 Pacific island nations also often lack legislation and policies, to regulate civil-
military coordination (Soldateschi, 2011, GoV and SPC, 2015, IFRC, 2016, GoF and SPC, 2017).  
The aforementioned factors can create a dilemma for stakeholders, which are legally obligated 
to respect State authority over HADR responses but also meet humanitarian needs. Reports 
suggest this has led to some actors to act independently, which is interpreted as disrespectful 
or an affront to Sovereignty by local officials and organisations (GoV and SPC, 2015, Barber, 
2015). This has led many local actors to call for greater ‘localisation’ in Pacific HADR responses 
(WHS, 2015, Australian Red Cross, 2017).76  
Considering the growing calls for localisation and the relative power difference between foreign 
militaries and affected nations, this thesis provides a valuable opportunity to explore how the 
NZDF was perceived by locally-based stakeholders, in previous HADR responses.  
 
Part Four: New Zealand’s approach to Pacific HADR 
i. GoNZ and NZDF Guidance material  
 
WoG leadership and ‘command and control’ arrangements 
Since the 1990’s, New Zealand has become increasingly involved Pacific HADR. Military and 
civilian agencies have also been progressively integrated, to the point that HADR responses are 
now undertaken via a Whole of Government (WoG)77 approach (MFAT, 2019). These changes 
reflect global trends, regarding the militarisation of HADR and the integration of civil-military 
relief efforts (ACMC, 2012, Hartwell, 2016, Harris, 2016a).  
WoG ‘command and control’ arrangements are detailed in both GoNZ and NZDF documents.78  
These clarify that MFAT will act as lead agency in all GoNZ HADR responses in the South Pacific 
(MFAT, 2012b). This means that while the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) retains full 
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 Although there has been significant foreign investment in National Disaster Management Offices (NDMO’s) and structures 
across the Pacific, reports continue to call for efforts to strengthen local capacity. Most funding has been provided by the UN, 
European Union, the GoA and GoNZ (within Official Development Assistance or Aid budgets). 
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 Localisation is defined as: a process of recognising, respecting and strengthening the independence of leadership and 
decision making by national actors in humanitarian action, in order to better address the needs of affected populations. 
77
 While some documents also refer to this approach as an All of Government (AOG) response, the term WoG is used 
throughout this thesis as most GoNZ reports use this term. 
78
 The term ‘command and control’ is a term used by the military, which is also interchangeable with the term ‘C2.’ It means a 
process that commanders or command organisations use to plan, direct, coordinate and control their own and friendly forces 




command of all military personnel, WoG responses are ultimately civilian-led (HQ JFNZ, 
2019a).79 Documents also state that civil-military coordination is facilitated within coordination 
hubs. These are established by MFAT in the Emergency Coordination Centre in Wellington, and 
in New Zealand High Commissions in affected countries (HQ JFNZ, 2019a).80 
These policies mean NZDF personnel and assets are always deployed in a supporting role, 
alongside civilian members of the Emergency Task Force (ETF) (MFAT, 2012a, p.6).81 This 
ensures the GoNZ and MFAT maintain control over deployed military elements. 
The aim and purpose of WoG and NZDF responses 
Both GoNZ and NZDF policy clarify that WoG responses aim to meet humanitarian needs. For 
example, MFAT’s ‘Policy and Strategies for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Risk 
Reduction’ states the WoG approach aims to achieve an “effective needs-based response to, 
and recovery from, emergencies” (MFAT, 2012b, p.3, 5). Actors in a WoG response will, 
therefore, adhere to the following requirements: 
1. Respect national government authority. 
2. Respond to requests for humanitarian assistance based on assessed needs, availability 
of resources, security of access to affected populations and the ability to determine 
New Zealand’s effectiveness and impact.  
3. Focus on vulnerable people (MFAT, 2012b). 
The NZDF’s ‘Contingency Plan Number 102: Pacific’ (CONPLAN 102) further clarifies that 
military HADR deployments aim to: 
“provide appropriate military support to minimise loss of life or injury, 
support the welfare of the affected county’s population and liaise with the 
affected country to ensure unity of effort, coordination response and civil-
military cooperation” (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.8). 
NZDF support will then be withdrawn when the military’s “HADR effect” has been delivered and 
met the “GoNZ intent” (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.8).82 This aim, however, implies that NZDF HADR 
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 Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) has Operational Command of all the Initial Assessment Team (IAT), Joint 
Command and Reconnaissance Team (JCART) and Force Elements assigned as part of a Joint Task Group (JTG). 
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 Disaster relief efforts are coordinated from the Emergency Coordination Centre, which is based in MFAT headquarters in 
Wellington. WoG coordination centres are also often established in the New Zealand High Commissions in affected Pacific 
island nations. New Zealand has consular services in the following Pacific island nations: Cook Islands, Fiji, Hawaii, Kiribati, 
Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Communications 
between the NZDF and NGOs that may be operating in the affected country are also arranged through MFAT officials in 
country. 
81
 ETF agencies include the New Zealand Ministry of Health, Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ), Police, Red Cross, INGO 
and NGOs, as well as actors from FRANZ partner countries. NGOs are represented by the Council of International Development. 
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remains focused on State and military objectives, rather than humanitarian needs. This subtlety 
in the text appears to reinforce the concerns of some authors, which are discussed in the 
section relating to ‘the tensions and challenges of civil-military coordination’ (Metcalfe et al., 
2012, De Siervo, 2012, Powles, 2016).83  
 
ii. GoNZ and NZDF international and humanitarian obligations 
 
According to GoNZ policy, all WoG HADR responses must be undertaken in accordance with the 
international legal obligations and agreements the country is signatory to (MFAT, 2012a, MFAT, 
2019). These obligations are laid out in human rights conventions, UNSCR’s, the Oslo and APC-
MADRO Guidelines and the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles (MFAT, 2012a, p.4, 
GHD Initiative, 2013, GHD Initiative, 2016).84 Collectively, they require WoG actors, including 
the NZDF, to provide HADR in accordance with the ‘humanitarian principles’ (MFAT, 2012b).  
GoNZ and NZDF application of HADR principles 
While no studies have examined how WoG actors or the NZDF adhere to the above obligations 
in HADR, recent measures have aimed to increase actors’ accountability. New Zealand’s 
‘National Action Plan’ for UNSCR 1325, for example, describes GoNZ and NZDF plans to 
implement this resolution (GoNZ, 2015). CONPLAN 102 also states that the NZDF will:  
“ensure all relevant aspects relating to [Women, Peace and Security] are 
considered during planning and implemented during any HADR activity” (HQ 
JFNZ, 2019a, p.12).  
Several allusions to UNSCRs and the civil-military guidelines also suggest that the NZDF is 
bolstering its efforts to adhere to international obligations. Aspects of the Oslo and APC-
MADRO Guidelines are, for example, referred to in policy. CONPLAN 102 states that NZDF 
assets should only be employed as a “last resort” and “on the basis that suitable and sufficient 
civilian capability is not available, in the time required to meet critical humanitarian needs” (HQ 
JFNZ, 2019a, p.4).  
The NZDF’s ‘Forward Leaning Approach’ to HADR deployments is also described. This involves 
the military providing “proactive support” to MFAT as disasters are forecast and offering the 
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 This tension surrounds the idea that military involvement in HADR may be more motivated by State interests, rather than the 
humanitarian principles. 
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 Other international codes and guidelines include: International Disaster Response Law Guidelines; Principles of Conduct for 
the International Red Cross Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes; Principles agreed under the Busan Aid 
Effectiveness Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation; The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum 
Standards in Humanitarian Response; and Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations 




“immediate deployment” of some units (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.3).85 A footnote clarifies, however, 
that this aim “does not imply that NZDF is the lead agency or first responder to an emergency or 
disaster” (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.3). While somewhat paradoxical, this suggests the NZDF is trying 
to balance the Oslo guidelines with a rapid military response. 
 
iii. NZDF models and mechanisms 
 
Minimal guidance material on how HADR models function 
In line with GoNZ intentions to enhance NZDF HADR and interagency capabilities, a number of 
civil-military coordination models have been introduced over the last two decades. Minimal 
literature, however, describes these models or how interoperability will actually be achieved. 
New Zealand Defence Doctrine (NZDD), for example, describes the requirement for “a large 
degree of civil-military interaction” in HADR and comprehensive approaches. It, however, 
contains little detail around how this will be achieved (NZDF, 2017b, sect 3.50).86 CONPLAN 102 
also describes how Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) teams and the DJIATF are deployed, but 
does not clarify how they function in HADR contexts.87 
A report published by the Non-Government Disaster Relief Forum (NDRF) (NDRF, 2016a) also 
critiqued the 2016 Defence White Paper. The analysis highlighted that the White Paper had 
failed to detail how the military intended to integrate with the robust humanitarian system in 
the South Pacific, despite this being a major defence priority (NDRF, 2016a, GoNZ, 2016, Sect 
5:47).88 In its conclusion, the report recommended the NZDF to work more closely with OGAs 
and NGOs, to better clarify actors’ roles and develop civil-military coordination guidance 
material.  
Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) models 
Due to this lack of clarity, the ‘Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Domestic and 
Offshore Aide Memoire’ (HQ JFNZ, 2019b) is likely the best public resource describing the 
NZDF’s HADR operations. It contains operational-level guidance and describes key lessons 
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 This deployment is, however, limited by the need to give military personnel and assets notice for departure, which can be 
between twelve or twenty-four hours, depending on the unit or asset. 
86
 The document defines a comprehensive approach as: “an approach that responds effectively to complex crises by 
orchestrating, coordinating, and deconflicting the activities of the military, other government departments, and, where possible, 
international organisations and non-governmental organisations.” 
87
 It is possible more details are included in the Annexes of this document. These were not, however, provided to the 
researcher due to classification and security issues. 
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 While the White Paper recommended the NZDF enhance interoperability by developing: “complementary capabilities, as 
appropriate, ensuring mutual familiarity (developed through personnel exchanges and exercising), and the compatibility of 




learned from previous responses (HQ JFNZ, 2019b, p.19-25).89 The document was, however, 
published in 2019, which only the 2012 version existed at the time of the TC Pam and Winston 
responses (HQ JFNZ, 2012). In comparison, this focused on HADR in a New Zealand context, 
rather than in the Pacific. 
NZDF literature also contains little information around how Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) 
models are applied by the force. For example, the 2012 Aide Memoir describes the need to 
establish models such as a CIMIC Centre and CIMIC teams in HADR, but provides no description 
of how these function (HQ JFNZ, 2012, sect 1.19.4).90 CONPLAN 102 acknowledges that “CIMIC- 
HADR activities inherently involve significant CIMIC planning and tasks” and that responses will 
usually involve a CIMIC cell, but provides no further unclassified details (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, 
p.12).91 The term CIMIC is also, rather conspicuously, missing from the new 2019 HADR Aide 
Memoir. 
This lack of clarity around CIMIC models is also reported in international case studies, which 
suggest that CIMIC models are often not well understood or are applied in an ad hoc manner by 
militaries (Haugevik and de Carvalho, 2007, Soeters et al., 2014, Smith, 2015). 
Coalition and ADF guidance material 
The lack of defence doctrine on these concepts means most NZDF descriptions of CIMIC 
elements are drawn from coalition or ADF doctrine (ABCA, 2008, ADF, 2009).92 Within this,  the 
role of CIMIC operational support teams is described as the provision of “expertise, CIMIC 
liaison and staff assistance in planning, coordinating and/or executing CIMIC activities in 
support of a [Joint Task Force]” (ADF, 2009, Sect 4.13).  CIMIC disaster assessment teams are 
also, reportedly, likely to  coordinate with civilian representatives from the Lead Agency, Host 
Nation, INGOs and NGOs, during disaster responses (ADF, 2009, Sect 4.13-17).  
The fact that these ADF and coalition documents are not specific to the NZDF or Pacific region 
raises questions about the applicability of these documents and models for the NZDF. The lack 
of clarity around how the NZDF uses CIMIC teams is also particularly concerning, as CIMIC 
teams were deployed by the NZDF during both the TC Pam and Winston response. This 
highlights a further contribution this research makes to literature, through exploring the NZDF’s 
use of CIMIC in past responses. 
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 These include the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, 2015 TC Pam, 2016 TC Winston, and 2017 Kaikoura earthquake. 
90
 The document states that the CIMIC Centre should contain representatives of the Lead Agency (MFAT or Affected 
Government), LOs and staff from; Life Line utilities (e.g. ports, airports, electricity, hospitals, gas, fire services), local 
government, military, OGAs and NGOs. 
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‘American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies Coalition Operations Handbook’ and the ‘Australian 




The new DJIATF model 
The DJIATF model is, however, described in slightly more detail in NZDF literature. This model 
was adopted in 2014, to address previous concerns around ad hoc ‘command and control’ 
arrangements and interoperability (NZDF, 2014). It is described as a scalable, operational-level 
command and control capability, which is deployed in joint inter-agency or multinational 
operations, such as Pacific HADR (NZDF, 2014).  
DJIATF staff support WoG efforts by providing MFAT with military options and planning 
capabilities. These elements can consist of an Initial Assessment Team (IAT)93 and a Joint 
Command and Reconnaissance Team (JCART)94 (HQ JFNZ, 2019b). The unit can also seconder 
staff from other NZDF units for HADR responses, to act as LOs to provide service-specific 
expertise.95 Overall, these measures aim to strengthen working relationships, information-
sharing and cooperation with national actors and OGAs.  
Application of the DJIATF model in HADR 
As with the application of other civil-military coordination mechanisms, stakeholder 
perspectives on the DJIATF vary significantly. NZDF media and reports, for example, suggest the 
introduction of model enhanced civil-military coordination efforts during the Southern Katipo 
civil-military exercise,96 as well as in Vanuatu and Fiji (Gall, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2019b).  
In contrast, an independent examination suggests the DJIATF encountered obstacles to 
coordination, during the TC Winston response (Roddis, 2016).97 Findings were collated the 
perspectives of twelve stakeholders from the NZDF, GoNZ, GoF, humanitarian agencies and 
community representatives. These suggested that while the DJIATF model was mitigating some 
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 The IAT is a small team comprising of four personnel that deploys at the invitation of the lead agency. It is commanded by a 
Major, with the remainder of the team comprising a Logistics, Intelligence and an Environmental/ Health specialist. The IAT is 
responsible for providing advice on what military effects can be achieved, coupled with military planning to the New Zealand 
lead agency (often the New Zealand High Commission) but is on hand to respond to Requests for Information, which assists 
with informing planning at the joint operational level. 
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 HQ DJIATF has the capacity to form one JCART, which is intended to deploy on command after an event. This is a tool to 
develop situational awareness through the conduct of reconnaissance and liaison in theatre. The JCART role is to provide expert 
advice on contingency planning and operational issues, including force composition, logistics, command and control, and 
communications. Up to twelve NZDF personnel will form the nucleus of the Light HQ, should it subsequently deploy. 
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 For example, a representative from the Royal New Zealand Air Force, Navy and New Zealand Army can act as separate Liaison 
Officers to provide expertise on asset capabilities.  
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assets. It offers the NZDF an opportunity to work with its international defence partners, particularly those in the Pacific region. 
The joint exercise involves naval, land and air assets and often includes personnel from other countries, such as Australia, 
Canada, Fiji, France, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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 The researchers’ unpublished Honours dissertation, focused on the application of the DJIATF model in the TC Winston 
response. This collated perceptions of the NZDF’s TC Winston response from desk based literature and twelve semi-structured 




obstacles to civil-military coordination, the unit’s effectiveness was still constrained by other 
barriers, such as disaster politics and actors’ interests.98  
This discrepancy between the grey literature and stakeholder perspectives is concerning. It also 
reinforces the need for further research, to explain why the literature and actual stakeholder 
perspectives appear to be inconsistent. 
Historical reports of ‘ad hoc’ civil-military coordination 
While few studies have examined the NZDF’s coordination efforts in the Pacific, previous 
academic studies have raised concerns about the military’s models and policies. Jacobs-Garrod 
(2010), for example, investigated the NZDF’s coordination with NGOs in the Bosnia, East Timor 
and Afghanistan in her PhD thesis. Her research revealed that NZDF and NGO personnel lacked 
an understanding of the NZDF’s CIMIC doctrine and protocol. This contributed to ‘ad hoc’ 
coordination in all three case studies. Poor NZDF-NGO coordination also reportedly reduced the 
effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, as well as the NZDF’s ability to carry out its mission. 
This led Jacobs-Garrod to recommend that the NZDF develop a Civil-Military Affairs doctrine 
and create a specialist unit or personnel to undertake CIMIC tasks. 
Coordination issues have also been identified in the context of natural disasters.  Jones’s (2011) 
analysis of the 2010 Christchurch Earthquake, for example, described communication, 
‘command and control’ and coordination issues between the NZDF, GoNZ agencies, NGO’s and 
local actors. Mosley’s (2012) research into the 2009 Samoan Tsunami response discussed 
weaknesses in the NZDF’s operational planning and logistical support (Royal New Zealand Navy) 
vessels. Fogarty (2014) also linked civil-military coordination issues to a lack of realistic training 
and simulation exercises for NZDF personnel. This included exercises failing to incorporate 
HADR scenarios or include key disaster responders, such as humanitarian actors and MFAT. 
These works suggest NZDF operations have been impeded by common obstacles to civil-
military coordination in the past. Analysis of more recent Pacific HADR responses is, therefore, 
needed to determine whether or not these obstacles are continuing to impede coordination. 
   
Chapter One summary 
In the chapter above, key sections of the civil-military coordination literature were examined. 
Theoretical concepts were discussed in Part One, which discussed the increasing complexity of 
civil-military relations and the on-going debate over integration and separation. In Part Two 
weaknesses and gaps in existing literature became evident. Concerns particularly surrounded 
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the scarcity of empirical research in HADR contexts and identifying obstacles to civil-military 
coordination. 
Similar research gaps were identified in Part Three, which examined civil-military coordination 
in the Pacific HADR context. This section revealed that despite having numerous coordination 
mechanisms in the Pacific, few studies have investigated their effectiveness or how 
stakeholders perceive them. Part Four then reviewed New Zealand’s WoG HADR approach and 
civil-military coordination models. This found a lack of clarity within GoNZ and NZDF policies, 
particularly around how models function in the Pacific. Throughout all four parts, discrepancies 
were identified between grey literature, the academic research and stakeholder perspectives. 
Collectively, these sections reinforce the need for this study and to find answers to the 
proposed research questions. A comparative analysis of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in 
past Pacific HADR responses is, therefore, crucial. This is needed to better understand 
stakeholder perceptions, identify any obstacles to civil-military coordination and how these 
may be impacting actors’ assistance. These findings are examined in the following chapters, 





Chapter Two: A Tidal Wave of Foreign Assistance 
 
The chapter below presents findings from grey literature data, which depicted civil-military 
coordination in the TC Pam disaster response. The scope of the case study includes all 
coordination taking place in New Zealand and Vanuatu, between 07 March and 22 April 2015.99  
The chapter is presented in two parts. Part One provides the reader with the context needed to 
understand the NZDF's civil-military coordination response. Part Two then reports how 
stakeholder perspectives of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination were portrayed in grey 
literature. This includes reports of obstacles to coordination and their impact on HADR.  
 
Part One: Overview of the TC Pam disaster and response  
 
The sections below describe key elements of the TC Pam disaster and civil-military 
coordination. They provide an overview of the disaster scale and humanitarian needs, the 
overall HADR response and a description of the civil-military coordination mechanisms. This 
provides the context needed to understand the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts, which 
are examined in Part Two. 
i. Disaster scale and humanitarian needs 
 
Between 12 and 14 March, 2015 TC Pam passed through all five of Vanuatu’s provinces.100 
Twenty-two islands were impacted and experienced hurricane-force winds of up to 320 
kilometres an hour (ABC News, 2015b). Catastrophic damage and severe humanitarian needs 
remained in affected areas. These included Epi Island and the Shepherds Island group, where 
the NZDF assistance was later provided (see the centre of Figure 1).  
At the time, the Category 5 storm was the most powerful cyclone ever recorded in the South 
Pacific.101 These factors made the disaster response extremely challenging, by global standards. 
This was reflected on by the director of Save the Children Vanuatu, who stated, 
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 These dates include coordination which occurred the week before the cyclone event and all interaction which took place up 
until HMNZS Canterbury departed from Vanuatu on 22 April 2015.  
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 The Category 5 cyclone travelled in a southerly direction, severely affecting all areas shaded orange in the diagram. 
Vanuatu’s five Provinces are depicted in Figure 1. Impacted islands were: Torres and Banks (Torba Province), Pentecost, Ambae 
and Maewo (Penama Province), Malekula, Ambrym and Paama (Malampa Province), Efate, Epi Island and the Shepherds island 
group (Shefa Province), and Tanna, Aniwa, Futuna, Erromango and Aneityum (Tafea Province). 
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 Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale describes a cyclone with winds of over 252 kilometres an hour. This scale suggests 
catastrophic damage will occur, including a high percentage of framed homes destroyed and power outages which may last for 




"I was present for the Haiyan response and I would 100 per cent tell you that 
this is a much more difficult logistical problem.” (New Zealand Herald, 
2015a)102  
 
Figure 1: Path of TC Pam. Source: (GoV, 2015a, p.3) 
 
Although communities in Vanuatu frequently encounter natural disasters, TC Pam was beyond 
the scale of anything previously experienced (United Nations, 2014).103  Approximately 188,000 
individuals were affected −  approximately 74% of the population (GoV, 2015a, p.1). 
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Widespread power outages and severed communication lines also isolated many villages in the 
initial response (BBC News, 2015, UN OCHA, 2015c, p.7).104  
As a result, significant humanitarian needs were reported. In some areas, over 90% of 
residential housing was destroyed (GoV, 2015a, p.4, UNDAC, 2015b).105 High proportions of 
health facilities and schools were also damaged, creating major disruptions to medical and 
education services (GoV, 2015a, p.4).106  
Crop damage also meant food sources were depleted within weeks, in severely affected areas 
(UN OCHA, 2015a).107 These shortages affected up to 80% of the population, who relied on 
agriculture for their livelihood, food and nutrition security (GoV, 2015c, p.2-4). The Post-
Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) indicated the most vulnerable sectors of the population, 
such as youth, women and those with disabilities, were the most severely impacted (GoV, 
2015c, xiv). 
In total, the damages and losses caused by the cyclone were estimated at 48.6 billion Vatu -  
64% of Vanuatu’s GDP (GoV, 2015c, ix, IDA, 2015, p.3).108 Even following a successful Flash 
Appeal by the UN, international donations were not enough to adequately address all the 
aforementioned needs (UN CERF, 2015).109 One GoV official highlighted the challenging 
situation this put the government in, stating: 
"This is the time of most need, and we're going to need a lot of assistance, so 
we're pretty much counting on our development partners to come forward 
now with financial assistance and other assistance because we can't get 
through this on our own." (ABC News, 2015a) 
The financial, logistical and communication challenges described above contributed to foreign 
militaries such as the NZDF playing a significant role in the TC Pam response. Effective civil-
                                                      
104
 Only one operational cellular tower remained in Port Vila following TC Pam, restricting the mainland’s communication with 
outer islands. Widespread power failures also isolated some affected communities into mid-April.  
105
 The Humanitarian Action Plan reported up to 90% of houses were damaged on the islands of Tongoa, Emae and Erromango. 
Other sources reported that 90,000 individuals needed housing repairs. 
106
 Up to 70% of health facilities and over 50% of primary and secondary schools sustained damage or were destroyed. 
107
 UN OCHA estimated that food sources in Tafea and Shefa Province would only last until 25 March, less than two weeks 
following the cyclone. 
108
 These damages and losses equate to NZ $633 million. The UN considers Vanuatu one of the world's least developed 
countries. It has a GDP of US $828 million with about two-thirds of the population make a living from agriculture.  
109
 Figures suggest that of the US $37.7 million required to meet needs, only US $26.8 million was received. An overview of 
reported funding is included in Annex Four. This highlights two key issues, first, that the GoV faced a significant financial 
shortfall, meaning some needs would likely not be met. Second, much of the assistance came in the form of donated supplies or 
was channelled through UN agencies, the IFRC and INGOs. The latter highlights that although much-needed support was 




military coordination was therefore vital, as actors needed to work together to ensure the 
affected population’s needs were met and that the most vulnerable received assistance. 
ii. Overview of the national and international response 
 
The initial response 
At the onset of the disaster the GoV was clear that national actors would take control of the 
HADR response and its coordination. National disaster management structures were stood up, 
although their capacity was limited by the cyclone’s direct impact on the capital, Port Vila 
(Vanuatu NDMO, 2015a, p.8).110 This factor and the growing awareness of humanitarian needs 
led the GoV to accept offers of international and military assistance quickly.  
A large influx of stakeholders soon arrived in the country. In total, twenty foreign 
governments,111 seven foreign militaries,112 over one hundred INGOs, NGOs and independent 
agencies contributed to the response (UNDAC, 2015a, p.6).113 At the time, this made the TC 
Pam response the most substantial case of civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR. 
The NZDF and other foreign military assets were among the first to arrive in the country on 15 
March. This preceded the international appeal for assistance, which was televised by Vanuatu’s 
President the following day (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.13). The emotional nature of this appeal and 
the fact that it was broadcast from the UN World Conference on Disaster Risk and Reduction 
raised significant media interest in the response (The Guardian, 2015).114 This heightened 
media awareness contributed the uncontrolled influx of actors and donated goods arriving in 
Vanuatu, as well as the coordination challenges this number of stakeholders created. 
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 The Category 5 cyclone passed only fifty kilometres from Port Vila. As a result, although National Clusters met as early as 09 
March and the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) and National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) were 
activated on the 11th, many individuals within the disaster management structure were personally impacted and offered five 
days leave to recover. These coordination mechanisms are discussed in the section which details the civil-military coordination 
structures used in TC Pam. 
111
 The majority of Governments provided financial support, although some of this would go directly to the GoV most would be 
used to provide relief items or would be channelled through UN agencies, the IFRC and INGOs. Donor Governments included: 
Andorra, Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Estonia, France, French Polynesia, Germany, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, New Caledonia, India, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America.  
112
 Australia, France and New Zealand, provided military support under the FRANZ agreement, with other military assets being 
provided by Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga and the United Kingdom. These actors assisted the GoV with its disaster response, with 
the support of the Vanuatu Mobile Force and Police Patrol Boat. 
113
 Many humanitarian actors offered specific assistance, which was accepted by the GoV. This included support from; UN 
OCHA Regional Office for the Pacific (OCHA ROP), United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team, Pacific 
Humanitarian Team, and World Food Program. 
114
 Vanuatu’s President Baldwin Lonsdale requested “a helping hand" in the disaster while attending the UN World Conference 
on Disaster Risk and Reduction, in Sendai Japan. He discussed the humanitarian needs which needed to be met and listed 
several items which could be donated to help the emergency response. These statements later resulted in an influx of 
Unsolicited Bilateral Donations into the country, which further overwhelmed the national disaster management structure and 




Response priorities and data collection  
The GoV announced multiple priorities in the HADR response. These were initially the provision 
of life-saving aid such as “water, sanitation, food, health, shelter and key non-food items” (RedR 
Australia, 2015, GoV, 2015a). The prioritisation of restoring health and education services then 
followed (Radio New Zealand, 2015).115 Notably, damage and needs assessments were 
mandatory before HADR was to be delivered (SBS, 2015). GoV officials stated that this aimed to 
ensure “transparency, accountability and a fair distribution of relief supplies" (Cooke, 2015). 
Response priorities were, however, impeded by logistical, resource and communication 
challenges. For example, although officials reported that aid had reached all of the nation’s 
islands by the end of March, multiple sources refuted this claim (UN News Centre, 2015, 
Hawkins, 2015b, UNDAC, 2015a, p.11).116 The PDNA was also not completed until 18 April, over 
a month after the cyclone (GoV, 2015c, p.6).117 These factors presented challenges for 
supporting actors, as they relied on GoV sources to determine priorities and focus their 
assistance where it was most needed. 
Collectively, these factors led agencies and donors to call for greater visibility in future 
responses, to ensure their aid was being distributed according to humanitarian needs 
Foreign military support  
Partly due to these challenges, FRANZ and other foreign militaries played a crucial role in the 
response. These supported the GoV by providing logistical support, assisting with assessments, 
clearing debris and repairing infrastructure (French Embassy, 2015).118 Within the response, 
FRANZ militaries provided HADR in separate geographical locations, which were a top GoV 
priority (Cowlishaw and Downes, 2015, GoV, 2015b).119 The fact that these militaries were 
operating in areas which had the most severe humanitarian needs made civil-military 
coordination even more vital. 
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 The GoV aimed to get schools open as early as possible so the population could return to normalcy. It instructed all schools 
to reopen by 30 March, although many struggled due to damages and the fact they were being used as evacuation centres. 
116
 The GoV and UN reported on 27 March that aid had reached all twenty-two storm-affected islands in the country, with food 
for more than 160,000 people. This was contradicted by other sources, including a Radio New Zealand reporter based on 
Erromango Island. Local stakeholders reported that although a Government team had assessed the island two weeks prior, 
villages were yet to receive assistance on the 27th and only had enough food to last a few more days. UNDAC reports stated 
that approximately 85,000 individuals had received assistance by 05 April, as opposed to the 180,000 claimed. Other reports 
claimed that some communities did not receive assistance for six weeks. 
117
 The PDNA produced a detailed analysis of damages, losses, humanitarian needs and laid out a recovery strategy for the 
country. Although the GoV began initial damage assessments on 14 March, the report acknowledged that data collection 
challenges and a lack of logistical support had impeded efforts. 
118
 Vessels from FRANZ nations arrived as early as 19 March, with hundreds of embarked military personnel. 
119
 The French frigate Vendémiaire was to first to arrive on the 19th, focusing on Tanna, while the patrol boat La Glorieuse 
focused on the Tafea Province. The Australian logistics support ship HMAS Tobruk arrived on 24 March and also focused on 
Tanna. The NZDF’s multi-role vessel HMNZS Canterbury then arrived on 25 March and provided support in the Shefa Province, 




Some concerning obstacles to coordination and the distribution of HADR  
Within grey literature, some stakeholders reported issues about women and minorities not 
being included in the decision-making processes of the GoV or foreign stakeholders (2015b).120 
An INGO report, for example, revealed that while CDCCC members encouraged women to 
participate and raise post-disaster concerns, women in some communities felt excluded (CARE 
International, 2017). The report noted:  
“Women were not confident in speaking up in [some] community meetings, 
and some reported in the women's focus group that they were not able to 
participate in community decision-making and had to follow the chief's 
instructions" (CARE International, 2017, p.38). 
These perspectives raise questions about the inclusivity of women in the decision-making 
process and civil-military coordination efforts of the NZDF. 121 
Other concerns related to the influences of politics, corruption and interests on coordination 
and HADR. Transparency International Vanuatu and the Vanuatu Daily Post, for example, 
alleged that foreign relief supplies and funds were being used for personal gain by officials 
(2015a, 2015b, 2016, Roberts, 2018).122 These related to local authorities or committees:  
“[diverting] aid from those who most need it towards their families, friends, 
ethnic or regional group, or those able to pay” (Transparency International 
Vanuatu, 2015b). 
Further validating these concerns was the conviction of fourteen GoV Ministers in October 
2015, on bribery and corruption charges (ABC News, 2016).  
New Zealand media also reported that a GoV official attempted to hijack a truckload of relief to 
give to their supporters during the response, but was intercepted by military personnel (Radio 
New Zealand, 2015). As a result, local stakeholders cautioned foreign donors to ensure they 
were communicating and coordinating with trusted locals (Transparency International Vanuatu, 
2015a, 2015b, 2016, Roberts, 2018, ABC News, 2015b).  
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 Transparency International Vanuatu, for example, viewed the inclusion of vulnerable population groups as vital for ensuring 
that humanitarian needs were met. 
121
 As with the other gaps identified in TC Pam grey literature, interviewees will provide further clarification of this in Chapter 
Three. 
122
 Articles alleged that NDMO staff, government and provincial officials stole, sold or unfairly distributed aid items. One 
member of the public alleged that a senior provincial government official for selling, for personal profit, TC Pam relief supplies. 
They claimed that “bags of rice, canned foods, building materials, water bottles, bales of sugar and many more supplies were 
not being distributed, as intended, to the people of his island, but that all the supplies were stored safely in a storage room 




Despite foreign militaries or donors not being explicitly named in these sources, they raise 
questions about whether, and to what extent, these factors may have impacted the NZDF and 
other stakeholders.123 While some of these factors are discussed below, greater analysis is 
provided in Chapter Three and Six. 
Stakeholder perspectives on civil-military coordination 
Within grey literature, tensions and coordination issues were reported between the GoV and 
foreign actors, despite officials expressing gratitude for the external support.124 Numerous 
locally-based stakeholders claimed the influx of international assistance was detrimental to 
coordination and the delivery of HADR (Cowlishaw and Downes, 2015, Hawkins, 2015a, Barber, 
2015). In contrast, international media and stakeholders critiqued the national response, 
reporting delays in distribution and that humanitarian needs were not being met (Cooke, 2015, 
Hawkins, 2015b).125  
These factors contributed to some international actors and humanitarians reportedly working 
on their own, rather than in cooperation with the GoV (Cowlishaw and Downes, 2015). One 
report summed up stakeholder perspectives of response coordination as follows: 
“While the [TC Pam] international response was at the time considered to be 
highly effective and achieved much, it has subsequently been criticised for 
being foreign-driven, undermining government systems, and lacking 
accountability” (GoA, 2017b, p.28). 
These negative perceptions of stakeholders later had significant implications for Pacific HADR. 
They led Pacific-based stakeholders, in particular, to call for greater localisation and national 
control in future responses (WHS Regional Consultation for the Pacific, 2015, p.10-12, Loy, 
2017).126 The response also impacted civil-military coordination, with humanitarian 
stakeholders recommending greater “adherence to existing international guidelines on civil-
military [] coordination,” and “regular joint exercises,” to achieve appropriate and principled 
military support in Pacific HADR (WHS Regional Consultation for the Pacific, 2015, p.10-12). 
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 While the report did not clarify which foreign military was involved, the incident reportedly occurred on Tanna Island and 
involved a Black Hawk helicopter. These details suggest the ADF was likely the military involved, as ADF assistance was based on 
this island and the military deployed these helicopters.  
124
 These tensions will be discussed in greater detail in Part Two, as they related to the NZDF’s coordination. 
125
 An examination of the financial support raised for the TC Pam response also reveals that even with international support, 
total funds were insufficient to repair all damages and meet humanitarian needs. This resource shortage meant decisions had 
to made by the GoV and donors in the response, concerning the prioritisation of needs.  
126
 Rooted in the belief that locals know best what their communities need, “localisation" aims to empower local actors to lead 
responses to crises on their turf. These actors include indigenous peoples, community organisations, local NGOs, municipal 




Within the TC Pam lessons learned workshop report, only a small number of civil-military 
coordination issues were identified with minimal accompanying analysis (GoV and SPC, 
2015).127 In contrast, a UN end-of-mission report concluded the HADR response set a new 
“global standard” for civil-military coordination (UNDAC, 2015a, p.16).128 The report further 
recommended that a more detailed analysis of these coordination efforts be undertaken, to 
ensure this capacity could be “maintained in the Pacific region” (UNDAC, 2015a, p.16). 
These reports highlight how positively civil-military coordination efforts were portrayed in grey 
literature. Stakeholder requests for further analysis also highlight the suitability of using the TC 
Pam response as a case study to examine the NZDF’s coordination. 
 
iii. Civil-military coordination mechanisms 
 
The following sections describe the major civil-military coordination mechanisms the NZDF 
engaged with in the TC Pam response. This provides the reader with the context needed to 
understand Part Two findings.  
National coordination structures 
In the initial response, Vanuatu’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs took charge of receiving offers of 
foreign military assistance and determining which were accepted. This arrangement meant the 
Ministry played a “key role as a linking agency," through facilitating discussion with FRANZ 
partners and foreign affairs officials (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.26). 
Interaction between foreign military and civilian representatives also took place in the National 
Disaster Management Office (NDMO) and National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) in Port 
Vila. These mechanisms were co-located and became a focal point for civil-military coordination 
in the response (GoV, 2010, Section 3.4, GoV, 2013b, p.33).129 This structure aimed to bring all 
GoV agencies, Ministries and humanitarian organisations together, to address humanitarian 
needs through the National Cluster System.130 
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 The TC Pam lessons learned workshop report collated the perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders. The report 
reflected on foreign militaries as a collective. This limitation meant the NZDF was not explicitly named anywhere in the report.  
128
 These civil-military coordination challenges will be discussed below in Part Two, as they relate to the NZDF. 
129
 Within the structure, NDMO representatives took responsibility for coordinating the overall disaster response, while the 
NEOC acted as an information hub which was manned at all hours. The NDMO and NEOC were co-located in the Ministry of 
Climate Change, Adaptation, Meteorology and Geo-Hazards, Energy Environment and National Disaster Management. Both 
operated under the NDMO Director, who also acts as National Disaster Coordinator. See Annex Four for a more detailed 
description of this structure. 
130
 The National Cluster System was adopted by the GoV in 2011 and is an adaption of the United Nations cluster system. It 
consists of six clusters which are led by government ministries and co-chaired by Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT) members. 




These national coordination mechanisms were linked to provincial and community structures, 
which some foreign military representatives engaged within the field (GoV, 2013a, p.7-8). 
Community Disaster and Climate Change Committees (CDCCCs) were established at the village 
level, in some areas of Vanuatu (Vanuatu NDMO, 2017, p.17).131  These aimed to ensure fair aid 
distribution and that the needs of women, youth, the disabled and disadvantaged were met. 
Most interaction between militaries and the affected population was, however, facilitated by 
local Liaison Officers (LOs) or chiefs.132 
New civil-military coordination mechanisms were developed 
Despite Vanuatu’s disaster management systems being well-established, the GoV did not have 
a clear policy on how stakeholders would engage with military actors in HADR responses 
(Soldateschi, 2011, p.13, Gero et al., 2013, p.96-97).133 Changes to national coordination 
structures such as the NEOC and National Cluster System were also made during the response 
(GoV, 2013a)(Barber, 2015, p.6, 15).134 These factors contributed to two civil-military 
coordination mechanisms being adopted as the response progressed.  
One of these mechanisms was an informal structure adopted by the GoV. The structure placed 
the NDMO Director-General in charge of authorising military tasks, which were appealed for 
and approved in writing (Vanuatu NDMO, 2015b). Requests for military assistance were then 
given to military LOs, who attended meetings in the NEOC. Tasks were then undertaken, if the 
FRANZ Foreign Affairs approval was gained. This decision-making structure ensured both the 
GoV and foreign States maintained civilian control over military operations. 
The UN also introduced a civil-military coordination mechanism. This consisted of a UN-
CMCoord Officer who facilitated communication between military LOs and the civilian 
stakeholders operating within the National Cluster System (Lacey-Hall, 2015). The UN-CMCoord 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Education (Ministry of Education), Health & Nutrition (Ministry of Health), Agriculture (Department of Agriculture), Water, 
Sanitation and Hygiene (Department of Rural Water Supply), and Protection & Gender (Department of Woman Affairs). 
131
 CDCCCs consist of elected community representatives and facilitate coordination at the village level. Members identify safe 
houses, train families on how to prepare for disasters and evacuations, and aim to ensure the elderly, disabled and vulnerable 
community members are also treated fairly. Members of CDCCCs were selected to represent the different ages and groups 
within the community, with a particular focus on women, youth and the disabled or disadvantaged. Although CDCCCs were 
being established with the support of INGOs and the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT), many villages across Vanuatu still did 
not have these established by 2017.  
132
 Secretary Generals, Provincial governments and Area Councils disseminated information and direction through Provincial 
Disaster Committees and Community Disaster and Climate Change Committees (CDCCCs).  
133
 Although Vanuatu’s disaster management framework had been adequate for small and medium scale disasters, prior 
responses revealed that legislation needed to be updated. For example, Soldateschi conducted an independent assessment of 
Vanuatu's Disaster framework in 2010 following both an earthquake and tsunami. This study recommended that legislation be 
updated and amended to clarify existing roles and better facilitate foreign disaster response, noting that draft legislation 
existed and was awaiting approval. 
134
 The GoV accepted offers of support from UN OCHA and the Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT). This surge support increased 
the number of individuals operating in the NEOC and NDMO. Some stakeholders considered this a result of the GoV accepting 




officer also introduced Request for Assistance (RFA) forms, which aimed to streamline 
humanitarian requests for the use of foreign military assets (Reario, 2015, p.10). These were 
given to the NDMO Director-General, who applied the approval procedure described above. 
Part One findings 
The sections above provided an overview of the TC Pam disaster and civil-military coordination 
efforts. A range of key factors were identified, which likely impacted the NZDF’s response. 
These include the large scale of humanitarian needs, an existing lack of logistical capacity to 
reach affected islands and an overall funding shortfall. The large influx of foreign stakeholders is 
also likely to have impacted coordination efforts, particularly considering the impact this had on 
national structures. 
Having gained an understanding of the HADR context and these factors, Part Two now focuses 
specifically on the NZDF response. Considering the above factors above and the fact that the 
response was considered to have set a new ‘global standard’ in civil-military coordination, the 
TC Pam response is an ideal case study to examine the NZDF coordination efforts  
 
Part Two: the New Zealand Defence Force Response to TC Pam 
 
The three sections below examine how grey literature portrayed the NZDF's civil-military 
coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical level.135 Obstacles to coordination are 
examined, along with how sources reported these impacted HADR. While most stakeholders 
did not clarify how obstacles to coordination impacted the NZDF’s coordination or actors’ 
assistance, some of these factors are discussed in the sections below. This is due to their 
relevance to interview findings and the comparative analysis in Chapter Six. 
Stakeholder perspectives were predominantly drawn from NZDF and GoNZ sources, which 
amounted to over 80% of the utilised literature.136 The other crucial document used was the TC 
Pam lessons learned workshop report (2015). This collated the perspectives of stakeholders 
from the GoV, UN, INGOs, NGOs, foreign States, civilian agencies and academic institutions.137  
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 The strategic level is a military term which refers to decisions made at the highest level of leadership, usually at the national 
or headquarters level. The operational level refers to coordination at the general planning level. The tactical level refers to 
coordination within the field. In this case, it refers to the interaction between the NZDF and civilian actors on the ground in New 
Zealand, Vanuatu and on outer islands. This engagement is at the level of the soldier, airman or sailor.  
136
 As discussed in the introduction, only one internal NZDF report reflected on coordination issues which occurred in the TC 
Pam response. This document is titled the 'TG 651.3 OP PACIFIC RELIEF Tropical Cyclone Lessons Learned Synopsis,' which 
identified issues which had occurred within both the TC Pam and Winston responses. The majority of other published material 
consisted of media and press releases produced by the NZDF and GoNZ. 
137
 The TC Pam lessons learned workshop report collated the perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders. The report 




These proportions mean most stakeholder perspectives, including some civilian views, were 
drawn from NZDF or GoNZ sources. This raises concerns about publication bias and whether, or 
not, these reports accurately reflect the perspectives of civilian stakeholders. 
 
i. Coordination at the strategic level 
 
Pre-disaster coordination among New Zealand stakeholders  
The GoNZ began preparations for a WoG disaster response one week before TC Pam struck. In 
accordance with deployment guidelines, MFAT took charge as lead agency and established two 
coordination hubs. These were located in the Emergency Coordination Centre in Wellington 
and in the New Zealand High Commission in Port Vila (MFAT, 2012b, p.5).138  
These structures ensured the GoNZ maintained civilian control over the WoG and NZDF 
response. They also enabled communication and information-sharing efforts to begin, between 
military and civilian strategic level leadership, in New Zealand and Vanuatu (HQ JFNZ).139 This 
paved the way for a rapid WoG response, as WoG stakeholders were able to begin coordinating 
the civil-military response before personnel departed. 
Coordination among FRANZ partners 
The FRANZ agreement also facilitated the NZDF’s rapid deployment into Vanuatu. This enabled 
representatives from the Australian, New Zealand and French High Commissions to be briefed 
by NDMO staff in Vanuatu (Vanuatu NDMO, 2015a). This in-country meeting was praised by 
State stakeholders, as it enabled FRANZ partners to begin coordinating which military assets 
would be deployed if the cyclone made landfall (French Embassy, 2015, UNDAC, 2015a, p.6).140  
The TC Pam lessons learned report also reflected on the benefits of the pre-disaster interaction. 
It reported that having New Zealand High Commission officials already based in Vanuatu meant 
there were “existing strong relationships” between countries, which helped facilitate civil-
military coordination (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.26). These officials also reportedly helped “resolve 
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 Within the New Zealand hub, the Emergency Task Force (ETF) was stood up and held daily meetings within the initial 
response. MFAT chairs the ETF; other members include the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, New Zealand Police, 
Ministry of Health, the New Zealand Fire Service, NGO partners (represented by the Council for International Development), the 
New Zealand Red Cross, FRANZ partners and the NZDF. 
139
 Throughout the response, NZDF personnel were based in and attended meetings in these centres. This arrangement enabled 
civil-military coordination to take place at the strategic level between the GoNZ, HQ JFNZ Zealand and other New Zealand 
civilian representatives from MFAT, OGAs and humanitarian organisations. The operational forces of the three services are 
directed from HQ JFNZ, opposite Trentham Military Camp in Upper Hutt. From here, military leadership exercises command 
over NZDF elements. This command includes control of all overseas operational deployments. Among NZDF representatives 
who attended these meetings were HQJFNZ and DJIATF personnel. 
140
 The first FRANZ meeting took place on 11 March. Partners met again with the GoV on 15 March, when offers of assistance 




issues, logistical needs and provide coordination solutions” between militaries and GoV (GoV 
and SPC, 2015, p.35). While these issues were not detailed, the report concluded that this 
strategic-level coordination meant GoV requests were completed rapidly in the response. 
The NZDF’s rapid response and arrival was portrayed positively 
Pre-disaster coordination meant the GoNZ’s offers of financial, humanitarian and military 
support were quickly accepted by the GoV (McCully, 2015c, McCully, 2015b).141 This meant 
NZDF air assets began arriving in Vanuatu on 15 March. This was less than twenty-four hours 
following the cyclone and prior to the international appeal for assistance.  
All GoNZ and NZDF press releases described the military’s rapid response in a positive light 
(McCully, 2015c)(Chapman, 2015).142 MFAT officials, in particular, emphasised how the NZDF’s 
speed and coordination efforts benefitted the GoV and GoNZ (McCully, 2015c). For example, a 
Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) P-3K2 Orion completed reconnaissance of affected islands 
and shared this information with the GoV and civilian stakeholders (McCully, 2015c).143 This 
civil-military coordination was viewed as critical, as it informed the GoV’s damage assessments 
and enabled priorities to be established in the initial response (Chapman, 2015). 
Hercules aircraft enabled WoG stakeholders to arrive rapidly 
C-130 Hercules aircraft also commended frequent flights into Vanuatu immediately after the 
airport opened on 15 March (Embassy of France, 2015).144 New Zealand media and officials 
highlighted how this speed and the NZDFs logistical support had benefitted stakeholders 
(McCully, 2015a, New Zealand Herald, 2015a).145 This related to the transportation of WoG 
personnel and large quantities of aid into Vanuatu, from New Zealand humanitarian 
organisations, such as Red Cross (New Zealand Herald, 2015a).146  
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 These offers of assistance were facilitated via bilateral discussions and the FRANZ agreement. On 15 March, an initial one 
million NZD contribution was announced by the GoNZ, for Vanuatu, Fiji, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands. This amount increased to 
a total of 3.5 million NZD for Vanuatu, over the complete response. Funding included costs for relief supplies, technical 
assistance and medical personnel. A further 26 million NZD was also given to help the tourism sector recover. 
142
 The Oslo guidelines are described in Chapter One. The principle of 'last resort' states that military assets should only be 
requested and deployed when no comparable civilian alternative exists, and these are necessary to meet a critical humanitarian 
need. 
143
 The P3 Orion deployed rapidly, in part, because it was already in the Pacific region for a Search and Rescue operation. The 
Aircraft began initial assessments on 15 March in Tuvalu, which had also been affected by TC Pam. 
144
 Five military aircraft arrived on 15 March, immediately after the Bauerfield Airport was opened. These were: one C-130 and 
two C-17s from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), one CASA plane from New Caledonia’s armed forces (FANC), and the 
NZDF’s RNZAF C-130 Hercules.  
145
 Eight tonnes of relief was transported on these flights. Aircraft which followed contained similar quantities, which was 
distributed under the guidance of the Vanuatu NDMO. These aircraft also evacuated New Zealand citizens, transported relief 
supplies and personnel into the country. 
146
 Red Cross personnel and relief supplies were transported on some of the first Hercules flights which landed on 16 March 




Media also emphasised how these coordination efforts benefitted humanitarian agencies and 
the affected population. This was because humanitarian agencies were able to arrive in 
Vanuatu, while the airport remained closed to civilian aircraft (New Zealand Herald, 2015a). It 
also enabled these agencies to get urgent relief supplies to outer islands (McCully, 2015a).   
No NZDF reports, however, reflected on NZDF-humanitarian coordination. This reveals a crucial 
gap in grey literature, considering the perceived benefits civilian stakeholders described above. 
Civil-military coordination challenges described by other sources 
While no rstakeholders specifically reflected on the fact that these arrangements and the 
NZDF’s rapid response could be interpreted as undermining the principle of ‘last resort’ in the 
UN Oslo guidelines, some sources alluded to related issues. For example, two reports identified 
general civil-military coordination issues which were linked to the rapid influx of actors.147  
One of these was a Government evaluation of Australia’s response to TC Pam. This stated that 
the rapid influx of relief supplies “overwhelmed the capacity of local facilities and humanitarian 
agencies to manage them” (GoA, 2017b, p.37). The Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) 
prioritisation of speed was also believed to have contributed to these challenges. This led to the 
conclusion that Australian and international assistance could have “slowed down to better align 
with national systems and better address needs” (GoA, 2017b, p.2).  
Similar coordination issues were identified in the TC Pam lessons learned report. This admitted 
"initial challenges” had impeded collaboration between the GoV, donors, regional and 
international actors (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.26).148 GoV stakeholders also reported a lack of 
understanding about the protocols for the use of military assets and stated these should have 
been communicated “from the outset” (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27). Although further details 
were not given, the need for military actors to “follow and conform to the host country’s 
diplomatic channels” was identified as an area for improvement (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27).  
Collectively, these reports raise question about the NZDF response. These surround whether or 
not the NZDF’s rapid arrival and prioritisation of speed may have had similar impacts on 
coordination, as were observed with the ADF.149 This gap in grey literature further justifies the 
need for stakeholder interviews, to better understand how these factors may have impacted 
the NZDF’s civil-military coordination and the HADR provided.   
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 Although not directly stated, these documents raise the question of whether these issues also impacted the NZDF and if so, 
how they may have affected the assistance provided. 
148
 These issues concerned a lack of communication, lack of understanding, particularly around how militaries were controlled. 
149




ii. Coordination at the operational level 
 
The first application of the DJIATF model 
On arrival in Vanuatu, personnel from the DJIATF, MFAT and OGAs were embedded in the New 
Zealand High Commission (McCully, 2015a, New Zealand Herald, 2015a).150 This was the first 
time the DJIATF model had been used in a Pacific HADR context and entailed DJIATF leadership 
and LOs providing MFAT, OGAs and GoV officials with military expertise and operational 
planning support throughout the response (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.5).151 This arrangement 
demanded high levels of civil-military integration between WoG stakeholders, most of whom 
had never worked together previously. 
Within literature, all published sources portrayed the DJIATF’s coordination with civilian 
stakeholders as positive. NZDF representatives further stated that the unit’s coordination 
efforts enhanced the overall NZDF and WoG response (NZDF, 2015a, McLoughlin, 2015). An 
example of this related to DJIATF personnel forming a Joint Command and Reconnaissance 
Team (JCART), with MFAT and GoV representatives. Together, these individuals undertook 
aerial reconnaissance of affected islands where the NZDF later provided assistance.152 This 
helped WoG stakeholders determine the materials and assets to be loaded on HMNZS 
Canterbury before departure (Chapman, 2015). It also meant operational-level officials were 
able to begin identifying priorities and planning assistance before the Joint Task Force (JTF) 
arrived (NZDF, 2015a, McLoughlin, 2015, p.8).153 
Published NZDF sources reported the DJIATF’s coordination was good  
As detailed in Part One, DJIATF LOs were invited to attend daily meetings in the NEOC (GoV and 
SPC, 2015, p.9).154 All published sources reported that the coordination efforts of these NZDF 
personnel were good, with the GoV, humanitarian agencies and other civilian stakeholders in 
the NEOC. For example, it was stated that foreign governments “worked collaboratively with 
the NDMO” (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.26).  
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 A small number of DJIATF and WoG staff arrived on the first Hercules flights into the country on 15 March. Other supporting 
personnel arrived in the following days. 
151
 Military LO’s from the Air Force, Army and Navy were seconded into the DJIATF from the NZDF. These personnel were 
therefore, not full-time members of the DJIATF but provided service-specific expertise to support the WoG response. This 
arrangement is termed a ‘shadow posting' in the NZDF.  
152
 This team assessed damage and gathered information about the Shepherds island group and Epi Island on approximately 18 
March. These islands are 100 kilometres north of Port Vila in the Shefa Province. They are discussed in detail in Part Two. 
153
 NZDF press releases stated that: “having combined reconnaissance teams… sets up access for [the NZDF], allowing us to 
prioritise work and decide what to put where and when.”  
154
 This arrangement resulted in close coordination with GoV Ministry officials and the NDMO Director-General, who identified 




In contrast, the internal HQ JFNZ lessons learned synopsis contained slightly more analysis 
around obstacles to coordination. For example, it reported that MFAT officials lacked an 
understanding of the DJIATF model and how it was applied (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.14).155 NZDF LOs 
were also observed to need more knowledge of their "respective asset capabilities” for HADR 
(HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.15).156 These more critical views indicate the DJIATF did encounter challenges 
in the model's first application, although these were not reported publicly.  
The eighteen-page HQ JFNZ synopsis, however, only mentioned the DJIATF once. It also did not 
provide clarification on how obstacles impacted civil-military coordination or the HADR 
provided. This is surprising, considering the significant role the DJIATF played in the response 
and the fact this was the first time the model was tested in the Pacific. A more in-depth 
understanding of how stakeholders viewed the DJIATF would, therefore, be valuable and is 
presented in Chapter Three. 
UN stakeholder views were positive 
Throughout the response, DJIATF LOs met regularly with the UN-CMCoord officer, UN agencies 
and other humanitarian partners, which UN officials concluded was a  “great success” and a 
“best practice” (Reario, 2015, p.10, Lacey-Hall, 2015, p.1). Most perspectives related to the 
outcomes of coordination or the practical benefits of NZDF support. For example, UN 
stakeholders emphasised that RFAs were often completed by militaries in less than twenty-four 
hours. This reportedly demonstrated the “effective and efficient” use of foreign military assets 
and how essential these supported HADR in the TC Pam response (Reario, 5, p.10). 
These stakeholders, however, predominantly referred to foreign militaries as a collective and 
provided little reasoning for why they felt coordination was positive, beyond the practical tasks 
achieved.157 
Domestic factors and national coordination mechanisms were linked to challenges  
While stakeholders did not always reflect on how obstacles to coordination impacted civil-
military interaction or the NZDF specifically, some of these factors are needed for the case 
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 MFAT Heads of Mission also reportedly did not understand the differences between the light and heavy JCART options and 
what these entailed. This misunderstanding resulted in only a small number of DJIATF personnel deploying in the initial 
response. The report suggested that increased interaction between the NZDF and MFAT might improve understanding of 
actors’ strengths, challenges, systems and acronyms. 
156
 NZDF Air LOs and Maritime LOs were specifically mentioned. Maritime LO, in particular, were reported to need an 




 UN stakeholders, in particular, reflected on how joint civil-military efforts and planning enabled actors to complete the 
second phase of needs assessments in a shorter space of time. Examples of this coordination are discussed below, in the 




study analysis. For example, many sources reported that domestic factors and coordination 
mechanisms had impeded the overall coordination efforts.  
Some issues were linked to legislation, which did not clarify how the GoV would facilitate civil-
military coordination (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.9, 27, 36, GoV, 2013a, p.15).158 Guidance 
documents were also produced across fifteen years and many were due to be updated.159 
These factors contributed to confusion over stakeholders' roles, responsibilities, and how 
military assistance would be facilitated (GoV and SPC, 2015, p. 22-23, 26-27). Sources did not, 
however, indicate how this may have impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination. 
Stakeholders also identified issues which related to national mechanisms. GoV buildings, 
national coordination structures and many public servants were directly impacted by the 
cyclone (UN OCHA, 2015c, p.7).160 This negatively impacted the capacity of the NEOC and 
NDMO, particularly in the initial response (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.23).161 Challenges were also 
reported about the National Cluster System (2015b, p.2, 2015a, p.3). These factors meant 
“existing structures were not in place when international assistance was needed” (GoV and SPC, 
2015, p.29). 
Collectively, these obstacles and GoV procedures meant humanitarians reportedly struggled to 
utilise military assets. For example, the decision-making process for the approval of military 
tasks was also described as "problematic," by UN stakeholders, who believed this contributed 
to “delays in accomplishing urgent tasks requested by the clusters” (Reario, 2015, p.10).162 
Stakeholders did not, however, comment on how these factors may have impacted the NZDF’s 
coordination or the HADR provided by actors. 
International and humanitarian coordination mechanisms were linked to challenges  
Coordination issues were also linked to the influx of international stakeholders and 
humanitarian mechanisms. Locally-based stakeholders, for instance, reported that 
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 Vanuatu’s legislation stated that logistical support from FRANZ partners could be utilised at the GoV’s formal request. No 
clarification was, however, provided on how foreign militaries would interact with the NEOC, national or international actors. 
Stakeholders, therefore, did not know whether Vanuatu’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NDMO or international mechanisms 
would facilitate coordination. 
159
 Key legislation included the National Disaster Act (2000), National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster 
Management (2007), National Disaster Plan Review (2010) and the Cyclone Support Plan (2013). Discrepancies between 
documents meant only the ‘National Cyclone Support Plan’ accurately described the structures in place prior to TC Pam. 
160
 TC Pam passed only 50 kilometres from the country's capital Port Vila, damaging the building which housed both the NEOC 
and NDMO. Public servants were reportedly given five days leave to repair their houses and help family members. 
161
 These challenges were noted in the TC Pam lessons learned report, which stated that the NDMO was “understaffed and 
under-resourced,” while the NEOC lacked the information management and coordination capacity to fulfil the multiple roles it 
was given. Documentation stated that the NDMO was to be run by eight full-time staff. Three volunteers and two VHT staff 
members could also be seconded if needed.   
162
 These challenges were linked to both the NDMO Director-General having to provide written approval of requests, along with 
Foreign Affairs approval from FRANZ partners. Assets were also reportedly frequently tasked for passenger transportation, 




“complications increased exponentially” after international surge capacity was accepted in the 
NEOC (Barber, 2015, p.15).163 National and international pre-cyclone staff were reportedly 
‘pushed aside’ by incoming actors, who failed to show respect to figures of authority (Barber, 
2015, p.13, 19)(Loy, 2017). One locally-based humanitarian emphasised why this was 
particularly harmful in the Pacific. They stated,  
“In Vanuatu as throughout Asia Pacific… government authorities expect to be 
respected. The importance of ensuring that no one ‘loses face’ is ingrained in 
the national psyche… is referred to locally as the ‘bigman syndrome’ – the 
expectation by men in senior positions that they will be accorded a degree of 
deference” (Barber, 2015, p.19). 
This led to tension between local and foreign representatives, with GoV officials stating the 
constant stream of donations and stakeholders into Port Vila impeded their ability to efficiently 
coordinate and deliver HADR (Cowlishaw and Downes, 2015). 
Changes were also made to humanitarian coordination mechanisms (see Figure 6). 164 This 
confused stakeholders, as the roles and responsibilities of national and international 
stakeholders were "not understood outside a small number of individuals” (Barber, 2015, p.16). 
National and international coordination structures also "appeared... to be significantly 
overlapping," according to local actors (Barber, 2015, p.16). 
Although UN, ADF, Australian Government and some humanitarian stakeholders reported the 
UN-CMCoord officer played a vital coordination role in Vanuatu, they also noted the 
coordinator arrived "several days after the cyclone hit” (ACMC, 2018, p.4).165 This delay meant 
there was little civil-military coordination in the first forty-eight to seventy-two hours, when 
civil-military coordination was of vital importance.  
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 Vanuatu-based humanitarian agencies felt meetings took longer than they should have, due to the sheer number of actors. 
Incoming actors were reported to have had a “very limited understanding of national processes and requirements." Many 
agencies were also reported to have not coordinated their activities with the GoV or through the national clusters 
164
 For example, an extra Cluster was added to the National Cluster System, along with seven working groups.  Members of the 
PHT and UN Agencies also took a leading role in clusters, as opposed to Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT) members. 
165
 These stakeholders also reported that the UN CMCoord officer had the right personality, skill set, training and experience to 




Figure 2: TC Pam humanitarian coordination structure. Source: 166 
 
Grey literature lacked analysis about coordination and obstacles at the operational level 
The grey literature sources described above often lacked an in-depth analysis of civil-military 
coordination, in general, and the NZDF’s efforts specifically. Some sources, however, alluded to 
these obstacles having negative impacts on civil-military coordination. The lessons learned 
report, for example, highlighted the need for the NDMO to be recognised as the “central linking 
agency” between military and humanitarian teams (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27). This was 
identified as an area for improvement, to strengthen the “coordination, location and 
prioritisation of military assets” in future responses (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27).  
While not openly stated, these statements imply some of the aforementioned obstacles were 
likely impeding the use of foreign military assets. Further information is, however, needed to 
better understand both how these obstacles may have impacted the NZDF and the views of 
these stakeholders. 
The HQ JFNZ synopsis also contained no specific analysis of the NZDF’s coordination with the 
GoV or national structures. It did, however, draw collective lessons about host nations from the 
TC Pam and Winston responses. Personnel noted a perceived lack of a higher-level national 
plan the NZDF could work to (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). It was also reported that host nation 
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officials “may not operate in the same way” or may have different priorities to the GoNZ (HQ 
JFNZ, 2016, p.12). This led to warnings that NZDF personnel needed to be prepared for host 
nation officials to take "ownership over offers of aid" (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).  
While no further clarification or examples were given, these observations raise questions about 
how differences in organisational culture and ‘command and control’ issues may have impacted 
NZDF-GoV coordination.167 
 
iii. Coordination at the tactical level168 
 
The Joint Task Force response 
The Joint Task Force (JTF) response to TC Pam was made up of several NZDF elements, which 
operated simultaneously and coordinated with a range of civilian actors. The central aspect of 
the response was, perhaps, the multi-role vessel -HMNZS Canterbury, which served as a civil-
military coordination platform during the twenty-nine days NZDF elements were deployed.169  
Throughout the response, the ship served as a mobile base from which NZDF, WoG and other 
civilian stakeholders were accommodated and deployed. These included LOs from MFAT and 
the GoV, who helped identify tasks the military would undertake. Representatives from New 
Zealand OGAs, including USAR and NZ MAT teams, were also embarked for two weeks (New 
Zealand Herald, 2015b, NZMAT, 2015).170  This was the first time most of these civilian 
representatives had worked with the NZDF. It also culminated in closer civil-military integration 
than had occurred in any previous WoG HADR deployment. 
Three four-person NZDF CIMIC teams were also deployed with the Canterbury and played a 
crucial civil-military role in the response (NZDF, 2015b). These operated ashore and moved 
ahead of the JTF to help identify priorities and tasks for the NZDF. This meant personnel 
gathered information about population needs by “engaging with local leaders and 
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 These factors would be raised by interviewed stakeholders and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
168
 The tactical level refers to coordination which takes place in the field. In this case, it refers to the interaction between the 
NZDF and civilian actors on the ground in New Zealand, Vanuatu and on outer islands. For example, between civilian actors and 
NZDF officers, soldiers, airmen or sailors.  
169
 The Canterbury arrived in Port Vila on 25 March and departed from the country on 22 April. The vessel transported a 
significant amount of aid into the country as well as equipment and assets. These included two Landing Craft Medium (LCM), 
Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBS) and vehicles such as the Unimog and Pinzgauer. 
170
 Although transported by the NZDF, these civilian teams operated independently from the military and focused on separate 
tasks. The New Zealand Fire Service deployed a USAR squad of 14 personnel to support the WoG response. The Ministry of 
Health also sent an NZMAT team made up of 11 doctors and nurses. Both OGA teams operated alongside NZDF personnel 
between 25 March to 07 April. The USAR team conducted building repairs, operated equipment to provide communities with 
drinkable water and provided logistical support for the NZMAT team. This team was made up of doctors, nurses, which 




personalities, maintaining relationships and providing a single consistent point of contact for 
the duration of the deployment” (NZDF, 2015b). This led to interaction between NZDF CIMIC 
personnel and chiefs, provincial officials, CDCCCs and humanitarian agencies operating in the 
NZDF’s vicinity.171  
The final major element of the NZDF’s civil-military engagement involved the use of air assets 
(Chapman, 2015). 172  These aircraft supported needs assessments by conducting air 
reconnaissance and transporting GoV and humanitarian representatives to complete these. 
They also conducted casualty evacuation and transported aid, civilian and military personnel 
into Vanuatu, as well as among isolated islands during the response.173 
The NZDF’s area of operations 
Throughout the response NZDF and WoG efforts were focused in Epi Island and the Shepherds 
islands group, in the Shefa Province (see Figure 3).174 These were considered a high priority by 
the GoV due to their critical humanitarian needs islands and relative isolation, being 100 
kilometres north of Port Vila (see Figure 4, NZDF, 2015c).175  
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 CDCCCs are discussed in Part One; this term stands for Community Disaster and Climate Change Committees. 
172
 These included a King Air B200, Seasprite helicopters, a P-3K2 Orion and C-130 Hercules. Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee 
critiqued the decision not to deploy any the NZDFs eight new NH90 helicopters to Vanuatu. This was reportedly due to 
difficulties surrounding the transport of the NH90’s and the aircraft not yet being cleared to operate from the CANTERBURY. 
Helicopter operations were therefore conducted with only one Seasprite, which limited the NZDF’s ability to transport civilian 
actors, supplies and access outer islands. 
173
 For example, a Hercules aircraft was offered as transportation for individuals from Fiji to Vanuatu. This coordination enabled 
a contingent of the Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF) engineers, health professionals, and supplies from Fiji to support the 
response. These were transported from Suva to Vanuatu on 24 March. 
174
 Some NZDF personnel, including NZ Army engineers, supported Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) efforts, on the mainland Efate 
and in Port Vila. This military-paramilitary coordination was, however, not the focus of the JTF response. 
175
 The isolation of these islands also made it difficult for civilian actors to access them, due to national logistical capacity being 
limited to only a small number of vessels. Cyclone damage had reduced the country’s logistic capacity to one functional police 





Figure 3: Map of Epi Island and the Shepherds Island group. Source: (FSAC, 2015) 
The priority humanitarian needs of these islands were described in assessments produced over 
a week before the NZDF arrived (Humanity Road, 2015, Humans of Vanuatu, 2015).176 These 
clarified that the smallest islands were the most severely affected, with widespread food and 
water shortages and the destruction of up to 100% of dwellings in some villages (UNDAC, 
2015b).177 These factors made coordination between the NZDF and civilian actors even more 
vital, to ensure population needs were met. 
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 As early as 15 March, humanitarian sources began reporting water and food shortages within communities. These concerns 
included reports that villages within the Shepherd Islands were drinking saltwater. This claim was however contested on social 
media, with some questioning whether Ni-Vanuatu were instead digging into the beaches to access fresh water springs. 
177
 An UNDAC rapid needs assessment of some of the Shepherds islands was conducted on 20 March. It revealed that up to 
100% of dwellings were destroyed on some islands. For example; all 37 houses on Mataso had been damaged, all 83 on 




NZDF assistance and tasks 
NZDF and WoG assistance was provided in two phases. Phase one focused on the larger islands 
of Epi and Tongoa, while phase two concentrated on smaller islands such as Mataso, Tongariki 
and Buninga (NZDF, 2015c).178 While grey literature contained no analysis of these phases, their 
sequence meant the bulk of NZDF and WoG assistance was initially focused on islands which 
had more extensive population bases, but less severe humanitarian needs.179 This raises 
questions about whether HADR was provided according to the greatest humanitarian needs. 
NZDF tasks on these islands predominantly focused on restoring public infrastructure. These 
included clearing debris and roads, restoring water storage and repairing schools, medical 
facilities and aid posts (NZDF, 2015c).180 Although the NZDF transported some water, food and 
non-food items to these islands, most aid was disembarked in Port Vila, for distribution by local 
stakeholders (McLoughlin, 2015, p.5).181 This arrangement meant GoV elected LOs facilitated 
communication between the NZDF, local officials and village chiefs, who helped identify needs 
and tasks for the NZDF. 
Perceptions of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination at the tactical level 
Due to the number of civilian actors which engaged with the JTF, the perspectives of 
stakeholders are grouped according to sector below. This provides a greater depth of analysis, 
as it highlights how grey literature portrayed the perspectives of: 1) New Zealand civilian actors, 
2) international and local humanitarian stakeholders, 3) the GoF and 4) the affected population. 
Coordination with New Zealand civilian actors 
Published grey literature reported that coordination was good 
Overall, all published sources portrayed the NZDF’s coordination with New Zealand civilian 
stakeholders as positive. Media reported that WoG efforts were “really well coordinated” 
(McLoughlin, 2015, p.8). An NZDF representative described coordination as follows:  
“Everyone here has the same sense of purpose and vision, and we are all 
determined to provide maximum effect to improve the situation of the people 
on these islands as soon as possible. We are all focused on the same thing so 
that makes it really easy to work together” (McLoughlin, 2015, p.8). 
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 Phase one was undertaken between 27 March and 12 April, phase two between 13 and 19 April 2015. 
179
 The order and priorities of the NZDF’s assistance will be reflected on by interviewed stakeholders in the following chapter. 
180
 Over the four weeks the NZDF completed repairs to twelve schools and eight medical clinics, installed sixteen water tanks, 
reinstated existing community water supplies and transported tonnes of aid. Desalination plants were also used to provide 
communities with water. A more detailed report of these tasks is provided in Annex Five. 
181
 On arrival in Port Vila Canterbury offloaded 150 tonnes of food and other supplies under GoV direction. The NDMO, local 




These perspectives led NZDF and GoNZ sources to suggest the NZDF’s civil-military coordination 
efforts had enhanced the HADR response (McLoughlin, 2015, p.8). 
There was a general lack of civilian perspectives 
The majority of perspectives were, however, drawn from NZDF or GoNZ sources. For example, 
civil-military interaction was only briefly described in one NZ MAT newsletter. This reflected 
that it was the first time OGAs had worked alongside the NZDF in the Pacific, which “gave an 
opportunity for all three organisations to get to know how each better” (NZMAT, 2015). This 
scarcity of New Zealand civilian perspectives evidences the need for interviews, to better 
understand how these stakeholders perceived coordination at the tactical level. 
The HQJFNZ synopsis contained greater information but lacked in-depth analysis 
In contrast, the internal HQ JFNZ lessons learned synopsis contained slightly more detail, but 
lacked in-depth analysis of coordination efforts and impacts. For example, NZDF stakeholders 
commented that MFAT LOs were easy to work with and proved “very beneficial” on the 
Canterbury  (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.8). It also reported that “once deployed, ‘on the ground’ 
relationships with the OGAs were good” (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.9). The report also concluded that 
the overall efforts of the HADR Task Group in TC Pam were a success “in terms of the effects 
delivered and the high level of civil-military and inter-service cooperation” (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.4).  
Examination of the synopsis, however, reveals that few statements included explanations of 
why stakeholders held these views, other than positive outcomes. The report also contained no 
analysis on how NZDF-New Zealand humanitarian coordination was perceived.  
Some coordination challenges were identified or alluded to 
The internal report also identified some obstacles to NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination. 
The concerned tight timeframes and procedures,182 the rotation of MFAT LOs on Canterbury,183 
a civilian lack of understanding about the NZDF,184 differences in priorities,185 as well as 
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 NZDF personnel noted that Canterbury’s short timeframe for departure had placed strain on NZDF-MFAT coordination. This 
put pressure on NZDF personnel, meant MFAT-sponsored stores were transported at the last minute and there was  little time 
to determine the suitability of embarked equipment. The vessel departed within forty-eight hours of New Zealand Foreign 
Affairs Minister Murray McCully announcing that the Canterbury would deploy. This statement was made on 19 March. 
183
 MFAT LOs were also rotated on the Canterbury, with minimal handover. This reportedly impacted coordination, due to 
military staff needing to spend time updating new team members, each time MFAT LOs were replaced. 
184
 These included a lack of understanding about NZDF assets and operations and the different operating styles and priorities of 
stakeholders. 
185
 NZDF personnel perceived that OGA priorities were prioritised ahead of the NZDF's. An example of this disparity concerned 




communication and information sharing issues (NZDF, 2015a, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.8)(HQ JFNZ, 
2016, p.9-10).186 Notably, none of these issues were discussed in published literature.  
In some sections, the synopsis alluded to these obstacles having negative impacts on HADR. The 
NZDF and OGAs, for instance, conducted separate internal assessments of HADR. This meant 
some villages were assessed “numerous times” which was inefficient (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.9). Late 
notice requests by civilians also negatively impacted the work and rest ratios of NZDF 
personnel.187 While no analysis surrounded how these obstacles may have impacted the 
affected population,  several recommendations were made to improve civil-military 
coordination future Pacific HADR responses (HQ JFNZ, 2016).188 
Coordination with international and local humanitarian actors 
Few humanitarian perspectives reflected on interaction in the field  
Grey literature contained less than five descriptions of coordination between the NZDF and 
humanitarian actors at the tactical level. Of these, all were the views of either UN stakeholders 
or representatives of one INGO.189 All sources, however, depicted NZDF-humanitarian 
coordination in a positive light and did not report any barriers to coordination. 
UN and INGO perspectives were positive 
Of the UN sources, most focused on the benefits or outcomes of NZDF support, rather than the 
quality of coordination. For example, stakeholders focused on how the NZDF’s coordination 
with UN, humanitarian and GoV representatives enabled these actors to rapidly complete the 
second phase of needs assessments (Lacey-Hall, 2015, UNDAC, 2015a, p.6).190 This reportedly 
saved civilians weeks of work and provided a better understanding of residual humanitarian 
needs and gaps in assistance (Reario, 2015, p.10). UNDAC representatives further concluded 
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 Communication issues occurred on the Canterbury as the ship lacked a common information-sharing system. NZDF security 
restrictions also meant OGA’s could not view or share data on the ship's system, this meant OGAs had “no visibility” of stored 
data. 
187
 This lack of understanding about the NZDF was reported to have resulted in the NZDF needing to provide OGA’s resources 
and transport unexpectedly. It was also connected to OGA’s not attending daily meetings held by the NZDF, which resulted in 
late notice requests for assistance, which impacted work and rest ratios for NZDF personnel. 
188
 Key recommendations included the need for regular interaction and joint briefings between the NZDF and New Zealand 
civilian actors, to increase mutual understanding for future HADR responses. Other key recommendations included: 1) the 
development of Standard Operating Procedures for coordination and assessments, 2) the need to clarify the command and 
control structure between OGAs and the NZDF, and 3) the need to develop an Unclassified system so civilian actors could share 
information and access email accounts on the Canterbury. 
189
 The only non-UN perspectives were from representatives of the INGO Save the Children. 
190
 Assets from all military forces were used to insert eleven teams into the Provinces of Shefa and Tafea to undertake the 
second round of needs assessments in early April 2015. The NZDF contributed a Sea Sprite Helicopter and B200 King Air aircraft. 
The ADF contributed HMAS Tobruk and fixed and rotary winged assets (Australian S70 Blackhawk helicopters, the RAAF B350 
King Air aircraft and an Australian C130 aircraft). The Solomon Islands and Tonga both contributed their own Pacific Class Patrol 




this example of military planning and support set a “new global standard” for civil-military 
coordination in humanitarian operations (UNDAC, 2015a, p.16).  
CIMIC teams enhanced coordination efforts 
INGO representatives, in contrast, highlighted the benefits of CIMIC teams, which facilitated 
coordination between NZDF personnel and humanitarian agencies in the outer islands. The 
director of Save the Children Vanuatu, for instance, reflected on how NZDF and humanitarian 
capabilities could be complimentary. He stated, 
"[The NZDF have] got significant assets that we don't have in terms of their 
helicopters, their barges, their boat, their desalination capacity to provide 
fresh water. I was talking to them yesterday, I will continue to talk to them so 
that we can coordinate and use the best of our skills together" (Gil, 2015). 
Locally-based humanitarians and community representatives also reflected on how NZDF-
humanitarian assistance efforts helped the affected population, as combined efforts led to  
schools on Epi Island opening early (Gil, 2015).191  
While the HQ JFNZ synopsis did not mention the efforts of CIMIC teams or NZDF-humanitarian 
coordination, media suggested these efforts enhanced the JTF response. This was because 
humanitarians provided the military with local knowledge, which helped with NZDF task 
planning (NZDF, 2015b). This conspicuous lack of analysis is concerning, considering the key role 
CIMIC teams played in the field and the significant humanitarian needs in the NZDF’s vicinity.192 
Coordination with the Government of Vanuatu 
Coordination was perceived positively by State stakeholders 
In line with an emerging trend, all published sources described coordination between the NZDF, 
GoV, NDMO and local officials as positive at the tactical level. These perspectives largely related 
to the practical benefits of the NZDF’s maritime and air support, which reportedly enhanced the 
GoV HADR response (Cullwick, 2016, Brownlee, 2015, UNDAC, 2015a).193 This included NZDF 
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 This outcome was linked to NZDF personnel conducting repairs, while the INGO distributed learning materials. A community 
representative also reflected on this, stating, "If it wasn’t for the help of organisations such as Save the Children and the New 
Zealand Army, I don’t know how long it would have been before we had the materials and money to rebuild the school. We are 
immensely grateful for their help.” 
192
 The fact that analysis of CIMIC team coordination was conspicuously missing in the HQ JFNZ synopsis is concerning and may 
reflect a lack of understanding in the NZDF about how these teams are applied. This lack of understanding about CIMIC will be 
reflected upon by interviewees in the following chapter and discussed in greater detail in the discussion within Chapter Six. 
193
 This support reportedly enhanced the GoV response by enabling it to transport aid, personnel and complete assessments 




logistical support enabling the GoV and local stakeholders to begin distributing critical food and 
non-food items to communities (McCully, 2015a).194 
GoNZ and NZDF sources also reported the military's coordination efforts were well-received by 
the GoV and had benefitted both nations. Politicians and Ministers, for example, reported that 
coordination efforts strengthened bilateral relations  (McCully, 2015b, Brownlee, 2015). NZDF 
personnel also noted that local LOs gave the NZDF information and connections, which helped 
the military determine its tasks and priorities (Chapman, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). 
Internal reports disclosed some coordination issues with host nation officials 
Although no obstacles to NZDF-GoV coordination were publicised, the HQ JFNZ synopsis alluded 
to issues which may have impeded coordination.195 Most notably was the concern that there:  
“may be a tendency for local officials to channel support to their own areas of 
interest first, with a perceived lack of a higher level national plan that the 
NZDF could work to” (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). 
Further clarification or examples were not given. This gap in the report raises questions about 
how domestic factors may have impacted trust, relationships and coordination between the 
NZDF and GoV.196 
Coordination with the affected population 
All published literature expressed the affected population’s gratitude 
Of all the sources reporting the affected population’s views of the NZDF, over 90% were 
produced by the GoNZ or NZDF. While this meant actual community perspectives were limited, 
all articles suggested there were good relations between individuals. In general, these views 
focused on the outcomes of the NZDF’s HADR or the gratitude of communities (McLoughlin, 
2015, p.7)(NZ Army, 2015, p.8).   
Local media also reported that the NZDF received “overwhelming praises and words of 
appreciation” from communities on Mataso and Epi Island, for the HADR provided (Cullwick, 
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2015).197 While no articles reported obstacles to NZDF-community coordination, the overall lack 
of perspectives from the affected population emphasises the value of stakeholder interviews, 
particularly to determine how communities viewed the NZDF’s coordination. 
Coordination was reportedly improved by GoF LOs and previous HADR experience 
This gap in literature meant the HQ JFNZ synopsis contained the most in-depth analysis of the 
NZDF-affected population coordination.198 This emphasised the benefits of using chiefs and 
local guides to facilitate communication between the military and outer island communities. 
Personnel reported this broke down language and social barriers and made it easier to extract 
information about villages (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). This was because chiefs were perceived to be 
“more aware of what needed to be done within their own community,” which helped the NZDF 
determine its tasks and priorities (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). 
Internal reports identified some coordination challenges  
In contrast to published literature, some obstacles to coordination were alluded to in the HQ 
JFNZ synopsis. This noted that interaction with islanders varied, due to the different priorities 
and operating styles these individuals had to New Zealand actors. These differences led to the 
observation that:  
“Patience is required when dealing with the local population to determine 
priorities when providing HADR support” (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). 
Information from locals was also reportedly "not forthcoming," at times, until locals understood 
the NZDF was there to help (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). No further analysis accompanied these 
statements, around how these obstacles may have impacted coordination or the HADR 
provided. These observations do, however, raise questions about why Ni-Vanuatu appeared 
non-communicative and had different priorities to the military.199 
Some coordination issues were alluded to by communities and stakeholders 
While obstacles were not openly discussed by communities or linked to the NZDF, some articles 
alluded to relevant issues. A number of agencies and members of the population reported the 
vulnerable and severely impacted were not receiving adequate assistance (Transparency 
International Vanuatu, 2016). Among these individuals were several community leaders from 
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Shefa Province, where the NZDF later provided assistance (Transparency International Vanuatu, 
2015a, Hawkins, 2015b).200 They stated,  
"our communities are short on water, most of our islands and communities 
lack the necessary sufficient facilities that can support families after a natural 
disaster, it is now more than a week, and we have yet to receive any form of 
relief assistance while other areas have already received assistance” 
(Transparency International Vanuatu, 2015a, Hawkins, 2015b). 
These reports suggest humanitarian needs were not being met and that HADR may have been 
unfairly distributed. While these statements were made prior to the NZDF commencing tasks 
on Epi Island, they highlight the context the NZDF was deploying into. Further information is, 
however, needed to determine whether, or not, this impacted the NZDF. 
Part Two findings 
The sections above, examined the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts at the strategic, 
operational and tactical level. Within grey literature, these efforts were generally portrayed in a 
positive light, with coordination often described as ‘good’ or ‘beneficial.’ Most sources reflected 
on the practical benefits of NZDF support, particularly for civilian actors and the population.  
While the number of these reports is substantial, their content and sources reveals some 
limitations. For example, minimal analysis or evidence surrounded why stakeholders held these 
views. The majority of stakeholder perspectives, including those of civilians, were also drawn 
from NZDF or GoNZ material.201 Published grey literature also contained minimal analysis of 
obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-military coordination or how these impacted HADR.202 The HQ JFNZ 
synopsis also contained few examples of how obstacles impacted coordination or HADR.  
On the surface, these findings may reinforce stakeholder perceptions that the NZDF’s 
coordination was positive and well-received. The fact that the internal HQ JFNZ lessons learned 
synopsis, however, identified several obstacles to coordination which were not publicised, 
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questions how accurately grey literature portrayed obstacles and stakeholder perspectives.203 
This indicates there is a discrepancy between published and unpublished stakeholder 
perspectives in grey literature. 
 
Chapter Two summary 
The chapter above explored how TC Pam grey literature described both overall HADR response 
and the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts. While, in general, stakeholder perspectives 
portrayed the NZDF’s coordination efforts favourably, a number of inconsistencies were 
evident, when published and unpublished grey literature views were compared.  
Substantial gaps were also identified in grey literature, which amplify the concerns raised in 
Chapter One. In particular, these include a lack of clarity around how civilian stakeholders view 
the NZDF's civil-military coordination and how obstacles may be impacting actors' assistance. 
These shortcomings justify the need to interview a broad range of stakeholders, both to better 
understand actors’ perspectives and ensure a balance analysis of the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination is presented. These interview findings are presented in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Three: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen 
 
In Chapter Two TC Pam grey literature described the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts 
as ‘positive’ and ‘beneficial.’ The present chapter builds on these findings by examining how the 
thirty-five interviewed stakeholders perceived these same efforts.204 This provides more in-
depth data, which aims to address the identified gaps in grey literature. 
Findings are presented in three parts, with each focused on a separate research question.205 
Part One examines how interviewees perceived the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in the TC 
Pam response. Part Two discusses the four key obstacles to coordination, as discussed by 
participants. Part Three then explores the impact these obstacles were reported to have on the 
HADR provided by stakeholders.  
 
Part One: TC Pam stakeholder perceptions 
 
Interviewee perspectives are examined in the four sections below. These report how 
participants described the NZDF’s coordination with: i) New Zealand civilian actors, ii) 
international and local humanitarian actors, iii) the GoV, and iv) the affected population.   
In each section, the general impressions of interviewees are summarised, along with their 
reasoning for holding these views. Both positive and negative stakeholder perceptions are 
reported, while a more detailed examination of obstacles and their impacts is reserved and 
reported in Part Two and Three respectively. At times, perspectives varied significantly between 
participants. These contrasts are highlighted where possible, along with participants’ 
justification for their views. 206 
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i. Coordination with New Zealand civilian actors 
 
Civil-military coordination enhanced the WoG response 
In general, interviewees viewed the NZDF’s coordination with MFAT, USAR, NZ MAT and New 
Zealand humanitarian agencies as positive in the TC Pam response. Most New Zealand 
participants described the practical benefits of coordination, such as the NZDF’s logistical 
support and how this reduced overall costs for civilian actors.207  
As a result, many felt civil-military coordination had enhanced the overall WoG response and 
the ability of individual civilian actors to meet the affected population’s needs.208 This was 
because it enabled civilian actors to provide assistance more rapidly, efficiently and in larger 
quantities than would have been possible using commercial assets.209 
Pre-disaster interaction enhanced coordination at the strategic level 
A number of factors were believed to be behind positive coordination efforts. Particularly at the 
strategic level, pre-disaster interaction between the NZDF and stakeholders such as MFAT and 
the Ministry of Health (MoH) was described as “key to the success of the [WoG] mission.”210 
This was because individuals had a greater understanding of each other’s roles and 
organisations before deployment.211  
The new DJIATF model and its leadership improved coordination 
 
The application of the DJIATF model and particularly embedding NZDF personnel in the High 
Commission were also perceived as “crucial” in the initial response.212 This was because this 
close interaction improved communication, planning and understanding between NZDF and 
civilian representatives in Port Vila.213  
Four interviewees credited the success of the model to DJIATF’s leaders, who were described as 
particularly skilled, professional and competent in their roles.214 This enabled them to act as a 
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bridge between civilian and military spheres, as they “could work with diplomats, civilian medics 
and all three of the services of the Defence Force.”215 
The unique characteristics of the NZDF 
Interviewees also reported that the NZDF displayed characteristics which made coordination 
easier with civilians. These characteristics included flexibility, a ‘give-it-a-go’ attitude and 
friendliness.216 Participants also felt the NZDF’s smaller size and command chain meant 
personnel were less hindered by hierarchy and bureaucracy.217 One New Zealand humanitarian 
participant observed,  
“[NZDF] tasking was much more civilianised and that does make life a lot easier… I think 
there is a flexibility, a 'can do' approach that is much more inherent within the New 
Zealand Defence Force than, as I say, the Australian.”
218 
Four interviewees felt these characteristics set the NZDF ahead of other foreign militaries, in 
terms of its civil-military coordination with national actors.219  
Command and control issues 
Despite these positive perceptions, ‘command and control’ issues were also observed and 
reportedly impeded civil-military coordination.220 While some interviewees felt MFAT’s civilian 
control over the NZDF had, at times, enhanced coordination, it also resulted in tensions 
between these stakeholders.221 Some participants described instances where NZDF personnel 
were believed to have deliberately disregarded civilian leadership or acted without MFAT 
authorisation. This frustrated MFAT officials and on at least one occasion reduced the 
effectiveness of the assistance provided.222 
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Ad hoc coordination and a lack of interaction 
Stakeholders also reported NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination was often ‘ad hoc’ or 
improvised.223 One OGA representative acknowledged that both the NZDF and civilian 
stakeholders were “winging it,” when working together. They reflected, 
“As it progressed it was very much neither [the NZDF nor OGA’s] really knew 
what the others did and weren't really sure how it really fitted into this 




Some interviewees believed this was due to most NZDF and new Zealand civilian personnel 
having little or no experience working together, prior to TC Pam.225 Others felt this was the 
result of shortcomings in the methods used to improve civil-military coordination.226  Exercises, 
table top discussions and lessons learned mechanisms were, for example, perceived as not 
always relevant for the Pacific HADR context and at times did not involve key actors.227 This 
frustrated stakeholders, particularly as 90% of all NZDF and New Zealand civilian actors felt 
more training and interaction would improve future civil-military coordination efforts.  
 
ii. Coordination with international and local humanitarian actors 
 
Minimal or ad hoc coordination was reported 
In general, participants reported there was either minimal or ad hoc coordination between 
NZDF and humanitarian representatives in the TC Pam response. 228 As evidence of this, two 
locally-based humanitarians reported their organisations were operating in the same area as 
the NZDF, yet only discovered this in hindsight, when representatives came across military 
personnel.229 One of these commented,  
                                                                                                                                                                           
Port Vila to embark a TV crew. This delayed the transportation of relief supplies for affected communities and angered MFAT 
officials who had not given their approval. 
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“For [NGO’s]… We don't have any information at all … that we can have a 
relationship or work closely with this [New Zealand] army.”
230
 
Despite the general lack of direct NZDF-humanitarian contact, participants which did witness 
examples of coordination perceived these as positive.231 Humanitarian reasoning related to the 
benefits of NZDF logistical support, which reduced transportation costs, and enabled agencies 
to access isolated communities and deliver assistance more rapidly.232  NZDF interviewees also 
described coordination in the field as “complimentary,” as personnel benefitted from the local 
knowledge and connections NGOs offered.233 
Stakeholders reported that different reasons were behind the lack of interaction 
Interviewees provided three main explanations for the lack of NZDF-humanitarian coordination. 
Two NZDF interviewees and one GoV official believed this was the result of humanitarians being 
reluctant to work with the NZDF.234 One NZDF representatives stated, 
“I have heard on the grapevine… that the [NZDF] combined headquarters at 
Port Vila struggled a little bit with [humanitarian] agencies that don’t really 
want to be seen to be aligning with military organisations.”
235
 
These reports were, however, contradicted by all humanitarian interviewees. These expressed 
the desire to coordinate more closely with the NZDF, in order to utilise assets and meet 
humanitarian needs.236  
Only one humanitarian stakeholder confirmed their organisation had reduced direct contact 
with the NZDF to adhere to the humanitarian principles.237 They emphasised, however, this did 
not mean their organisation did not want to coordinate, but chose to use humanitarian 
coordination mechanisms to facilitate interaction. 
Domestic factors were believed to impede coordination 
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Challenges concerning national capacity, coordination structures and oversight were also 
reportedly behind the NZDF-humanitarian separation.238 These views were expressed by 80% of 
humanitarian interviewees, who believed physical communication issues and poor facilitation 
by the GoV impeded their ability to coordinate with the NZDF.239 Some felt the GoV 
intentionally isolated humanitarian actors in the response, due to poor relations between these 
stakeholders.240 This included one participant who reported that some agencies were “not 
given permission” to operate in certain outer islands.241 
Challenges with the humanitarian coordination structure 
Interviewees also reported the humanitarian coordination structure and actions of INGO and 
UN agencies contributed to the lack of interaction.242 These issues related to UN mechanisms, 
stakeholder interests and a lack of integration between local and international structures.243   
Many local interviewees stated UN agencies and INGO’s had taken too much control over the 
NEOC.244 One local humanitarian described how this led some local agencies to boycott the 
system, which reduced their ability to coordinate with the NZDF. They recounted, 
“[Foreigners] came and sat and overtook, overtook OUR NDMO… there was 
not a black face in the room… There were [expatriates] colour-coded and 
running around… there was not any uniformed person in terms of any of the 




This meant that while larger INGOs and international agencies were able to coordinate with the 
NZDF through the NEOC, smaller agencies and local actors felt they were ‘left out.’ 
As a result, some stakeholders believed current humanitarian and UN coordination mechanisms 
were unsuitable for Pacific HADR responses.246 This included two humanitarian representatives 
                                                      
238
 Interview: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. The term foreign stakeholders include interviewees who were not Vanuatu-
based, such as INGO representatives or actors from New Zealand, Australia or other Pacific islands. Reasons largely related to 
national systems not functioning or being too slow to ensure humanitarian needs were being adequately met. 
239
 Interview: 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. Many believed either the GoV had not communicated how humanitarians could utilise NZDF 
assets. 
240
 Interview: 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16. Some stakeholders felt this separation between actors was a reflection of the GoV’s 
lack of trust for humanitarians. This was connected to historical tensions and the GoV’s frustration about local systems being 
disregarded and the NEOC being overwhelmed by international actors. 
241
 Interview: 1. 
242
 Interview: 9, 11, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25, 28. 
243
 Many participants believed humanitarian agencies were seeking publicity and donor support in the TC Pam response. Some 
felt this and the cost of travel to Epi Island (where the NZDF was operating) led agencies to provide assistance on the mainland 
Efate and Tanna Island, as they were more likely to gain visibility there. 
244
 Interview: 9, 11, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25, 28. 
245
 Interview: 11. 
246




with extensive HADR experience and two GoV officials. One of these GoV participants further 
reflected they would be “very hesitant for the UN to take that senior lead [on civil-military 
coordination]” following the TC Pam response.247 
 
iii. Coordination with the Government of Vanuatu 
 
The NZDF was viewed positively compared to other militaries 
Although, in general, interviewees felt GoV-NZDF coordination was positive, perspectives varied 
significantly among GoV participants. For example, while the majority of NZDF and GoNZ 
interviewees believed coordination was ‘good,’ just over half of the GoV participants expressed 
this view.248  
Interviewees provided three main reasons for their views. First, NZDF and GoNZ participants 
believed the NZDF adopted a flexible and “collaborative approach” with the GoV.249 This 
reportedly enhanced coordination as it demonstrated respect for national leadership and 
fostered better relationships. One GoNZ official reflected,  
“New Zealand [Defence Force] efforts were appreciated by the [GoV] and 




Second, both GoV and New Zealand stakeholders felt the use of DJIATF and local LOs enhanced 
civil-military coordination efforts.251 These benefits were particularly observed in the NEOC and 
on the Canterbury, where close interaction reportedly increased levels of understanding, 
communication and coordination.252  
Third, while not all GoV participants agreed, some interviewees believed the NZDF’s unique 
characteristics, culture and ethnic makeup meant the GoV found it easier to coordinate with 
the NZDF.253 Participants also reported the influence of New Zealand culture made the NZDF 
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friendlier and easier to work with.254 Due to a combination of these factors, a number of GoV 
officials reported it was easier to coordinate with the NZDF, in comparison to other foreign 
militaries such as the ADF.255  
Initial tension and issues over control were reported 
Despite these positive views, 70% of GoV interviewees identified ‘areas for improvement’ and 
three officials reported significant coordination issues with the NZDF.256 These related to the 
NZDF’s prioritisation of speed, organisational culture and the military’s tendency to take 
control. These factors led some GoV officials to report that it was “difficult to work with the 
military.”257  
In contrast to most interviewees who felt the NZDF’s rapid arrival was positive, some GoV 
participants believed this negatively impacted coordination. One GoV official reported NZDF 
personnel were viewed as “trying to bulldoze everything” in the initial response.258 This 
frustrated officials and almost resulted in the first NZDF Hercules aircraft being denied approval 
to land in Vanuatu, when a public servant did not receive requested information.259  
Other GoV interviewees believed the rapid influx of militaries and a lack of communication 
meant assets were not always suitable for the disaster context or used effectively.260 One of 
these reflected,  
“Your need to help is not what's important here and you need to listen to 
people like me or the Prime Minister's Office or NDMO… having all the 
military assets there for the first ten days or fourteen days, and them all to 
leave when really the hard work is just about to get started, is a bit tough.”
261
 
These views led GoV participants recommended the NZDF or GoNZ ask affected governments 
what support is needed prior to departure.262 They also reflected on whether staggering the 
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arrival of assets or using these for longer periods, might be more beneficial for the affected 
population in the long-term.263 
Frustration and coordination issues were also reported over the control of NZDF assets. GoV 
officials felt NZDF personnel had, at times, undermined national leadership, which was 
considered disrespectful.264 One GoV official recalled, 
“When [NZDF personnel] walked [into the NDMO] they said ‘we feel that it’s 
proper for us to assist Shefa province, we’re able to operate within that 
facility’… But normally it’s the [Vanuatu] Government that should decide 
where [military assets] go.”
265
  
These views were, however, challenged by NZDF and GoNZ participants, post-interview.266 
 
iv. Coordination with the affected population 
 
Perceptions tied to positive outcomes for the affected population 
In general, participants’ reported that relations and coordination between the NZDF and 
affected population were positive. Many interviewees believed this was a natural reaction to 
the desperate situation communities were in, prior to NZDF arrival.267 Some felt this meant the 
communities would have been grateful for any assistance provided.268 This was reflected on by 
one GoV official, who stated,  
“The [Ni-Vanuatu] people are lovely people. They are not going to stand in 
the way of the [NZDF’s] assistance… And they don't much care whether it’s 
the Vanuatu Government, the New Zealand Government… They just want to 
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All community representatives expressed this extreme gratitude and described the NZDF’s 
assistance in a favourable light.270 Some also stated that the NZDF’s presence uplifted 
community spirits after the disaster.271 
Contrasting views of the level of coordination and communication 
Participant perspectives varied considerably about the level of communication between the 
NZDF and communities. Most NZDF, GoNZ and GoV interviewees, for example, believed local 
LOs and chiefs had helped facilitate communication.272  
In contrast, ten participants, including 70% of community representatives reported there had 
been minimal interaction or communication between the NZDF and population.273 This 
outcome was linked to the NZDF communicating with only a small number of predominantly 
male leaders.274 One community representative reflected,  
“If [NZDF personnel] spend just one minute talking with somebody to make 
assessments, they can get [information] that… is not serious or is not too 
important... They are talking with some important people in the village, but… 
You cannot just talk to ONE person.”
275
 
This meant information was not always shared with communities and only certain needs were 
reported to the NZDF.  
Contrasting views of cultural understanding 
Perspectives also varied concerning the impact culture had on coordination. For example, 
several interviewees believed the NZDF’s “friendly” culture and the deployment of personnel 
with Maori or Pacific Island heritage made it easier for the affected population to coordinate 
with personnel.276 This contrasted with the perspectives of some locally-based interviewees. 
One highlighted that NZDF personnel were mainly Polynesian not Melanesian, and that there 
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were “huge differences between Polynesian… and Melanesian cultures.”277 This meant cultural 
understanding and better coordination were not guaranteed for the NZDF.  
Community representatives also reported examples where they felt cultural barriers impeded 
coordination with the NZDF.278 Some reported Ni-Vanuatu were “afraid” to approach military 
personnel or felt they would be judged or considered lazy if they communicated their needs.279 
Some participants linked these concerns to Vanuatu’s colonial past and development history.280 
Others reported communities were worried that questioning or disagreeing with the NZDF 
might lead to support being withdrawn.281  
Communities desired greater levels of interaction and accountability 
As a result of the lack of interaction and communication, four community representatives 
believed the NZDF had not understood or addressed the priority needs of communities.282 One 
of these commented, 
“It'd be more social [for NZDF personnel] to try and talk to locals… the people 
would really want to socialise more with them and ask them ‘what are they 




This led all of these interviewees to recommend greater coordination between the NZDF and 
the affected population in the future.284  
Part One findings 
The sections above examined the perceptions of TC Pam stakeholders and presented key 
findings. One of these is that most interviewees viewed the NZDF’s civil-military coordination 
efforts as good and beneficial. Some even considered the NZDF ahead of other militaries, in 
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terms of coordination with the GoV and other civilian stakeholders.285 Participants provided 
reasoning for these positive views. These included factors like the NZDF’s characteristics and 
culture, previous interaction between actors and coordination mechanisms, such as the DJIATF. 
In contrast to these positive perceptions, minimal or ad hoc coordination was also reported 
between the NZDF and sectors.286 Some GoV representatives also felt there had been 
significant tensions and challenges when coordinating with the NZDF.  
In general, these stakeholder perspectives portrayed a more critical view of the NZDF’s civil-
military coordination, than was expressed in grey literature. Over 90% of all participants did, 
however, highlight a strong desire to coordinate more closely with the NZDF and enhance civil-
military coordination efforts in future HADR responses. 
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Part Two: Obstacles to Coordination  
 
This section reports the four key obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-military coordination, as collated 
from interview data. An overview of these obstacles is presented in Table 2.287  
Key obstacle  % Sub-themes and coordination issues 
i.  Domestic    
    factors 
83% − Measures taken to protect sovereignty and ensure national 
oversight impeded civil-military coordination. 
− The strain on national capacity (human, logistical and financial) 
impeded national coordination mechanisms. 
− Politics and personal interests impeded relationships, trust and 
civil-military coordination. 
 ii. Poor   
communication 
66% − Physical communication issues. 
− The use of terminology by military and civilian actors. 
− Communication and data band issues on HMNZS Canterbury. 
− Poor communication with the population, advanced by 
language, cultural barriers and limited engagement with local 
leadership. 
− Poor communication with humanitarian agencies. 
iii. Lack of 
understanding 
66% Regarding:  
− The capabilities and roles of the NZDF 
− Ni-Vanuatu culture and context, other actors’ capabilities and 
roles, HADR operations and the humanitarian principles 
(exhibited by NZDF personnel). 
− How the NZDF and civilian actors could communicate and 
coordinate. 
− How CIMIC teams and the DJIATF model integrated in HADR. 
iv. Organisational 
culture 
54% − Clashes in priorities, culture and organisational structure 
(between NZDF and civilian actors).  
− High staff rotation (MFAT within country and NZDF/DJIATF staff 
within postings). 
Table 2: Obstacles to the NZDF’s Civil-Military Coordination in the TC Pam response 
Due to the complexity of these obstacles and the number of sub themes, a more thorough 
analysis of these is included in Annex Four. This presents participant views and examples of the 
obstacles and sub-themes described the table above.  
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Part Two findings 
When collated, interviewee data revealed four thematic obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination. In order of significance these were: domestic factors, poor communication, lack 
of understanding, and organisational culture. 
An examination of the statistics behind these findings is also revealing. First, each obstacle was 
described by at least half of all participants, including at least one representative from each of 
the four civilian sectors.288 Three or more obstacles were also identified by 43% of all 
participants, including all of the NZDF and three GoNZ interviewees.289  These high proportions 
and the consistency of reports across sectors strengthen the validity of findings. 
Although some of these obstacles were discussed in grey literature, interviewees identified 
many additional sub-themes, some of which were believed to have significantly civil-military 
coordination.290 These obstacles were also frequently described as interconnected or dynamic. 
This meant some obstacles appeared to overlap and interact with one another.291  
Many participants also emphasised that their willingness to discuss these obstacles with the 
researcher was motivated by a desire to improve civil-military coordination efforts in future 
responses. This acknowledgement, in addition to many interviewees reporting issues which 
were not discussed in grey literature, draws attention to a discrepancy between published 
stakeholder views, and those reported by interviewees. 
 
Part Three: How the Obstacles to Coordination Impacted HADR  
 
Within interviews, participants identified four main impacts which resulted from the obstacles 
identified above. These are detailed below and include: i) HADR was delayed or not delivered, 
ii) assistance not always being suitable for the affected population or context, iii) population 
needs not always being met in accordance with humanitarian principles. 
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i. HADR was delayed or not delivered 
 
Twenty interviewees discussed examples where the assistance of the NZDF or other civilian 
stakeholders was delayed or not delivered because of the identified obstacles to civil-military 
coordination.292 Some of these related to the NZDF and other actors duplicating assessments, 
which were conducted prior to aid delivery or the commencement of tasks.293 Other examples 
related to NZDF procedures around the use of aircraft and vessels.294  
A frequently raised example was the lengthy reconnaissance which needed to be conducted by 
the NZDF, prior to the delivery of personnel or assistance in the outer islands. One GoV official 
described this as a “REALLY BIG challenge” as at times reconnaissance took a whole day to 
complete, while many populations remained isolated and were yet to receive food, water or 
medical assistance.295 
A lack of communication between the NZDF public relations team and MFAT, in particular, had 
negative impacts on HADR. For example, one GoNZ interviewee reflected on how the public 
relations team’s actions delayed the Canterbury’s departure from Port Vila, to embark a 
television crew. The interviewee reflected on how this went against procedures, commenting,  
“All communications from countries are meant to go through the High 
Commissioner... it was raised with [the NZDF] a couple of times and the guys 
on the ground were quite supportive, but the actual [NZDF Public Relations] 
team itself felt that it had its own mandate.”
296
  
This delayed the NZDF’s transportation of relief supplies for affected communities and angered 
MFAT officials, who had not given their approval. 
The GoV, OGAs and humanitarian participants also reported not being able to utilise NZDF 
assets or support effectively, which impeded their ability to provide and deliver assistance.297 
One GoV official, for instance, reported that it was three days before the GoV could utilise NZDF 
assets in the initial response, due to “the language barrier, the way they operate, the 
protocol.”298 At times, similar factors meant humanitarians struggled to meet the NZDF’s 
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planning requirements. This meant aid and personnel were “missed” and could not be delivered 
to affected populations as rapidly.299 
 
ii. Assistance was not always suitable for the affected population or context 
 
Fourteen interviewees provided examples where obstacles resulted in assistance being either 
unsuitable for the disaster context or affected population.300 
Some participants reported the NZDF’s assets and supplies were not always suitable for the 
outer island context.301  This was reportedly due to a lack of understanding about the area of 
operations, as well as a lack of communication between the NZDF, GoV and local stakeholders 
before deployment.  
Participants also connected this outcome to the NZDF’s prioritisation of speed and protocol.302 
One NZDF interviewee believed the drive to depart rapidly meant the Canterbury was “loaded 
at about a 60% solution,” whereas another forty-eight hours would have provided a better 
outcome for the population.303 
In other cases NZDF reportedly delivered Non-Food Items, equipment and aid to communities, 
but did not communicate how these were to be used or maintained.304  Some participants also 
reported the NZDF’s decision-making processes and HADR did not account for gender or 
women’s needs.305 These outcomes were connected to the NZDF predominantly 
communicating with male leadership and the military’s lack of awareness, cooperation and 
utilisation of trustworthy mechanisms, such as Community Disaster Committees.306  
Some negative impacts will likely have negative long-term impacts on communities 
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Finally, some of the tasks undertaken by the NZDF were perceived to have had negative long-
term repercussions for the affected population. A GoV representative, for instance, recounted 
how NZDF personnel were tasked to clear fallen trees and chop wood at the Prime Minister's 
Office. They reflected, 
“Apparently [sarcasm implied] there wasn't anything else for [the NZDF] to 
do… This [local] person said to me… ‘We should be paying a Ni-Vanuatu 
person to do that, so that they've got some money to take home and buy 
food for their family or put a new roof on their house.’”
307
 
This suggests some of the NZDF’s tasks may have been more appropriate for local stakeholders 
or individuals to undertake, for long term development benefits. These examples highlight a 
number of areas for improvement, particularly surrounding how the NZDF’s tasks are identified 
and making sure these account for the HADR context and long-term development impacts on 
the population. 
 
iii. Population needs were not met in accordance with the humanitarian principles  
 
Nine interviewees believed the four key obstacles and a lack of civil-military coordination 
contributed to some population needs not being met.308 Participants felt this was a result of a 
lack of communication and coordination between the NZDF, GoV and humanitarian actors.309 
This meant the NZDF predominantly focused on infrastructure repairs, while communities had 
higher priority humanitarian needs that were not being met by other actors. Four community 
representatives confirmed this occurred, reporting that food, water, medical supplies and 
shelter were actually their urgent needs.310  
Interviewees also felt a lack of communication between the NZDF and the affected population 
contributed to this outcome.  Community representatives and other interviewees believed the 
NZDF was either unaware of community needs or had not asked what these were.311 One 
humanitarian interviewee reflected on how this impacted the population, they commented, 
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“When [our organisation] did research post Cyclone Pam [community 
members] said, ‘[the military] didn’t ask me about what I need. They were 
basically giving me these relief items, but I don’t need them’… These 
[affected] people are hungry and living without water and maybe some of the 




The fact that the NZDF may not have focused on the priority needs was discussed and defended 
by one GoV official. They reflected,  
“In a different role [the NZDF] could have done some other things good or 
better. But that WASN'T their role. You can't fault them for their role. They 
were given a role to play and they played that role very well.”
313
 
The GoV participant acknowledged that it took six weeks for some stakeholders to get food and 
shelter to some communities on Epi Island and the Shepherds island group, due to logistical and 
financial issues.314 This, however, meant that while the NZDF was not tasked to meet these 
needs, there was higher priority humanitarian needs in their vicinity.  
Assistance was not always focused in areas of need  
 
Eight participants also reported the NZDF had not always focused its assistance in areas of 
greatest need.315 Many believed the NZDF began providing assistance in areas of Epi Island 
which were easier-to-access and less severely damaged, than the smaller, more isolated 
Shepherds islands nearby. These smaller islands reportedly had greater humanitarian needs 
and yet were not assisted by the NZDF until near the end of the deployment.316  
One NZDF interviewee reported that the military was aware of this in hindsight, along with the 
fact that local actors had already completed and returned needs assessments of these islands, 
prior to the NZDF’s arrival.317 
Some participants were aware stakeholders were trying to manipulate the NZDF’s HADR  
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Fifteen participants raised concerns that this or other examples of NZDF assistance were the 
result of local actors manipulating the NZDF’s assistance for their own interests.318 This included 
one GoV official, who stated, 
“In Vanuatu we have a lot of political parties and during distribution times it's 
easy for people in politics to influence, to step in and you know try to make a 
name for themselves using the aid that’s coming from New Zealand.”
319
  
Interviewees also felt the lack of coordination between the NZDF and local actors who 
distributed aid meant that unfair distribution occurred in some communities.320 Among these 
were six community representatives, some of who believed this aid was transported by the 
NZDF. Participants also reported it was the most vulnerable members of the community that 
often missed out on this assistance, such as widows, single mothers, orphans and those with 
disabilities.321 
While most NZDF and GoNZ participants reported politics had not impacted the NZDF’s 
response or stated they were unaware if it had, two acknowledged they were aware of these 
factors and attempts to manipulate HADR.322 One GoNZ interviewee stated, 
“The [local] representative on board [Canterbury] they were… ‘influencing’ 
where all the relief was going. Most of it would be going to the particular 
island where they are from. That is just from a PERSONAL perspective.”
323
  
This reveals a major challenge for NZDF personnel overseas, particularly when under the 
direction of governments and operating with limited information on the needs in outer islands. 
Part Three findings 
In the sections above, interviewees reported several impacts they felt obstacles to civil-military 
coordination had on HADR. Three of the major impacts entailed assistance being delayed, not 
delivered or being unsuitable for the affected population or context.  
Serious concerns were also raised by participants about the priority needs of communities not 
being met, as well as unfair distribution occurring and impacting vulnerable sectors of the 
population. Although not always directly attributed to the NZDF, these outcomes were believed 
to be the result of either a lack of civil-military coordination or communication between the 
NZDF and key sectors. 
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Analysis of these reports also reveals that, in many cases, interviewees believed that multiple 
obstacles contributed to the negative impacts on HADR. This illustrates the complexity of civil-
military coordination and draws further attention to the interconnected and dynamic nature of 
the identified obstacles to coordination.  
Finally, a number of interviewees were also concerned about critiquing the NZDF or GoV 
response. This particularly surrounded discussing how the identified obstacles to coordination 
impacted actors’ assistance. While most expressed hesitancy through body language or chose 
not to provide examples, a few openly discussed these concerns in their interviews.324 These 
views raise concerns about how valid data and feedback can be obtained following HADR 
responses, particularly if stakeholders are afraid of receiving negative repercussions. 
 
Chapter Three summary 
In the chapter above, TC Pam interviewee findings were examined. These detailed how the 
thirty-five interviewed stakeholders perceived the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts, 
obstacles to coordination and the impacts these had on HADR.  
Findings confirm that most participants viewed the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts as 
positive and beneficial for actors. Interviewee data, however, provided a greater depth of 
analysis on the reasons why different sectors and stakeholders held these perspectives. These 
included the NZDF’s characteristics and culture, previous interaction and coordination 
mechanisms, such as the DJIATF. 
Other aspects of these findings reveal a discrepancy between grey literature perspectives and 
those of interviewed stakeholders from the same sectors.  For example, four thematic obstacles 
to coordination were identified by participants, along with numerous sub-themes, which were 
not discussed in grey literature. Some of these also reportedly had serious negative impacts on 
the NZDF’s civil-military coordination and actors’ HADR.325 The most concerning of these 
reports suggests the priority needs of communities were not always met, unfair distribution 
occurred and vulnerable sectors of the population were the most impacted.  
The fact that grey literature did not discuss some of these obstacles to coordination and their 
impacts on HADR, in particular, raises some concerns. These surround the fact that the NZDF 
and GoNZ may not have been aware of stakeholder views, all barriers to coordination and the 
impacts these may have had on HADR.  
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TC Pam interview findings, therefore, reinforce the need for a robust analysis of civil-military 
coordination in Pacific HADR. Their contentious nature also justifies the need to examine more 
than one case study, to verify and compare data. This is undertaken in the following chapter, 





Chapter Four: Many Hands Make Light Work 
 
Having examined the TC Pam case study in the previous two chapters, this chapter will now 
examine the TC Winston response and grey literature findings. The scope of the case study 
includes all coordination which took place in New Zealand and Fiji, between 13 February and 17 
April 2016.326 The chapter is structured identically to chapter two. Part One describes the 
context of the NZDF’s response. Part Two explores stakeholder perspectives on the NZDF’s civil-
military coordination, including obstacles to coordination and their impact on HADR. 
 
Part One: Overview of the TC Winston disaster and response  
 
The sections below describe key elements of the TC Winston disaster and civil-military 
coordination. They provide an overview of the disaster scale and humanitarian needs, the 
overall HADR response, and the civil-military coordination mechanisms applied. This provides 
the context needed to understand the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts, which are 
explored in Part Two. 
i. Disaster scale and humanitarian needs 
 
Between 20 and 21 February 2016 TC Winston passed through all four of Fiji’s Divisions.327 
Hurricane-force winds of up to 306 kilometres an hour were recorded. This meant the country 
had endured the most powerful Category 5 cyclones ever recorded in the southern hemisphere 
(GoF, 2016b).328  
The disaster left a trail of destruction across 167 of the archipelago’s islands (GoF, 2016b). The 
main island of Viti Levu and the Lau Island Group were both severely affected, where NZDF 
later provided assistance (see Figure 4). One NZDF representative gave their first impressions of 
affected islands as follows: 
“I saw the raw effects of what Winston had done; no leaves left on trees, and 
[the villages] just stood there naked. An island that was now brown and had 
lost all of its green, no roofs on houses and the church had taken some 
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damage too. The wharf was destroyed… A quiet, still island; soon be flooded 
by NZDF, USAR and Fijian Army Personnel” (Navy Today, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 4: Path of TC Winston and severely affected areas. Source (OCHA, 2015). 
 
The resulting destruction was greater than anything seen in previous natural disasters.329 
Approximately 540,400 individuals were impacted, this being 60% of the population (GoF, 
2016b). Communication was severed to most affected islands and power cuts were 
experienced in 80% of Fiji (GoF, 2016b). The restoration of these services took up to four 
months in some areas, which isolated many communities in the initial response (Radio New 
Zealand, 2016h). 
Major humanitarian needs were created. Residential housing was severely impacted, displacing 
nearly half of Fiji’s population (NZDF, 2016b, Baker-Wilson, 2016).330 Schools and hospitals also 
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suffered extensive damage, which halted medical and education services in some areas (GoF, 
2016b, Round, 2017).331 The PDNA indicated the individuals who were worst affected by TC 
Winston were already those in the most impoverished sector of society (GoF, 2016b).332 
In some locations, total crop losses were reported. These were further exacerbated by El Nino-
related water shortages and TC Zena, which struck two months after Winston (UN OCHA, 2016j, 
Round, 2016a). This led up to 70% of farmers to abandon their crops, which jeopardised the 
livelihoods of over half of Fiji’s population (Round, 2016c)(Radio New Zealand, 2016g, UN 
OCHA, 2016g).333 
In total, damages and losses were estimated at FJ$1.99 billion -  approximately 22% of Fiji’s GDP 
(GoF, 2016b, World Bank, 2018).334 These figures meant that despite the Island nation having 
one of the strongest economies in the Pacific, external support was required to address the 
aforementioned needs. While the UN’s Flash Appeal later made the TC Winston response the 
best funded emergency of 2016, figures suggest less than half of the required funds were 
donated (UN OCHA, 2016j).335 These factors, and the fact that foreign military assets were 
offered at no cost to stakeholders, likely contributed to the NZDF and other foreign militaries 
playing a major role in the response. 
This repeated cycle of destruction and recovery highlights not only the challenges faced by Fiji, 
but the many other Pacific Island countries enduring increasingly intense and frequent natural 
disasters. This trend reinforces the importance of this study and research into civil-military 
coordination, to ensure Pacific HADR stakeholders are working together well and adequately 
addressing the needs of affected communities. 
 
ii. Overview of the national and international response 
 
The initial response 
In contrast to the TC Pam response, the Fijian capital Suva was relatively undamaged. This 
meant a rapid national response was able to be initiated by the GoF, which placed the Fijian 
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 The GoV reported that 55% of schools and 88 medical facilities were either damaged or destroyed in the cyclone.  
332
 Data from 2013 and 2014 reported that 35% of Fijians lived below the basic needs poverty line. Hardest hit were the 
Northern and Eastern Divisions which had the highest poverty rates, at 48% and 40% respectively. 
333
 By June 2016 the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation reported major shortages of fruit, vegetables and fish. Articles also 
reported that children were being hospitalised for malnutrition around this time. 
334
 Fiji’s GDP was calculated from World Bank data, which reported Fiji’s GDP as US$4.39 billion in 2015. TC Winston damages 
and losses equated to NZD $1.39 billion. 
335
 The Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster only received 39% of the funding required. Combined with TC Zena setbacks, this 
left an on-going need for seeds and seedlings. The Shelter Cluster also received only 21% of the requested funding, which 




NDMO in charge of response coordination. A State of Natural Disaster was announced for all 
Divisions, on 20 February and would later be extended until 19 April (Bainimarama, 2016, Radio 
New Zealand, 2016c).336 This enabled the GoF to request emergency support from Fijian 
Ministries, police, RFMF and foreign militaries, to be used at officials’ discretion.  
The Fijian Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama then appealed for international assistance 
the following day (UN OCHA, 2016c). This call was responded to by twenty nine foreign 
governments,337 seven foreign militaries338 and numerous humanitarian actors responded to 
this appeal (UN OCHA, 2016g).339  
Response priorities and data collection  
The GoF announced multiple priorities in the response and undertook these in two phases. 
Phase one focused on the provision of basic needs such as food, water, shelter and accessibility 
(Fiji Village, 2016). Phase two focused on the restoration of essential services, such as 
electricity, water, ports, health and educational services (Fiji Village, 2016).  
The Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF) played a major role in spearheading these priorities. 
RFMF personnel were put in charge of evacuating affected communities, coordinating logistics 
and distributing food and non-food items (Bainimarama, 2016, UN OCHA, 2016e).340 This level 
of military involvement is considered unusual in Pacific HADR, as few Island States have 
national militaries, particularly the size of the RFMF (Rotan Charter, 2012).341 
Similarly to the TC pam response, logistical, resource and communication challenges, however, 
impeded overall HADR efforts. For example, while some officials stated that all communities 
had received emergency assistance by early March, other stakeholder reports challenged these 
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 Although legislation limited this State to 30 days, a second 30-day period was announced on 21 March. This extension only 
applied to red zone areas including: the northern Yasawas, Bua, Wainunu, Wailevu, Vaturova, Tunuloa, Savusavu, Rabi, 
Wainikeli Cakaudrove, Koro, Gau, Ovalau, Verata, Wainibuka, Nakorotububu, Saivou, Rakiraki, Tavua, Ba and the northern Lau 
Group (where the NZDF was based until departure on 17 April). 
337
 Donor Governments included: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, European Union, France, French Polynesia, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Lithuania, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Sweden, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Tonga, the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America, and Vanuatu. 
338
 FRANZ partners included the ADF, NZDF and Armed Forces of New Caledonia (FANC) and Armed Forces of French Polynesia 
(FAPF). India, Indonesia and Tonga also made significant military contributions. The Indian Government provided aircraft, 100 
military engineers were provided by the Indonesian Government and the Tongan Government deployed two Navy vessels. 
These were the VOEA Pangai and the VOEA Late which assisted in Vanuabalvu and the Lau Island group, alongside the NZDF. 
339
 Humanitarian actors began to be accepted by the GoF on 22
 
February. The support of UN OCHA and the Pacific 
Humanitarian Team (PHT) was among the first accepted. Local organisations such as the Fiji Red Cross Society also played 
significant roles in the response. This included at least forty five agencies which attended meetings organised by the Fiji Council 
of Social Service and the Pacific Islands Association of NGOs (PIANGO). 
340
 Damage assessments and ration distribution were also initiated by the military immediately after the cyclone. 
341
 The RFMF is large in relation to Fiji’s population as it has more than 3,500 active soldiers and 6,000 reservists. Maritime 
assets were allocated areas within which they provided assistacne. These included the MV Sigavou (Northern Division), MV 
Vunlagi (Western Division) and MV Cagivou (Eastern Division).  The Fijian Navy also deployed two patrol boats RFNS Kiro (in the 




reports (NEOC, 2016, Fiji News, 2016).342 Some of these suggested that HADR was delayed and 
not getting through to the most vulnerable (Baker-Wilson, 2016, Radio New Zealand, 2016n, 
Baleilevuka and Dipitika, 2016).343 
Delays created by TC Zena also meant the PDNA was released sixty-five days after TC Winston 
(UN OCHA, 2016h, p.1, GoF, 2016b, p.23). This meant stakeholders had to rely on locally-based 
sources and data to determine their priorities and meet humanitarian needs. Collectively, these 
factors led agencies and donors to call for greater visibility in future responses, to ensure their 
aid was being distributed according to humanitarian needs (UN OCHA, 2016g, p.3, NEOC, 2016, 
p.3, Fiji News, 2016). 
Foreign military support 
Despite previous diplomatic tensions between Fiji, Australia and New Zealand, the assistance of 
the NZDF and other FRANZ partners was quickly accepted by the GoF (UN OCHA, 2016c, 
McDermott, 2016).344 These militaries were deployed for up to eight weeks and provided 
assistance in the GoF’s highest priority areas (see Figure 5), in terms of cyclone damage and 
humanitarian needs (ADF, 2016, UN OCHA, 2016b). This scale of foreign military support 
exceeded that deployed for any previous Pacific HADR response. 
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 Officials reported that more than 370,000 individuals had received the first round emergency food distributions by the end 
of March. This was, however, 90% of the GoF’s targeted population.  
343
 As early as six days after the cyclone, humanitarian and community representatives reported that aid was not getting 
through to the most vulnerable. Reports also noted that isolated communities were often the last to receive aid, as the 10% of 
the population which hadn’t been reached by stakeholders were located in hard-to-access areas. 
344
 These tensions were briefly detailed in the introduction and will be discussed in greater detail within Part Two. They related 





Figure 5: TC Winston GoF priority areas. Source: (FAO, 2016).345 
Foreign militaries were deployed alongside RFMF contingents, within separate geographical 
boundaries. Their major tasks included logistical support, clearing debris and restoring critical 
infrastructure (ADF, 2016, NZDF, 2016g). Considering the NZDF was deployed for longer than 
any other foreign military and was allocated the GoF’s number one priority area, the force’s 
civil-military coordination would be vital for ensure population needs were met.  
Some concerning obstacles to coordination and the distribution of HADR  
Within grey literature, some stakeholders raised concerns about corruption and the misuse of 
aid. Some articles alleged RFMF personnel consumed or sold aid that was intended for cyclone 
victims (Radio New Zealand, 2016b, Rowan Gard and Veitayaki, 2017, p.161). Members of Fiji’s 
Opposition party also accused GoF officials of favouritism, nepotism and devoting most of their 
energy to “looking good on the international stage and ignoring the plight of the ordinary 
people at home” (Radio New Zealand, 2016b, Radio New Zealand, 2016m).346  
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 Figure 5 details the twelve priority zones in the response, these were designated by the GoF and are listed in order of 
priority. The Lau Island Group is centre right in the diagram and was where the NZDF and JTF was predominantly based 
throughout the TC Winston response. The ADF focused its support in the islands of Koro and Taveuni, in the Lomaviti group 
(GoF priority two in Figure 5). The HMAS Canberra and the majority of the Australian JTF were deployed to Fiji on 26 February 
and returned 01 April. NZDF and French military Forces alternatively focused on the Lau Island Group (GoF priority one). The 
NZDF and the majority of its JTF deployed from 28
 
February and departed on 17 April. French Forces departed 24 February; it is 
unclear how long French Forces stated for but at least until 15 March. 
346
 Fiji’s Opposition party called for greater accountability and transparency, particularly surrounding GoF control over foreign 
assistance. Opposition leaders stated the public was entitled to know the extent of damage caused by Cyclone Winston, while 




Community representatives also alleged that some offers of military support were conditional 
and motivated by political interests (Radio New Zealand, 2016l).347 The cyclone also struck in 
the lead-up to Fiji’s 2018 elections, which heightened domestic tensions (Cook Island News, 
2016, Radio New Zealand, 2017, Tahana, 2016). Diplomatic tensions were also reported 
between Fiji, New Zealand and Australia, although Prime Minister Bainimarama commented 
that New Zealand media was “exaggerating the tension between the two countries” (Radio New 
Zealand, 2016e, Round, 2016d). 
Concerns were also raised about the accuracy of information published during and after the 
HADR response. Stakeholders noted the “absence of critical baseline data” and “reliable 
assessment results highlighting areas of need” (UN OCHA, 2016j, p.2). This was acknowledged 
in the PDNA, which confirmed there were no records of aid supplies, once they reached the 
divisions (GoF, 2016b, p.114).348 Some linked this lack of information-sharing to Fiji’s Media 
Industry Decree, suggesting published stakeholders perspectives did not always reflect what 
was occurring on the ground (Round, 2016b, Amnesty International, 2017).349 This was 
reflected on by the leader of the Fijian Opposition Party, which stated that “self-censorship” 
was widespread in Fiji and among media (Round, 2016b).   
Some of the allegations above were validated by the Fijian office of the Auditor-General, which 
confirmed that disciplinary action was taken against GoF officials in 2017 (Vuibau, 2017). These 
measures related to the unauthorised diversion of rations, delays in aid delivery or rations 
being unaccounted for. No sources, however, reflected on how the aforementioned factors 
may have impacted civil-military coordination, or the NZDF’s response specifically. 
Stakeholder perspectives on civil-military coordination 
Within grey literature, many stakeholders reflected on the differences between the TC Pam and 
Winston responses. In general stakeholders reported that the overall response coordination 
was “much smoother” in Fiji and a “a completely different kettle of fish” to the response a year 
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 Comments referred to the Government of Indonesia’s offer of military support. This was connected to political interests in 
West Papua. Local stakeholders clarified they did not believe the GoNZ and GoA had set pre-conditions for HADR, despite these 
Governments being seen as opponents of Fiji's Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama. 
348
 This meant actors and the GoF could not evidence where their aid was delivered or that it had reached targeted 
communities. This presents a significant issue as it cannot be evidenced that aid and rations were distributed according to need, 
and therefore according to the humanitarian principles. 
349
 The Media Industry Decree was introduced in June 2010. This enables the Fiji Media Industry Development Authority to 
enforce and investigate possible violations by local media outlets. The Fiji Times editor and publisher were reported to be facing 
sedition charges post-disaster. This related to GoF officials accusing the Fiji Times of being a “mischief maker” surrounding post-
cyclone sugar industry issues. Articles also alleged that individuals were being intimidated or threatened for speaking out 




earlier (Narayan, 2016). This was linked to the NGO community learning lessons from Vanuatu 
and fewer humanitarian actors arriving in the country.350  
Stakeholders also believed the HADR response was more controlled due to the GoF’s approach, 
which they described as “centralist” and largely implemented by the RFMF (Narayan, 2016, Loy, 
2017). Locally-based actors, including one representative from the Fijian Red Cross, perceived 
this as a protectionist measure to ensure the GoF and national stakeholders maintained 
control. They stated, 
“The international response a year earlier in neighbouring Vanuatu… had 
been completely overpowering. International aid agencies, donors, and the 
United Nations swept in, bringing their own systems and ways of doing 
things… When Cyclone Winston struck, Fiji’s government was determined not 
to let the same thing happen” (Loy, 2017). 
The TC Winston lessons learned report also concluded that civil-military coordination efforts 
had been very good (GoF and SPC, 2017).351 This concluded that military resources achieved a 
rapid scaling-up of HADR operations, which was “far in advance of what would have been 
possible with civilian capabilities alone” (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.40). Only a small number of civil-
military coordination issues were discussed in this report, which included some common 
obstacles to coordination (GoF and SPC, 2017).352  
State and UN stakeholders also reported that civil-military coordination efforts were successful, 
beneficial and “a real team effort” (McDermott, 2016). A World Bank report even linked the 
quick deployment of assets and relief to the RFMF’s role in the response, which contributed to 
“strong civil-military coordination” between the GoF and foreign militaries (Mansur et al., 2017, 
p.5). 
In contrast, some locally-based humanitarian stakeholders reported that foreign militaries 
lacked an understanding of national structures and had “worked separately to local systems” 
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 The same influx of actors did not occur as in Vanuatu. This was due to GoF restrictions, which placed the NDMO in charge of 
all foreign assistance and accepted humanitarian agencies on a case-by-case basis. Fiji’s central location in the Pacific also 
meant many INGOs already had staff or national branches located on Fiji’s mainland, which reduced the number of incoming 
agencies. This led humanitarians to reflect that the TC Winston response was “a completely different kettle of fish” to the TC 
Pam response (Narayan, 2016) 
351
 TC Winston lessons learned workshops were attended by over 500 participants from the GoF, local and international NGOs, 
affected communities, the private sector, humanitarian partners, sub-national government and civil society groups. The report 
summarises discussions and recommendations collated from these workshops. Although the workshop was hosted by the GoF, 
it was funded by the EU’s ACP-EU Building Safety and Resilience in the Pacific project, the Pacific Community and UN OCHA. 
352
 These are discussed in greater detail in Part Two. Obstacles included poor communication, information management issues 




(Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15). These seemingly disparate views indicate a more detailed 
examination of civil-military coordination is needed, which is undertaken in Part Two.  
The TC Winston response led to calls for more regional civil-military coordination  
Following the disaster, interest was generated to develop a regional framework to enhance 
civil-military coordination. Stakeholders recommended this involve more civil-military training 
and HADR  exercises in the Pacific (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.41).  
Two different models for the use of militaries in future HADR responses were also proposed. 
The first entailed militaries assuming a central coordination role, while the other involved 
militaries providing support only when called upon by stakeholders (GoF and SPC, 2017, 
p.41).353 Advantages to both approaches were noted, as these “[capitalised] on the military’s 
unique capabilities… and [ensured] civilian leadership in areas where they have comparative 
strengths” (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.41). 
Regional momentum was further evidenced during a civil-military workshop hosted by Fiji in 
2018 (Kumar, 2018).354 State representatives discussed the possibility of creating a civil-military 
taskforce in the Pacific, with the Fijian Minister for National Disaster Management concluding: 
“this is what we want in the region - for countries to have a civil and military 
taskforce that is able to prepare for and respond to the disaster events both 
domestically and abroad… it is essential that we utilise the skills and 
experience to design a framework for a regional response and recovery 
mechanism” (Kumar, 2018). 
These perspectives evidence a growing desire to improve future civil-military coordination in 
the Pacific. This further reinforces the importance of this study, to help identify previous 
obstacles to civil-military coordination and the HADR provided by stakeholders.  
 
iii. Civil-military coordination mechanisms 
 
The following sections describe the major civil-military coordination mechanisms the NZDF 
engaged with in the TC Winston response. This provides the reader with the context needed to 
understand Part Two findings. 
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 The report would however state that in either scenario there was a need to: strengthen communication, information 
management structures, and train military personnel in humanitarian assistance and protection principles to inform their work. 
354
 The workshop was co-hosted by the GoF and GoA, it was attended by stakeholders from Fiji, Australia, New Zealand, France, 
the US, European Union, and UN. It was a three day Pacific civil-military disaster response coordination workshop to strengthen 




National coordination structures 
Fiji’s national disaster management structures were similar to those used in Vanuatu. Offers of 
military support were initially discussed between Foreign Affairs officials, within the FRANZ 
arrangement.355 This ensured Governments maintained control over their own military assets, 
while the GoF accepted the assistance it required. 
The Fijian NDMO and NEOC were both co-located in Suva and became focal points for civil-
military coordination (GoF, 2016b).356 Coordination between the GoF, Fijian Ministries and 
humanitarian agencies was also undertaken within a National Cluster System.357 The level of 
GoF and RFMF involvement in the NDMO, NEOC and Clyster System was, however, unusual 
(Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15).358 GoF Ministers and RFMF personnel were seconded into 
the NEOC and coordinated closely with foreign military LOs (Government of Fiji, 2013, Section 
7.11). Most of these officials were either serving or ex-RFMF personnel, including Prime 
Minister Bainimarama, who served as Commander of the RFMF until 2014 (GoF, 2014b, 
Fraenkel et al., 2009).359 
These national-level structures were also linked to coordination mechanisms at the divisional, 
provincial and district level, which some militaries engaged with in the field.360 Most interaction 
between foreign militaries and the affected population was, however, facilitated by RFMF 
personnel or GoV elected LOs (Quilliam, 2016). At the village level, these communicated with 
District Officers, Roko Tui, village headmen or Turaga Ni Koro.361 
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 The FRANZ Arrangement is discussed in the literature review. Fiji is a partner country within the agreement. 
356
 The NDMO took responsibility for coordinating the overall disaster effort, while the NEOC controlled information 
management. Legislation states that the Fijian NDMO is manned by twelve permanent staff. The NDMO and NEOC operate 
under the authority of the Director NDMO, who also acted as National Disaster Coordinator. Both mechanisms were located in 
the building housing the Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development, National Disaster Management and Meteorological 
Services. 
357
 The National Cluster System was first applied in the 2012 TC Evan response and is an adaption of the UN humanitarian 
cluster system. Within the structure the NDMO takes charge of inter-cluster coordination, while GoF Ministries lead eight 
individual clusters. These are: Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH: led by Ministry of Health, Environmental branch), Shelter 
(Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development, Housing & Environment), Education (Ministry of Education), Health & 
Nutrition (Ministry of Health), Logistics (Ministry of Finance- Fiji Procurement Office and NDMO), Safety & Protection (Ministry 
of Women, Social Welfare & Poverty Alleviation), Food Security & Livelihoods (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forests), and 
Public Works & Utilities (Ministry of Works, Transport and Public Utilities).  
358
 NEOC Standard Operating Procedures only state that a RFMF Military LO was to be based in the NEOC to liaise with the 
RFMF for military tasking and resources. During the response Fiji’s Prime Minister was briefed by foreign militaries, 
humanitarian actors and donor Governments and helped determine the tasks militaries undertook in the response. 
359
 The impact RFMF involvement and the militarisation of the NEOC may have had on the NZDF’s civil-military coordination will 
be discussed further in Part Two and in Chapter Five. Prime Minister Bainimarama was Commander of the RFMF for the last 
fifteen of his thirty nine years in the RFMF. 
360
 Divisional Commissioners assumed responsibility for the coordination of emergency operations in each of the four divisions. 
Disaster Management Committees (DISMAC) were also established at the Divisional, Provincial and District levels. District 
Officers were then responsible for distributing relief supplies and aid after the disaster.  
361
 Roko Tui is the title for the executive head of any one of Fiji’s Provincial Councils. The position of village headman is locally 




New civil-military coordination mechanisms were developed 
Although Fiji’s disaster management structure was extensive, legislation did not clarify the role 
of militaries or how civil-military coordination would be facilitated in HADR (Gero et al., 2013, 
GoF, 2014a, White, 2015).362 Changes to the NEOC and National Cluster system were also made 
as the response progressed and new civil-military coordination mechanisms developed (GoF 
and SPC, 2017).363  
The main mechanism was the ‘Future Operations’ cell, which coordinated the deployment and 
use of foreign military assets (GoF and SPC, 2017).364 This cell was established in the NEOC, was 
led by the Minister for National Disaster Management and was restricted to military personnel 
(Cava, 2014). Foreign military LOs were embedded in this cell and received written requests for 
assistance from civilian stakeholders. These were undertaken if approved by the Minister for 
National Disaster Management and respective Foreign Affairs officials. This ensured the GoF 
and foreign States maintained civilian control over the deployed militaries. 
The other civil-military coordination mechanism consisted of two UN-CMCoord officers who 
were based in the NDMO (UN OCHA, 2016g).365 These officers facilitated communication 
between humanitarian agencies, the National Logistics Cluster, RFMF and foreign militaries.  
These also introduced an RFA system, which aimed to help civilian stakeholders utilise military 
assets.366 These were reportedly send to the Future Operations cell, after which the 
aforementioned decision-making process was followed. 
Part One findings 
The sections above provided an overview of the TC Winston disaster and civil-military 
coordination efforts. Several unique factors were identified, which likely impacted the NZDF’s 
response. These include the significant involvement of the RFMF and foreign militaries in the 
response and the GoF’s centralised approach. These factors also contributed to the relative 
militarisation of the NEOC and changes to national structure, such as the creation of a new civil-
military coordination mechanism, which was led by a Fijian Minister and RFMF staff.  
Having gained an understanding of the HADR context and these factors, Part Two now focuses 
specifically on the NZDF response. Considering the factors above and that this was the NZDF’s 
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 Pervious disaster reports revealed a lack of clarity over the roles and responsibilities of national and international actors. The 
GoF acknowledged these and in 2006 attempts were made to update legislation. Progress had, however, stalled due to a lack of 
human and financial resources. Legislation was therefore due for review in 2015, the year TC Winston struck. 
363
 These are described in more detail in Part Two, with respect to the NZDF’s operational-level coordination. 
364
 The other military cells were ‘current operations’ cell and ‘planning, strategy and international coordination.’ 
365
 The UN-CMCoord officers arrived on 26 and 28 February, approximately one week into the initial response. They facilitated 
briefings and information sharing sessions between foreign militaries, the RFMF, GoF, NDMO and humanitarian actors. 
366
 Grey literature sources contradicted each other surrounding whether or not this system was actually utilised by the GoF. 




largest deployment in the Pacific since World War Two, the TC Winston response is an ideal 
case study to examine the force’s civil-military coordination (NZMAT, 2016).367 
 
Part Two: the New Zealand Defence Force Response to TC Winston 
 
The three sections below examine how grey literature portrayed the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical level.368 Obstacles to coordination are 
examined, along with how sources reported these impacted HADR. While most stakeholders 
did not clarify how obstacles to coordination impacted the NZDF’s coordination or actors’ 
assistance, some of these factors are discussed. This is due to their relevance to interview 
findings and the comparative analysis to follow. 
Within this case study, a greater number of reports were produced by civilian actors. The scope 
of grey literature also included a broader range of stakeholder perspectives on the NZDF’s 
response. Internal after-action reviews were, for example, produced by the NDRF (2016b)369 
and a draft document by FENZ (2016).370 The TC Winston lessons learned workshop report also 
summarised the views of over five hundred stakeholders, from the GoF, INGOs, NGOs, private 
sector, civil society groups and affected population (GoF and SPC, 2017). 
Yet despite this increased diversity, over 70% of the literature reflecting on the NZDF’s civil-
military coordination was produced by the NZDF or GoNZ.371 As with Chapter Two findings, this 
means many stakeholder perspectives, even that of civilians, were drawn from NZDF or GoNZ 
sources. These proportions raise concerns about publication bias and whether, or not, these 
reports accurately reflect the actual perspectives of civilian stakeholders. 
 
i. Coordination at the strategic level 
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 The NZDF deployed approximately 530 personnel to Fiji. These included 150 combat engineers, a 55-member detachment 
from the RNZAF’s 3 Squadron, as well as tradesmen, medical personnel, environmental health and logistics specialists. 
368
 The strategic level refers to decisions made by high-level of leadership, at the national or headquarters level. The 
operational level refers to coordination at the general planning level. The tactical level refers to coordination which takes place 
in the field.  
369
 The NDRF report collated the perspectives of twelve New Zealand humanitarian stakeholders. These were: the Adventist 
Development and Relief Agency; Caritas Aotearoa New Zealand; cbm New Zealand; Christian World Service, Habitat for 
Humanity; Oxfam; Rotary; Salvation Army; Save the Children; Tearfund; UNICEF; and World Vision. 
370
 The draft version of the ‘Cyclone Winston USAR Deployment and NCC activation review’ was obtained via OIA. Officials 
clarified that it contained some inaccuracies, which have not been resolved within FENZ. For this reason it has not been shared 
with the NZDF and other agencies. The report incorporated feedback from MFAT, NZDF, USAR, FENZ personnel.  
371
 Internal NZDF reports were obtained via OIA. They include the HQ JFNZ J8 (Continuous Improvement) Branch TG 651.3 – OP 
Pacific Relief Tropical Cyclone Lessons Collection Synopsis, Lessons Learned OP Pacific Relief (Tropical Cyclone Winston), CIMIC 




Pre-disaster coordination among New Zealand stakeholders  
In the week leading up to TC Winston, the GoNZ initiated preparations for a WoG response. In 
accordance with deployment guidelines, MFAT took charge as lead agency and established two 
coordination centres. These were located in the Emergency Coordination Centre in Wellington 
and the New Zealand High Commission in Suva, which became civil-military coordination hubs.  
These measures initiated strategic-level coordination between the NZDF and New Zealand 
civilian representatives from MFAT, OGAs, humanitarian agencies and other partner 
agencies.372 Within after action reviews these arrangements were praised. For example, NDRF 
stakeholders described MFAT as an “efficient conduit for relaying information between [the] 
NDRF and NZDF” (NDRF, 2016b, p.7). 
Notably, some of these civilian and NZDF representatives were involved in or had deployed 
together for the TC Pam response. This reportedly benefitted the WoG response as NZDF and 
civilian representatives had pre-established relationships and a greater understanding of each 
other’s roles and capabilities (NZDF, 2016h). 
Coordination among FRANZ partners 
Pre-disaster coordination was also initiated under the FRANZ Arrangement, by foreign affairs 
officials.373 These discussed which FRANZ military assets were available for deployment and 
offered these to the GoF. Reports indicate the GoF, however,  delayed accepting these offers to 
establish a better understanding of cyclone damage (UN OCHA, 2016c, p.1). This meant the 
GoNZ’s offer of a P-3K2 Orion Aircraft to conducted aerial surveillance and assess initial 
damages was accepted, while ADF assets were kept on standby.374 
While the GoF’s approach to foreign military assistance appears to be more aligned with the 
Oslo and APC-MADRO guidelines, some grey literature sources implied these offers and their 
acceptance were more motivated by State interests, than humanitarian need. Humanitarian, 
academic and local sources, for instance, alluded to competition and power struggles between 
States and donors (FWCC, 2018, Loy, 2017). Others linked the large scale and length of ADF and 
NZDF deployments to Government interests (Powles, 2016, Loy, 2017, Powles and Sousa-
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 Within the New Zealand coordination hub the Emergency Task Force (ETF) was stood up and held daily meetings within the 
initial response. The ETF is chaired by MFAT; other members include the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, New 
Zealand Police, Ministry of Health, the New Zealand Fire Service, NGO partners (represented by the Council for International 
Development), the New Zealand Red Cross, FRANZ partners and the NZDF. OGAs included the New Zealand Medical Assistance 
Team (NZMAT), which consisted of individuals from the Ministry of Health, Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), which consisted of 
representatives from the Fire and Emergency New Zealand and the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI). 
373
 The GoF briefed diplomatic partners on 21 February, as the cyclone subsided. 
374




Santos, 2016). This was because it was in the interests of the GoNZ and GoA to strengthen 
diplomatic ties with Fiji, after the 2014 elections.375 
The NZDF’s rapid response and arrival was portrayed positively 
In spite of the historical tensions between the GoF and GoNZ, offers of financial and military 
support from New Zealand began to be accepted within twenty-four hours (MOG, 2014).376 Pre-
disaster planning then led to a rapid response from the NZDF, which was praised by GoF, GoNZ 
and NZDF stakeholders (NZDF, 2016f, Baguioro, 2016, Moir, 2016, MFAT, 2016).  
Most sources emphasised the practical benefits this coordination for the GoF. NZDF and Fijian 
media, for example, reported these efforts strengthened bilateral relationships (Baguioro, 
2016, p.9, Fiji Sun, 2016b). Positive outcomes were also described by RFMF officials, one stated,   
“Without the [NZDF] Orion, [the RFMF] would have to physically visit the 
likely affected areas to assess the damage. That is how we did it in the past 
and that took days to carry out in a scattered archipelago” (NZDF, 2016a, 
p.15). 
Sources also emphasised various benefits which resulted from the NZDF sharing its aerial 
photography of affected areas. NDRF stakeholders, for example, noted the NZDF’s coordination 
with the environmental engineering consultant ‘Tonkin + Taylor’ resulted in rapid disaster 
mapping. This enhanced the planning ability of the GoF, NZDF, MFAT and some humanitarian 
actors (NDRF, 2016b, Tonkin + Taylor, 2018).377 New Zealand’s Minister of Defence also 
described these efforts as “a first for any Pacific island nation struck by a natural disaster” 
(Tonkin + Taylor, 2018). NZDF sources also indicated these efforts enabled the GoF to 
immediately secure international aid (Baguioro, 2016, p.9). 
Hercules aircraft enabled WoG stakeholders to arrive rapidly 
The rapid response of the NZDF’s C-130 Hercules aircraft and the transportation of WoG 
personnel into Fiji were also described favourably by media and NDRF members (NZ Red Cross, 
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 These statements concern the diplomatic tensions described in the introduction. These related to the GoNZ and GoA 
introducing sanctions and severing relations between their militaries and the RFMF, after Commodore Bainimarama overthrew 
Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase's government in December 2006. Diplomatic tensions only began easing after Bainimarama was 
elected in reportedly democratic elections, in 2014. This suggests the HADR response was also a way for the GoNZ to improve 
diplomatic relations with Fiji which had applied a “look north” policy, which increasingly relied on financial and military support 
from China and Russia. 
376
 NZD$50,000 in initial assistance and NZD$170,000 in pre-positioned relief supplies were announced on 21 February. As the 
WoG response proceeded the GoNZ gave further assistance, final reports suggest NZ $15 million was spent by the GoNZ on the 
TC Winston response. Although Defence expenditure was not published, this was likely included in this MFAT estimate. 
377
 Disaster relief organisations such as UNOCHA, UNICEF, Red Cross, Oxfam and Save the Children, as well as NGOs and 
Government agencies, were provided with Tonkin + Taylor’s online “click and see” rapid disaster mapping portal. NZDF, ADF 





2016, NDRF, 2016b, p.7).378 For example, a New Zealand Red Cross representative stated that 
this coordination enabled their organisation to send the largest ever deployment of relief 
supplies to Fiji. This was believed to have “[made] a real difference for the people who need it 
most,” which highlighted the importance of maintaining “close partnerships across the Pacific” 
(NZ Red Cross, 2016). 379 
No NZDF reports, however, reflected on NZDF-humanitarian coordination. This reveals a crucial 
gap in grey literature, considering the perceived benefits civilian stakeholders described above. 
Civil-military coordination challenges described by other sources 
In contrast to the previous case study, stakeholders’ internal reports did allude to obstacles to 
coordination at the strategic-level. These included “confusion around leadership” arrangements 
in the WoG response and the planning of OGA and DJIATF deployments (FENZ, 2016, p.15, 18, 
HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.14).380 USAR representatives were also reportedly frustrated as they felt 
pressured to “sell their capabilities to MFAT and NZDF” (FENZ, 2016, p.21). These reports raise 
questions, particularly around how these factors may have impacted the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination and assistance.381  
 
ii. Coordination at the operational level 
 
The second application of the DJIATF model 
DJIATF personnel were embedded in the New Zealand High Commissions in Suva and 
undertook similar operational level tasks to those described in Vanuatu.382  Overall, a larger 
number of DJIATF, MFAT and OGA representatives were, however, deployed in the TC Winston 
response. Some of these personnel had also deployed together in Vanuatu. This reportedly 
benefitted these stakeholders, as individuals had a greater understanding of each other’s roles 
and capabilities (NZDF, 2016g, Radio New Zealand, 2016a). 
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 The first flight contained 12 tonnes of relief supplies. Many Hercules trips followed, transporting over120 tonnes of aid into 
Fiji. Personnel from the WoG response were also transported, while citizens were returned to New Zealand. 
379
 This coordination enabled the New Zealand Red Cross to transport personnel and large quantities of aid to Fiji between 23 
and 27 February. Supplies totalled thirty three tonnes and included items such as: shelter tool kits, blankets, water containers, 
mosquito nets and tarpaulins. These were transported on four separate flights. 
380
 The deployment of NZMAT and NZ USAR at the same time created some confusion with cross communication about 
deployment status. There were reportedly no USAR policies and procedures surrounding small deployments for the Pacific. 
Confusion around OGA deployment also reportedly impacted on the continuity of the mission, relationships built with MFAT, 
and resulted in confusion around leadership.  
381
 While not openly stated, this suggests there may have been competition around the deployment of USAR and NZDF 
teams.This will be discussed in greater detail by interviewed stakeholders in Chapter Five. 
382




Most sources describing the DJIATF’s efforts were positive and reported the model helped 
improve upon the civil-military coordination seen in Vanuatu (NZDF, 2016h, p.10).383  For 
example, one DJIATF representative who was deployed in both disasters concluded,  
“Coordination across the different New Zealand agencies… has been effective 
and can be the model for future missions… There is unity of purpose and we 
are all working together to achieve a common goal. We did this in Vanuatu 
and we developed this further in Fiji” (Baguioro, 2016, p.9). 
NZDF sources also reported the DJIATF’s coordination efforts had enhanced WoG and military 
HADR (NZDF, 2016h, p.1). An example of this related to the JCART’s contribution in a Joint Inter-
Agency Team, which conducted reconnaissance of Vanuabalavu Island and the Lau Group.384 
This helped stakeholders prepare for the arrival of the JTF and WoG response and assisted with 
task planning and prioritisation.  
Published GoF and NZDF perspectives reported the DJIATF’s efforts were good  
As described in Part One, DJIATF personnel and LOs were embedded in the NEOC and Future 
Operations cell soon after their arrival. All published GoF, GoNZ and NZDF reports described the 
NZDF’s coordination efforts were excellent and well-received by stakeholders in the NEOC 
(Finau et al., 2018, p.132).385 While the HQ JFNZ synopsis did not specifically discuss 
coordination in the NEOC, it also concluded that NZDF-GoF coordination was, in general, to a 
high level (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.4). 
Despite coordination between NZDF personnel and GoF, RFMF, humanitarian and NDMO staff 
being reportedly positive in the response, few sources described why stakeholders felt this way 
(HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.15).386 This is surprising, considering the major involvement of the RFMF in 
the NEOC. Media also indicated that the  Fijian Minister for National Disaster Management 
(who led the Future Operations cell) had previously served alongside NZDF personnel in New 
Zealand, while in the RFMF (Cava, 2014).387 These factors highlight a gap in grey literature, 
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 NZDF personnel felt the increased size of the DJIATF deployment had enhanced the NZDF’s situational awareness, planning 
and decision-making. 
384
 This inter-agency team consisted of DJIATF, MFAT, OGAs and NDMO representatives. It conducted reconnaissance on the 
island of Vanuabalavu in the Lau Group between 27 February and 02 March. This was to prepare for the arrival of HMNZS 
WELLINGON and Canterbury. 
385
 Interviewed stakeholders reflected on how these factors impacted civil-military coordination. This is described within 
Chapter Five, in the sections relating to the NZDF’s coordination with the GoF. 
386
 DJIATF and NZDF LOs attended daily NDMO and regular meetings with GoF Ministers and Prime Minister Bainimarama. They 
were subject matter experts from each service (Army, Air Force and Navy), provided service-specific expertise and were 
seconded into the DJIATF from other positions. No information was published on the structure of the Future Operations and 
Planning cell within the NDMO, information was therefore drawn from interview data (Interview 36, 39, 41, 59 & 60). 
387
 The Minister spent two of his twenty years in the RFMF with the NZDF. These were served as an Officer Instructor at the 




particularly concerning how the militarisation of the NEOC and pre-existing ties with GoF or 
RFMF personnel may have impacted the NZDF’s coordination. 
UN and INGO stakeholder views were generally positive 
With respect to humanitarian perspectives of the NZDF and civil-military coordination, in 
general, views varied considerably. Most UN and INGO officials, for example, portrayed these 
coordination efforts in a positive light and focused on the logistical and financial benefits of 
using NZDF assets (UN OCHA, 2016k, p.14, GoF and SPC, 2017, p.43, Logistics Cluster, 2016a).  
These stakeholders also reported that UN-CMCoord officers helped “build relationships” 
between humanitarians and foreign militaries, which were founded on “mutual respect and 
trust of each other’s roles and responsibilities” (UN OCHA, 2018, p.119). This reportedly led to 
“strong civil-military coordination” in the NEOC between UN OCHA, UNDAC, humanitarian 
actors and foreign militaries (UN OCHA, 2018, p.119, Mansur et al., 2017, p.5). 
Other humanitarian agencies and locally-based stakeholders expressed more critical views 
Locally-based humanitarians, however, discussed obstacles to civil-military coordination, 
including a lack of understanding and poor communication (Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15, 
NDRF, 2016b). In one academic report an anonymous humanitarian stated, 
“Australia and New Zealand had no idea how [coordination] works at the 
local level. At the government’s Lessons Learnt Workshop – it became clear 
that the Australia and New Zealand military hadn’t been briefed but no one 
realised. They flew in and operated within their own terms of reference. No 
one thought to ask...” (Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15). 
The NDRF review supported these views, as representatives “consistently noted the absence of 
NZDF from in-country coordination fora, notably the UN Cluster system” (NDRF, 2016b, p.9). 
Domestic factors and national coordination mechanisms were linked to challenges  
Some of these outcomes and the separation between military and humanitarian stakeholders 
were linked to either domestic factors or coordination mechanisms in grey literature. For 
example, some stakeholders noted that Fiji’s legislation did not clarify how civil-military 
coordination was to be facilitated or the role militaries played in disaster relief (GoF and SPC, 
2017, p.40).388 Guidance documents were also produced across a span of twenty years, which 
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 Section 4.2 of the Disaster Management Plan stated that “all international assistance” would be coordinated by the National 
Disaster Controller and requested by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This contrasted with page nine of the Cyclone Support Plan, 
which stated that the National Disaster Management Council would liaise directly with Aid agencies and donors to determine 




meant they did not accurately describe existing coordination structures (GoF, 1995, GoF, 1997, 
GoF, 1998).389This created some confusion around how stakeholders could coordinate with 
militaries. 
Stakeholders also identified issues which related to national mechanisms, such as the National 
Cluster arrangement,390 NEOC and NDMO391 (Logistics Cluster, 2016a, p.1)(Winterford and 
Gero, 2018). These related to decision-making processes, data collection and information-
sharing issues, which were also acknowledged in the TC Winston lessons learned report (GoF 
and SPC, 2017, p.29). These resulted in logistical bottlenecks, reduced stakeholder control over 
their HADR and, at times, delayed aid distribution (UN OCHA, 2016f, p.3, Lam et al., 2016, p.18, 
GoF and SPC, 2017, p.29).392 This included figures which suggest less than 60% of humanitarian 
requests for military assistance were being completed (2016b, p.2).393 
International and humanitarian coordination mechanisms were linked to challenges  
In contrast, other sources linked coordination issues to international or humanitarian 
mechanisms. For example, humanitarian leadership over national clusters changed during the 
response (see Figure 6).394 OCHA’s RFA process was also reportedly accepted by the GoF but 
not used by national actors (Canyon, 2017, p.47). One author reported this was because the 
GoF considered it unacceptable to have their decisions vetted by a UN-CMCoord officer. They 
noted that while this “could have been viewed as a sign of defiance against OCHA,” it implied 
the GoF was confident in its own management of the response (Canyon, 2017, p.47).  
                                                      
389
 Key disaster management legislation included the National Disaster Management Plan (1995), the Natural Disaster 
Management Act (1998), and a ‘Cyclone support Plan’ (1997). The GoF was in the process of reviewing its HADR legislation. This 
was expedited after TC Winston. 
390
 Some stakeholders described national logistics cluster arrangements as “inadequate,” particularly to coordinate an effective 
Government and multi-agency emergency response. 
391
 Arrangements within the NEOC were at times described as a “challenge” and a “barrier to timely response.” This was 
because the dissemination of assessment reports and decisions depended on the availability of the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management, to endorse documents before they could be 
shared. Humanitarian representatives also noted that despite their pre-disaster relationship-building attempts, different GoF 
officials were put in charge of NDMO and response coordination. 
392
 Some noted this reduced donor and humanitarian control over aid and distribution, as the GoF implemented over half of all 
post-disaster relief projects. The Flash Appeal final summary report emphasised that although 85% of funding was received by 
UN agencies, the majority of projects were implemented by local actors. In fact 58% would be implemented by the GoF and 8% 
by national NGO’s, with only 14% by INGO’s and 20% by UN agencies.  
393
The logistics cluster report published on 14 March stated that only 47 of the 80 humanitarian requests had been successfully 
completed. 
394
 In contrast to documentation, which stated that National Clusters were to be co-led by locally-based humanitarian actors or 
UN OCHA (on request), most clusters ended up being led by UN agencies or INGOs. Two working groups were also added to the 





Figure 6: TC Winston coordination structure. Source: (UN OCHA, 2016a).395 
Stakeholders also recommended increased collaboration between humanitarian, national and 
military actors to “enhance coordination in future emergencies” (UN OCHA, 2016j, p.2).396 The 
need for “further training of military personnel in humanitarian assistance and protection 
principles” was also raised in two key lessons learned reports (Winterford and Gero, 2018, GoF 
and SPC, 2017, p.41). It was believed these changes would allow humanitarian partners to 
ensure responses are “better aligned with local needs” (UN OCHA, 2016j, p.2).  
While not openly stated, the perspectives above suggest obstacles such as a lack of 
understanding and military-humanitarian interaction were negatively impacting coordination 
and assistance in the response. Further research is, however, needed to better understand both 
these humanitarian views and how these obstacles may have impacted the NZDF. 
Grey literature lacked analysis about coordination and obstacles at the operational level 
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 Official approval was given by UN OCHA to use this image. 
396
 The summary was prepared by UN OCHA ROP on behalf of Fiji country clusters and the Pacific Humanitarian Team. National 




The grey literature sources described above often lacked an in-depth analysis of civil-military 
coordination, in general, and the NZDF’s efforts specifically. The TC Winston lessons learned 
report, for example, contained less than two pages of discussion focused on civil-military 
coordination and discussed militaries as a collective, rather than the NZDF explicitly (GoF and 
SPC, 2017, p.41).397  
Few published sources also discussed obstacles to the NZDF’s coordination at the operational 
level. Some issues to the DJIATF’s coordination were, however, alluded to in internal NZDF 
reports. Most of those identified in the HQ JFNZ report were identical to the obstacles reported 
in the TC Pam response (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.14-15).398 This included that host nation officials had 
“different priorities” and operational styles to New Zealand actors and a perceived lack of a 
higher-level national plan the NZDF could work to (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). These factors led to 
the suggestion that  NZDF personnel needed to be prepared for State actors to “attempt to take 
ownership” of offers of aid (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).399  
New issues were, however, identified in the DJIATF’s internal review, which provided greater 
clarity on these. Some challenges were linked to the staggered deployment of DJIATF staff, 
which meant personnel were initially unable to establish a functional headquarters to provide 
HQ JFNZ and civilian actors with timely information (NZDF, 2016h, p.2).400 Others concerned 
barriers to communication, command and control, and organisational culture (REF DJIATF 
report). 401 
The fact that the HQ JFNZ synopsis reported similar obstacles to coordination in both case 
studies, but did not include those identified by the DJIATF raises some questions. 402  These 
concern why obstacles persisted, despite mutual understanding and the DJIATF’s civil-military 
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 Only two of the one-hundred-and-twenty page TC Winston lessons learned report focused on civil-military coordination. It 
did, however, recommend Fijian documents be updated to clearly define the role of militaries. Military efforts were also 
mentioned briefly in the following sections despite its significant role: 4.2.3 (internal cluster coordination), 4.2.4 (role of the 
military), 4.2.6 (logistics), and 4.3 (information management & assessment). 
398
 These concerned a civilian lack of understanding about the DJIATF and the need for LOs to have an increased understanding 
of asset capabilities. For example, MFAT staff and Heads of Mission reportedly did not understand the differences between 
light and heavy JCART options and what these entailed. Following TC Winston, HQ JFNZ proposed the early deployment and 
pre-positioning of JCART elements prior to a major cyclone affecting a Pacific island country. MFAT agreed for to up to four 
JCART personnel to be deployed. 
399
 Lessons concerning host nations were drawn from both the TC Pam and Winston NZDF responses. It is therefore assumed 
that these issues applied within both case studies, despite Governments not being specifically named. 
400
 JCART personnel were deployed into Fiji across several days. These NZDF personnel were transported by military and civilian 
aircraft under MFAT and HQ JFNZ direction. The issue of staggered deployment has been reported to MFAT, which has since 
decided to deploy the DJIATF into High Commissions prior to disasters, if the safety of personnel can be guaranteed. 
401
 The lack of an UNCLASSIFIED deployable IT network was identified as a constraint to effective inter-agency planning. Local 
air assets were also not approved for use as they did not meet Defence Force Orders 36. This meant a NZDF platform (a 
Seasprite helicopter) had to be on standby at all times for casualty evacuations, which reduced air support for the affected 
population. 
402




coordination reportedly improving efforts. They also indicate published literature was not 
accurately reflecting all the barriers discussed by stakeholders.  
i. Coordination at the tactical level403 
 
The Joint Task Force response 
The JTF response to TC Winston was more extensive and complex at the tactical level, when 
compared to the Vanuatu response. One difference in the Fiji response was the deployment of 
NZDF Army engineers before RNZN vessels arrived. This meant the NZDF provided support on 
the mainland Viti Levu from 24 February onward and the force interacted with civilian 
stakeholders in two key locations (NZDF, 2017a).404  
Two RNZN vessels also deployed for Fiji, in a staggered response. This arrangement meant the 
Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) HMNZS Wellington arrived first, later followed by the Canterbury 
and the larger JTF (Fiji Sun, 2018).405 NZDF and GoNZ sources reported this approach enhanced 
NZDF and WoG efforts, as the OPV helped identify anchorages for the Canterbury in the outer 
islands. This enabled WoG actors to begin planning their tasks earlier and proceed ashore 
immediately after the Canterbury's arrival (Jane's International Defence Review, 2016, p.8). 
As occurred in TC Pam, these RNZN vessels were used as civil-military coordination platforms. 
MFAT, GoF, RFMF and local representatives were embarked in Suva and accommodated on 
board (Quilliam, 2016, p.5, Fiji Sun, 2016a).406 These State officials facilitated communication 
with the local population and helped identify tasks for the NZDF to undertake.  
OGA representatives from USAR and NZMAT were also embarked on vessels for up to three 
weeks (NZMAT, 2016, FENZ, 2016).407 Notably, USAR representatives were deployed on the 
Canterbury from New Zealand and worked with Army engineers ashore in integrated teams 
(Hudson, 2016).408 This was the first time most of these personnel had worked together in a 
Pacific HADR context and in integrated civil-military teams.  
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 The tactical level refers to coordination taking place in the field, at the level of the soldier, airman or sailor. It refers to the 
interaction between the NZDF and civilian actors on the ground in New Zealand, Vanuatu and on outer islands.   
404
 The team consisted of thirty-seven Army engineers. Viti Levu is the largest Fijian island. It contains the capital, Suva and 70% 
of the population - approximately 606,000 citizens, according to 2014 GoF estimates.   
405
 Wellington arrived first in Suva on 28 February, Canterbury followed on 01 March 2016. Both vessels disembarked their aid 
under the direction of the NDMO, which as put in charge of distribution. 
406
 Fijian officials included representatives from Provincial Councils, the NDMO, approximately twenty-six RFMF personnel and 
twenty staff from the Ministry of Education.  
407
 Overall, six NZMAT teams and three NZ USAR team rotations were sent to assist in Fiji. NZMAT teams included an Initial 
Assessment Team, four medical teams and an operational-level leadership team. One of these medical teams was based on the 
HMNZS Canterbury and provided mobile medical clinics on the islands of Avea, Vanuabalavu & Cikobia-i-lau. 
408
 Originally only nine USAR personnel were going to be deployed. Four flew to Fiji, while the remaining personnel were 




Another major difference in case studies relates to the fact that only five NZDF CIMIC personnel 
were deployed in the 2016 response (NZDF, 2015b).409 This team disembarked in Suva with “no 
orders or tasking," which resulted in the team supporting reconstruction efforts and completing 
a Measures of Effectiveness study for the NZDF (NZDF, 2017c, p.5). While this meant CIMIC 
personnel did not facilitate civil-military coordination in outer islands, the team did interact 
with RFMF, GoF, local leaders and some members of the affected population on the mainland. 
The final element of the NZDF’s tactical level coordination involved the use of air assets.410 
Aircraft conducted reconnaissance, supported needs assessments, evacuated casualties and 
transported aid, GoF, civilian and military personnel throughout Fiji (NZDF, 2016a). In contrast 
to the TC Pam response, many aircraft, including the new NH90 helicopters, were based on the 
mainland (INSERT JANES).411 This arrangement enabled the NZDF to transport Suva-based 
officials, as well as support GoF aid distribution to more isolated areas.412 
The NZDF’s area of operations 
Due to the division of NZDF efforts, the military’s coordination and HADR were focused on the 
mainland of Viti Levu and the Lau Islands Group (NZDF, 2016g).413 Vanuabalavu Island served as 
a base for the Canterbury and JTF operations during the response. This was becuase the island 
was the largest in the Lau Group and was the location of a GoF station where RFMF troops were 
deployed (see Figure 7).414  
The Lau Island Group was identified as the GoF's highest response priority (FAO, 2016). This 
related to the high levels of destruction and severe humanitarian needs identified, which were 
prioritised as food, water and shelter (Radio New Zealand, 2016i, Perrottet, 2016, GoF, 2016b). 
Evidencing these needs, an RFMF commander stated that over eight hundred more tents were 
needed, after national stores were delivered. He further reflected that affected islanders might 
be living in these “from six months to two years” due to the lack of building materials on the 
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 This contrasts with the three four-person CIMIC teams deployed in Vanuatu. Only one individual in this team had completed 
CIMIC training before deployment, due to other qualified personnel being deployed overseas. This staff limitation was 
recognised as a capability gap in the post-activity report.  
410
Aircraft included a King Air B200, two Seasprite and NH90 helicopters, a Boeing 757, P-3K2 Orion and C-130 Hercules aircraft. 
411
 The NH90’s were reportedly based on the mainland as they had not yet completed trials to land on the Canterbury at sea. 
This was planned for late 2016 and meant the helicopters were not able to refuel on the Canterbury, while it was based in the 
Lau Group. This limited the NZDF’s air HADR capability in the outer islands. 
412
 For example, NH90s transported relief supplies and medical staff, Very Important Persons from the GoF and RFMF were also 
transported. These included the Fijian Minister for Disaster Management, the RFMF Rear Admiral and the NZDF Commander 
Joint Forces New Zealand. All of whom visited Vanuabalavu on 13 March 2016, while the NZDF was providing assistance.   
413
 The Lau Island Group is located in the Eastern Division. It consists of 60 islands, 30 of which are inhabited. These cover 487 
square kilometres, with only two small airstrips. Notably, Vanuabalavu is the home island of the former Prime Minister Laisenia 
Qarase, who continues to hold a leadership position in the Lau Group. Qarase was ousted by current Prime Minister 
Bainimarama in the 2006 military coup. The implications of these domestic factors are discussed by interviewees, in Chapter 
Five.   
414




islands, which were 290 kilometres from the mainland (Perrottet, 2016). These reports were 
made prior to the NZDF arriving to provide HADR. 
 
 
Figure 7: Map of Vanuabalavu, detailing NZMAT assistance. Source (NZMAT, 2016). 
 
NZDF assistance and tasks 
Assistance was provided concurrently by NZDF elements during response.415 NZDF tasks 
predominantly focused on public infrastructure. This meant personnel cleared debris and roads, 
restored water storage and repaired schools, medical facilities and public buildings (Baguioro, 
2016, p.9)(NZDF, 2016a).416 The sequence of the NZDF’s tasks again meant the force’s HADR 
was first provided on the mainland and bigger islands, with larger populations (see Figure 8). 
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 The Wellington carried 60 tonnes of relief aid and 71 NZDF personnel into Fiji. It arrived in Vanuabalavu on 29 February and 
departed Fiji on 16 March. The Canterbury transported 300 NZDF personnel and 106 tonnes of aid, arriving in Vanuabalavu on 
04 March. Both vessels provided assistance to different islands, including Yasawa, Yacata, Vanuabalavu and others.  
416
 Over eight weeks the NZDF transported over 570 tonnes of aid into Fiji and completed a dozens of repairs to schools, 
medical centres and community buildings. Numerous generators and water tanks were also installed for communities. A more 




This meant smaller islands and more isolated villages received assistance later in the response. 
417  
 
Figure 8: NZDF aid delivery as of 10 March. Source (UN OCHA, 2016i). 
While the NZDF did transport water, food and Non-Food Items to affected areas, most aid was 
disembarked in Suva or distributed under the direction of RFMF or GoF officials. These officials 
also facilitated communication between the NZDF, village headmen and Turaga Ni Koro, who 
helped identify tasks  (Quilliam, 2016, p.5).418  
The NZDF deployment was also extended at short notice following bilateral discussions. This 
meant the Canterbury and larger JTF remained in the lau Group until 17 April.419 This extension 
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 Articles suggest over 80% of houses had been destroyed in some villages across the Lau Group. Some stated that only eight 
of the sixty houses in one village had not been destroyed. While some figures in the PDNA contradict local and media reports. It 
stated that the island group had a population of 11,455. It estimated 328 of the 5,897 houses in the group were completely 
destroyed, with 63 suffering major damage and 79% of households lacking water access after the cyclone. 
418
 The position of village headman is locally termed ‘Turaga Ni Koro’. Only a Fijian can occupy this position the appointment of 
the village headman follows through the ancestral line to identify who is next in line to take up the position. 
419
Although the JTF was originally going to depart at the end of the 30 day State of Emergency (21 March), the NZDF 
deployment was extended at short notice by both Governments following the extension of the State of Emergency. Confusion 
surrounded this decision, as it appeared to be announced after Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee travelled to Fiji. This visit was 




meant GoF, MFAT, OGA and other civilian representatives operated alongside the NZDF for a 
longer period than expected. 
Perceptions of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination at the tactical level 
Due to the complexity of coordination at the tactical level the perspectives of stakeholders are 
grouped according to sector below. This provides a greater depth of analysis, as it highlights 
how grey literature portrayed the perspectives of: 1) New Zealand civilian actors, 2) 
international and local humanitarian stakeholders, 3) the GoF and 4) the affected population.  
Coordination with New Zealand civilian actors 
Published grey literature reported that coordination was good 
Overall, the majority of published sources portrayed the NZDF-New Zealand civilian 
coordination at the tactical level as ‘very good.’ The Minister of Defence reported there was 
“close cooperation and seamless integration” between these actors (Brownlee, 2015). NZMAT 
teams reflected on how “smoothly” the deployment ran (NZMAT, 2016, p.12). USAR and NDRF 
reports further concluded that coordination efforts made a “significant contribution” to the 
WoG and overall disaster response (NDRF, 2016b, p.7, FENZ, 2016, p.21).  
The greater number of civilian reports meant these views were collated from OGA and NDRF 
sources, as well as NZDF. Most views, however, tended to focus on the outcomes and benefits 
of NZDF support, rather than describing the quality of coordination itself.  
NZDF sources suggested NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination had improved 
One key difference was the NZDF perspective that these coordination efforts had improved 
upon that seen in Vanuatu (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.4). Pre-deployment NZDF-MFAT coordination was, 
for instance, considered a “vast improvement” (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.8).420 Personnel deployed in 
both responses reported this was because they had a greater understanding of HADR and 
civilian actors, following the TC Pam response (Baguioro, 2016, p.9). This led officials to 
conclude the applied NZDF coordination model should replicated in future responses. 
Similar issues were identified in the HQ JFNZ synopsis 
With respect to the HQ JFNZ synopsis, NZDF perspectives were almost identical for both the TC 
Pam and Winston responses. MFAT LOs were reportedly “easy to work with” and relationships 
with OGAs were “good,” once deployed (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.7-8).421 The same obstacles to 
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 This resulted in stores being loaded onto RNZN assets in advance of their departure date. 
421
 As previously stated the Lessons Learned Synopsis identifies coordination issues which occurred in both the TC Pam and 




coordination were also identified, along with recurring challenges such as the rotation of MFAT 
LOs and a civilian lack of understanding about the NZDF (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.8).422 
The only new challenge concerned ‘command and control’ issues between the NZDF and OGAs. 
This concerned a lack of clarity around the command structure, when the USAR team was 
integrated with the Army Engineering Task Unit (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.10-11). While the report 
suggested the “cross-over of tasks and skills” contributed to coordination issues, little analysis 
surrounded how the identified obstacles impacted coordination or the HADR provided (HQ 
JFNZ, 2016, p.10).423  
Unpublished civilian reports contained more analysis of coordination issues  
In contrast to published literature and NZDF sources, internal civilian reports contained greater 
critique of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination. The draft FENZ review stated that some USAR 
representatives had “struggled at times to work under the arrangement set in place with NZDF” 
(FENZ, 2016, p.12-13). These frustrations also led to an incident between NZDF and USAR 
personnel, which was serious enough to deploy a senior fire service commander to Fiji, to 
resolve the issue (FENZ, 2016, p.12). The report concluded:  
“Although the logic of embedding NZDF and [USAR teams] together made 
sense, both agencies’ lack of understanding of each other’s specific missions, 
policies procedures and practices, and specific skills brought to the missions 
created some confusion and frustration” (FENZ, 2016, p.21-22). 
These views suggests NZDF-OGA coordination was being impeded by significant obstacles, 
which were only briefly alluded to in the HQ JFNZ report.  
Within NDRF and FENZ reports, similar obstacles to civil-military coordination were also 
described. These included a lack of understanding,424 information sharing and collection 
issues,425 poor communication426 and different operational styles427 (FENZ, 2016, p.12-13, 22, 
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 Obstacles included communication issues, conflicting priorities and confusion over command and control. Communication 
issues concerned the Canterbury, as the ship lacked an unclassified IT network capable of operating in a Combined Inter Agency 
Task Group. This meant OGA’s couldn’t view data or utilise the system due to classification issues. Organisational culture issues 
were alluded to, as NZDF personnel perceived that OGA priorities were prioritised ahead of the NZDF’s. The document also 
noted that some OGA representatives did not appear to appreciate the importance of attending the daily NZDF coordination 
meetings on Canterbury. A lack of clarity was also observed from civilian actors, surrounding NZDF operations and processes. 
423
  NZDF recommendations included the need for a definitive command and control structure, to ensure a coordinated WoG 
approach. It was stated that the issue of integrating USAR and New Zealand Army teams was “being addressed by USAR.”  
424
 The FENZ review noted a lack of clarity surrounding the command and control structure was when USAR was working with 
the NZDF. It also reported that NZDF personnel did not understand who was in overall command of USAR. 
425
 The NDRF report recommended that MFAT and the NZDF seek arrangements with host governments for the free circulation 
of surveillance data, to ensure their use as part of damage assessment and relief planning by NDRF and other nongovernment 
disaster responders. The FENZ report also identified collection of information between the NZDF and AOGs as an area for 




NDRF, 2016b, p.4, 8-9). Some had negative impacts on HADR, such as some stakeholders feeling 
they were unable to make use of the NZDF assets offered (NDRF, 2016b, p.11).428 The NDRF 
report also noted that without data about the NZDF’s HADR and costs, it was impossible to: 
“fully assess the effectiveness of the government response, and whether, 
from a purely humanitarian perspective, the deployment of [NZDF] assets 
was warranted” (NDRF, 2016b, p.9).429  
The fact that some of these perspectives and obstacles were not described in the HQ JFNZ 
lessons learned synopsis or shared with the NZDF highlights an important contribution this 
study makes to the literature.430 This also reinforces the importance of collecting stakeholder 
feedback, to ensure actors are aware of issues and can improve their future HADR responses. 
Coordination with international and local humanitarian actors 
UN and INGO perspectives were positive 
At the tactical level, few sources specifically described examples or analysis of NZDF-
humanitarian coordination. The majority of perspectives were, therefore, published by UN or 
larger INGOs, which reflected on coordination with foreign militaries in general. These reports 
focused on the benefits of NZDF logistical support and transportation for humanitarian 
agencies, which made an “enormous contribution to relief and early recovery” in the TC Winston 
response (UNICEF, 2016). 
There were no published perspectives of local humanitarians 
In particular, the perspectives of locally-based humanitarians were lacking. For example, while 
the Tongan Red Cross Society and Fijian branch of the Adventist Development and Relief 
                                                                                                                                                                           
were a “waste of time and way off the mark of what was required” as they did not cover the  importance of establishing 
communication with the chief in the village and being invited to help. 
426
 The FENZ report highlighted a lack of communication surrounding agreed upon processes, protocol and command and 
control. NDRF members also reported difficulty making contact with the New Zealand High Commission, and reported that 
there did not appear to be a point of contact for NGO’s in the response. 
427
 USAR and NZDF building compliance and health and safety requirements were different, which made it difficult for NZDF to 
manage the quality control of construction and repairs. USAR handovers were also challenging as some teams arrived just as 
others departed. This meant the new commander was unable to be fully briefed by the departing team. 
428
 While NDRF members  “roundly welcomed” the NZDF’s offer of transportation into Fiji, few were able to take advantage of 
this due to a lack of prepositioned stock in New Zealand in the initial response. This led to recommendations that NZDF assets 
be made available for transporting humanitarian personnel as well as aid, in future responses. 
429
 Some humanitarian representatives believed NZDF assets were “excess to humanitarian requirements” at times. These 
observations also led to recommendations that the cost of NZDF relief activities be publicised, along with whether this was 
drawn from the New Zealand Aid program budget. This was deemed “vitally important” as stakeholders questioned whether 
the same tasks could have been completed by the NDRF or other civilian actors at a lower cost. This would have enabled actors 
to spend more financial support on relief and the affected population. 
430
 The draft version of the ‘Cyclone Winston USAR Deployment and NCC activation review’ has not been shared with the NZDF 




Agency (ADRA) provided HADR on Vanuabalavu at the same time as the NZDF, neither reflected 
on any interaction with the military (Humanitarian Response, 2016, GoT, 2016).431  
While they were not local stakeholders, New Zealand-based agencies reported a lack of 
interaction between the NZDF and humanitarians in Fiji. They also observed that NZDF 
personnel in the field displayed an absence of awareness around “humanitarian principles and 
good practice tools generally, and civ-mil guidelines for humanitarian assistance specifically” 
(NDRF, 2016b, p.9). 
These perspectives and the lack of local humanitarian perspectives highlight substantial gaps in 
literature. These concern how locally-based humanitarian stakeholders viewed the NZDF’s 
coordination efforts and the extent to which actors interacted in the field. 
CIMIC teams were not optimally utilised  
Although the HQ JFNZ synopsis did not reflect on the efforts of CIMIC team, this unit’s internal 
report concluded that CIMIC capabilities were not optimally used in Fiji (NZDF, 2017c, p.4, 6).432 
This related to the teams location and tasks,  which limited their ability to provide CIMIC 
support and planning advice (NZDF, 2017c, p.3-4).433 It also meant CIMIC personnel did not 
facilitate communication between the NZDF and humanitarians, as occurred in Vanuatu. 
These outcomes were linked to a lack of information flow in theatre and a “limited 
understanding about the employment of CIMIC and its capability” across the NZDF (NZDF, 
2017c, p.5). The application of the new DJIATF model was also a factor, as DJIATF LOs 
somewhat replaced the roles of CIMIC planner liaisons (NZDF, 2017c, p.5).434  
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 The Tongan Red Cross deployed on the Tongan Navy vessels, which provided assistance to Vanuabalavu for three weeks. 
They supported initial assessments, distributed relief supplies to the needy and “[supported] the New Zealand relief team.” 
ADRA conduced some HADR assessments and distribution, as staff were already conducting a climate change program. 
432
 CIMIC teams were ideally supposed to be employed in the following activities: key leadership engagements, liaison with the 
host nation, local disaster management personnel, NGOs and OGAs, and national and other foreign militaries for support of 
allocation and planning, insertion, rapid village assessment, collation and dissemination of data, production of normality 
indicators, mission appreciation and planning, collation and dissemination of data, production of normality indicators. 
433
 As discussed above, teams were gathered information on the mainland to complete a Measures of Effectiveness study for 
the NZDF. Communication issues included: a lack of information flow in the field, the unit being unable to access DIXIS (military 
computer network), and physical communication issues which resulted in the team utilising cell phones and had a non-wifi 
capable laptop. As a result of these challenges the report recommended further training for CIMIC staff, building greater 
understanding and coordination between the DJIATF and CIMIC teams. Practical solutions included developing and 
disseminating SOP's which explain CIMIC capability. It also suggested that CIMIC personnel deploy immediately for HADR, both 
on the ground and within the local NDMO to "develop relationships" and commence early communication and coordination 
with other civilian actors and NGO's. 
434




These views suggest that despite NZDF officials concluding that the Force’s civil-military models 
were successful and should be replicated in future HADR, confusion still surrounded the roles 
and responsibilities of CIMIC and DJIATF personnel.435  
Coordination with the Government of Fiji 
Coordination was perceived positively by State stakeholders 
All published sources produced by the NZDF, GoF, GoNZ and Fijian media described NZDF-GoF 
coordination as positive as well-received by State officials. A key theme related to how NZDF 
support had practically benefitted Fiji, New Zealand and the affected population (Fiji Sun, 
2016a, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.6, NZDF, 2016c). For example, the Minister for Disaster Management 
commented it was “hard to imagine how [Fiji] would have coped with demands for relief 
without New Zealand’s assistance” (Baguioro, 2016, p.9). 
NZDF coordination efforts also reportedly strengthened stakeholder and bilateral relations 
between countries. NZDF-RFMF cooperation and previous relationship ties were considered 
central to these outcomes (NZDF, 2016d, Powles and Sousa-Santos, 2016).436  
The cooperation between the RFMF and NZDF enhanced efforts 
The RFMF Rear Admiral also reported that military-to-military cooperation aided the NZDF’s 
efforts as these actors were “complementing each other very well” through using the RFMF’s 
local knowledge and the NZDF’s technical expertise and equipment (Baguioro, 2016, p.9). NZDF 
personnel also reflected how coordination with GoF LOs helped the JTF determine priorities 
and tasks (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). These perspectives led NZDF sources to conclude NZDF-GoF 
coordination was to a “high level” and was a marked improvement upon civil-military 
coordination efforts in Vanuatu (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.4). 
Similar coordination issues were identified with host nation officials 
The HQ JFNZ synopsis, however, identified the same obstacles to coordination as were 
observed in the 2015 response. These included concerns that host nation officials may have 
channelled support to their own areas of interest first (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). The similarity 
between these two responses raises a number of questions. These concern why the same 
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 This will be discussed in greater length in the discussion within Chapter Six. 
436
 RFMF personnel noted that it was “great working with [NZDF personnel] again,” particularly as it had been eleven years 
since the NZDF had officially deployed to Fiji. This period refers to the GoNZ’s decision not to encourage engagement between 
the NZDF and RFMF, post 2006 military coup. The NZDF and RFMF only renewed their engagement after the Fijian 2014 




obstacles persisted, despite the perspective that NZDF-host nation coordination had 
improved.437 
Coordination with the affected population 
All published literature expressed the affected population’s gratitude 
As with the above sectors, all published literature reported that the affected population viewed 
NZDF coordination and HADR efforts as good. Sources consistently portrayed NZDF-affected 
population relations as warm and friendly. For example, one NZDF representative described the 
population’s reaction to the military as “very humbling,” with many communities “thanking [the 
NZDF] just for turning up” (Navy Today, 2016, p.6). Approximately 90% of perspectives were, 
however, either directly or indirectly linked to NZDF or GoNZ sources.438 This meant few actual 
community perspectives existed in grey literature. 
Concerning actual affected population quotes and perspectives, the majority focused on the 
positive outcomes of NZDF HADR (Baguioro, 2016, Sauvakacolo, 2016)(Dateline Pacific, 2016a, 
Radio New Zealand, 2016f).439 For example, some communities stated it would have taken 
them “more than a month to clean up” without the NZDF’s help (NZDF, 2016d). Officials 
confirmed these benefits, with one NZDF representative reflecting, 
“The biggest impact that we have had ashore [in the Lau Island Group] was 
helping with clean up, in particular the local school, so that it could be opened 
for the following Monday” (Navy Today, 2016, p.5). 
Coordination was reportedly improved by GoF LOs and previous HADR experience 
While most perspectives were outcomes-focused, some NZDF sources described why they felt 
NZDF-community coordination was positive. One NZDF officer felt this was due to pre-disaster 
training exercises, which meant personnel were “well-versed” in HADR and civil-military 
coordination situations (NZDF, 2016e).440 The NZDF’s use of chiefs and local guides was also 
viewed as beneficial, as it facilitated communication with outer island communities (HQ JFNZ, 
2016, p.12). It also made it easier for NZDF personnel to extract information and determine 
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 This will be discussed in greater detail by interviewed stakeholders in the following chapter. 
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 For example, many Pacific and Fijian media outlets quoted NZDF or GoNZ personnel and their views of the population. The 
perspectives of the affected population were also drawn from NZDF or GoNZ press releases. 
439
 Actual community perspectives also reflected this gratitude. Pacific and New Zealand media reported that communities 
found NZDF personnel hard-working and their assistance timely and appropriate. 
440
 The examples provided were Exercise Tropic Twilight and Southern Katipo 2015. Tropic Twilight is an annual exercise in the 
Pacific which tests the NZDF’s ability to work with militaries and governments from the region in a HADR context. 
Exercise Southern Katipo is the NZDFs major military exercise. It is held every two years and provides the NZDF an opportunity 




priorities, as chiefs were reportedly “more aware” of their community’s needs (HQ JFNZ, 2016, 
p.12). 
Reoccurring coordination challenges  
While published material did not identify any obstacles to coordination, the HQ JFNZ synopsis 
reported the same issues which were encountered in the TC Pam response. These included 
different perspectives on priorities, language and culture barriers (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).441 
These obstacles were, however, reportedly mitigated by using local officials and chiefs, who 
“[broke] down language and social barriers” (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). 
The fact that identical obstacles to NZDF-affected population coordination were identified in 
both case studies raises a number of questions. Some relate to why these obstacles may be 
reoccurring. Others concern why Fijian communities were perceived as non-communicative and 
appeared to have different priorities to the NZDF.442 The absence of population perspectives on 
these factors also points to a weakness in literature, reinforcing the need for interviews. 
Some coordination issues were alluded to by community representatives 
While obstacles were not openly discussed by communities, some articles alluded to relevant 
issues. For example, a housewife also recounted her initial impressions of the NZDF as follows: 
"I saw the helicopter arrive this morning and a Fijian soldier told me it was 
the New Zealand military. That's good because the Fiji Government needs 
international help to rebuild everything… We lost everything… our house and 
everything in it, our little farm… So we are grateful that New Zealand and 
other countries are helping us" (Radio New Zealand, 2016k). 
While this perspective expresses gratitude, it also indicates a lack of communication between 
communities and the NZDF. This is because the individual was unaware of the military’s arrival 
or that it would focus on public infrastructure. This reinforces the need for interviews, to better 
understand population views and their perceived obstacles.  
Further, while humanitarians reported the NZDF had done an “impressive job of immediate 
response in the major settlements on [Vanuabalavu],” they noted that smaller communities on 
the island remained “in very poor shape” and appeared not to have received assistance 
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 The report stated that local islanders “may not operate in the same way or have different priorities to the GoNZ.” It also 
noted that some locals were hesitant to give information to the NZDF, until they realised the military was there to help. As a 
result NZDF lessons learned reports suggested that patience needed to be exercised with local population, particularly when 
determining priorities in HADR support. 
442
 Community representatives and other stakeholders will comment on these obstacles in greater detail in the interview 




(Richards, 2016). These views are concerning, as they may suggest assistance was not provided 
in accordance with the humanitarian principles.  
The perspectives above highlight a number of gaps in literature which raise questions about the 
NZDF’s coordination, and particularly how obstacles may have impacted the HADR provided. As 
with the other gaps identified in TC Winston grey literature, interviewees will provide further 
clarification on these points in the following chapter. 
Part Two findings 
The sections above explored the NZDF’s civil-military coordination at the strategic, operational 
and tactical level. These efforts were, in general, portrayed as ‘excellent’ and ‘beneficial’ in grey 
literature. Many sources also reported an observed improvement upon the TC Pam response.  
As with the previous case study, the consistency within these reports is substantial. 
Examination of their content and sources, however, reveals limitations. Few sources, for 
example, explained why stakeholders held these views or evidenced these perspectives. While 
relatively more reports were produced by non-State sources, a scarcity of analysis meant most 
perspectives were still drawn from NZDF or GoNZ sources. 
Minimal analysis of obstacles to coordination and how these impacted actors’ assistance was 
also uncovered.443 The HQ JFNZ synopsis and other sources also reported almost exactly the 
same obstacles to coordination, as occurred in the TC Pam response. Yet few sources provided 
details of these or examples of how these impacted HADR.  
Two discrepancies are also evident within grey literature findings. The first is that while most 
NZDF and GoNZ sources reported that the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts had 
improved and enhanced actors HADR, other sources reported the same obstacles impeded 
coordination.444 The other is that internal reports and those produced by civilian and 
humanitarian actors were often more critical, than those portrayed by State stakeholders. 
These findings indicate published literature did not describe all obstacles to coordination or 
stakeholder perspectives accurately. 
 
Chapter Four summary 
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 The TC Winston lessons learned report, for example, only briefly mentioned civil-military coordination issues and referred to 
foreign militaries as a collective. Foreign military assistance was only mentioned in four sections of the TC Winston report, 
which was 123 pages long. These were sections: 4.2.3 (internal cluster coordination), 4.2.4 (role of the military), 4.2.6 (logistics), 
and 4.3 (information management & assessment). 
444
 The HQ JFNZ lessons learned synopsis, for example, identified many of the same obstacles to coordination, including a lack 




In the chapter above TC Winston grey literature was examined. This explored how sources 
portrayed the overall HADR response, the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts and how 
these were perceived by stakeholders. In general, the literature suggests that the NZDF’s 
coordination efforts were viewed positively by a broad range of actors in the response. Yet 
despite the prevalence of these reports, a number of inconsistencies were evident when 
published and unpublished stakeholder perspectives were compared.  
As with the previous case study, crucial gaps were identified in grey literature. In particular, a 
lack of clarity surrounded how domestic factors and the militarisation of the TC Winston 
response impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination. Another gap concerned how the 
identified obstacles to coordination may have impacted the HADR provided.  
Considering the major role the NZDF played in the TC Winston response, this lack of data is 
concerning. These gaps also reinforce the need to interview stakeholders, to provide more 
robust answers to the questions posed in this study. These interview findings are the subject of 




Chapter Five: Acting First, Asking Later 
 
In the previous chapter TC Winston grey literature findings were examined. These suggested 
that most stakeholders perceived the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts as ‘positive’ and 
‘effective.’ In comparison, this chapter explores how thirty-three interviewed stakeholders 
viewed the NZDF’s coordination, in the same response.445 This provides more in-depth data, 
which aims to address the identified gaps in grey literature. 
The chapter structure is identical to Chapter Three. Findings are reported in three parts, with 
each focused on a separate research question. 446 Part One examines how interviewees 
perceived the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in the TC Winston response. Part Two discusses 
the four key obstacles to coordination, which were identified by participants. Part Three then 
explores the impact these obstacles were reported to have had on HADR.  
 
Part One: TC Winston stakeholder perceptions 
 
Interviewee perspectives are examined in the four sections below. These report how 
participants described the NZDF’s coordination with: i) New Zealand civilian actors, ii) 
international and local humanitarian actors, iii) the GoF, and iv) the affected population.   
In each section, the general impressions of interviewees are summarised, along with their 
reasoning for holding these views. Both positive and negative stakeholder perceptions are 
reported, while a more detailed examination of obstacles and their impacts is reserved and 
reported in Part Two and Three respectively. At times, perspectives varied significantly between 
participants. These contrasts are highlighted where possible, along with participants’ 
justification for their views. 447 
  
                                                      
445
 All interviews were completed in New Zealand and Fiji between June and September 2017. Two GoF officials failed to 
confirm their involvement in the study or declined their involvement post interview. This meant GoF perspectives were collated 
from five rather than seven stakeholders, which reduced the total number of participants to thirty three. 
446
 The three research questions are: 1) how did stakeholders perceive the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in past Pacific 
disaster relief responses? 2) What, if any, were the obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in past responses? 3) How 
might identified obstacles have impacted the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief provided by actors? 
447




i. Coordination with New Zealand civilian actors  
 
Improvement was noted compared to previous civil-military coordination efforts 
Coordination between the NZDF and MFAT, USAR, NZMAT and New Zealand humanitarian 
agencies was viewed as positive by over 70% of interviewees from these agencies. Seven 
participants reported these coordination efforts were an improvement upon that in previous 
responses.448  
Most believed this improvement was the result of pre-disaster interaction and increased 
understanding between those deployed in both responses.449 One OGA representative 
reflected, 
“Fiji was bigger and better because it was based on the growth that we'd 
made in Vanuatu… it was a lot more integrated… And it flowed a lot better 
because it was based on knowledge of capabilities and relationships.”
450
 
All New Zealand participants reported that civil-military coordination increased the overall 
effectiveness of the WoG response. This was reportedly due to NZDF logistical support, which 
enabled civilian stakeholders to and provide assistance more rapidly in isolated areas. 
The DJIATF model and its leadership improved coordination 
Many interviewees believed coordination was positive and improved by the application of the 
new DJIATF model.451 This outcome was connected to the personality traits of DJIATF 
leadership and LOs, who were described as professional, friendly and as having excellent 
interpersonal skills. Participants also reflected on the benefits of deploying the same DJIATF 
leadership in both responses.452  This enabled military and civilian representatives to build trust, 
relationships and understanding between responses.  
Although these factors reportedly enhanced civil-military coordination, they also led some to 
suggest this improvement was “personality driven.”453 This concerned some interviewees who 
noted NZDF staff often change posting every two years, which meant this progress and 
experience might be lost.454 
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 Interview: 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 50, 51. 
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 Interview: 36, 37, 50, 51. Positive  examples of pre-disaster civil-military interaction included exercises, table top and post 
disaster discussions. 
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 Interview: 51. 
451
 Interview: 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 50, 51. 
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Issues concerning command and control 
Despite these positive views, stakeholders observed a number of command and control issues 
which they felt impeded coordination.455 In contrast to all NZDF interviewees, who believed 
military personnel had respected MFAT as lead agency, civilian stakeholders reported this had 
not always occurred on the Canterbury or in the field.456 One OGA stakeholder commented, 
“It appeared to me that the NZDF thought that they were the lead agency. 




One GoNZ official also reflected on this tension and believed some MFAT staff were viewed as a 
“necessary evil” by certain NZDF personnel.458 This frustrated MFAT LOs and undermined their 
leadership and coordination of the WoG response. 
In contrast to these perspectives, some NZDF representatives suggested the military reluctantly 
took charge in HADR scenarios.459 They reflected that MFAT LOs were rotated every two weeks, 
or less, on the Canterbury. This meant NZDF personnel were “re-teaching the situation and 
reforming those [NZDF-MFAT] relationships every time.”460 One NZDF representative believed 
this had a natural outcome, stating that “although MFAT has ‘technical lead,’ NZDF ends up 
leading the relationships… at the tactical and most of the integration levels.”461  
NZDF-OGA coordination was challenging in the field 
While NZDF-OGA coordination was generally perceived positively, some interviewees felt this 
was impeded by a lack of understanding, ‘command and control’ and organisational culture 
issues.462 These were particularly observed at the tactical level, when NZDF and OGA 
representatives worked alongside one another on the Canterbury and in the outer islands.  
In some examples OGA representatives felt they were excluded from the NZDF planning 
process or were not listened to, because they were civilian.463 Others reported they were 
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 Interview: 38. The interviewee suggested that although Navy personnel had respected officials, this was not the case with 
some New Zealand Army personnel. 
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“made to feel that we [civilian representatives] were under [NZDF] command.”464 This frustrated 
civilian representatives, some of who had extensive HADR experience.  
Interviewees reported it was this tension which led to the incident between NZDF and USAR 
officers, which were deployed in the field together.465  This ultimately led USAR and NZDF teams 
to operate independently, as they felt civil-military coordination was too challenging. 
Closer civil-military coordination and more interaction desired 
Nine interviewees linked the above coordination challenges to a lack of understanding and 
previous interaction between NZDF and civilian representatives.466 This led some to conclude 
that “below the very senior decision-making level [NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination] was 
a bit ‘ad hoc’.”467 As a result, 90% of New Zealand participants recommended more pre-disaster 
interaction to improve future civil-military coordination efforts.468 
Although some of the recommended measures were being applied, nine stakeholders 
expressed their frustration over how training and exercises did not appear to be improving civil-
military coordination.469 A range of reasons were reportedly behind this, including staff rotation 
in the NZDF and civilian agencies, a lack of direct interaction in exercises and efforts to improve 
civil-military coordination not always being supported by civilian or military leadership.  
 
ii. Coordination with international and local humanitarian actors 
 
Minimal coordination was reported 
Forty five percent of all participants reported there had been little or no contact between the 
NZDF and humanitarian actors in the TC Winston response. This figure included all 
humanitarian interviewees, five of which reported communication and information sharing had 
been poor between the NZDF and their agencies.470 One INGO representative commented,  
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 Interview: 41, 42, 52, 53. Frustration reportedly led to one USAR team choosing to identify their own tasking without 
coordinating or reporting to NZDF personnel first. 
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 Interview: 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56. Suggestions included more frequent civil-military exercises, 
training opportunities and integrated courses in New Zealand and the Pacific. Interviewees also recommended that New 
Zealand civilian representatives spend more time on NZDF assets in-between cyclone seasons, as this would increase their 
understanding of military procedures and culture. 
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“We didn't know the full scope of what [the NZDF] were able to provide… 
That was my experience through TC Winston… [Military support] wasn't 
made available specifically for everybody to utilise.”
471
 
These factors meant many humanitarians did not understand how they could coordinate with 
the NZDF in the field, or even if this was possible.  
While a general lack of interaction was reported, coordination which did occur was viewed 
positively by humanitarian interviewees.472 Examples often related to the offer of NZDF 
logistical support, which meant humanitarians could transport relief supplies to isolated areas.  
One INGO interviewee even reported that the NZDF was “in touch with the culture and basics of 
civilian operations in the Pacific,” which made coordination easier.473 This was reportedly due 
to the NZDF’s previous HADR experience, the higher level of interaction it had with New 
Zealand civilian humanitarians and factors relating to its characteristics and culture.474  
Stakeholders reported that different reasons were behind the lack of interaction 
Interviewee perspectives varied over why a lack of NZDF-humanitarian coordination occurred, 
although these tended to align with the sector participants represented. For example, three of 
the four NZDF representatives believed humanitarian actors did not want to coordinate with 
the NZDF or only did so for pragmatic reasons.475This contrasted with the views of all 
humanitarian interviewees, who expressed the desire to utilise logistical support or coordinate 
more closely with the NZDF.  
Only three interviewees commented that their agencies avoided direct interaction with the 
NZDF. This did not, however, prevent coordination but meant agencies used mechanisms to 
facilitate this. Only one humanitarian reported this choice was based on their organisations 
desire to adhere to the humanitarian principles, as they felt their neutrality may have been 
undermined by contact with the NZDF.476 This related to sensitivities around politics and the 
relationship between New Zealand and Fiji.  
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 Interview: 43, 44, 47, 49. Only two of the stakeholders interviewed confident that their supplies had been transported by the 
NZDF. This was because the Fijian NDMO had not kept records of which military had transported relief supplies and where 




 Factors included the small size of the NZDF which made it mobile, with less levels of hierarchy and the ability to build 
personal relationships between individuals. 
475
 Interview: 39, 40, 42. One of these commented: “Some of those NGOs leverage off us quite well and are really easy to work 
with and they very clear about… what they want from us. Other times they want nothing to do from us… until they end up in 
trouble” (Interview: 39). 
476
 Interview: 43. The stakeholders was concerned that the political context of TC Winston meant they needed to be careful 




In contrast, two interviewees stated their agencies had chosen not to assist in the Lau group 
because the NZDF was based there.477 Reasons included the belief that the military was already 
meeting needs, that their organisation would receive less visibility alongside the NZDF, and that 
the military’s culture and organisational style would make coordination more challenging.478  
Domestic factors impeding coordination 
Over 80% of humanitarian stakeholders also felt the lack of NZDF-humanitarian coordination 
stemmed from a separation between these actors. One INGO reflected on their experience, 
they stated,  
“[The NZDF’s] work in Fiji was mainly directly with the Government, so we felt 
that we were left out of that… civil-military engagement.”
479
  
Some interviewees believed this was the result of domestic factors such as the national disaster 
management structure, or RFMF and ex-military officials taking charge of the NDMO.480  Others 
felt the GoV had made decisions which intentionally isolated international humanitarian actors 
and reduced their ability to coordinate with the NZDF. One stakeholder even reported that 
some humanitarian agencies were ordered by the GoF not to work in the Lau region, alongside 
the NZDF.481  
As a result, some humanitarian stakeholders felt the success of civil-military coordination 
depended on certain personalities.482 This meant humanitarian representatives who had pre-
established relationships with MFAT, NDMO and GoF officials were successful in their 
coordination efforts with the NZDF, while others were not. 
Challenges with the humanitarian coordination structure 
In contrast, seven non-humanitarian participants reported poor civil-military coordination was a 
result of international humanitarian coordination mechanisms not integrating well with the 
National Cluster System.483 Interviewees, however, disagreed over whether humanitarian or 
national stakeholders were responsible for this separation. Most locally-based participants 
                                                                                                                                                                           
commented: “The first two weeks it was quite sensitive because I completely understood the nature of relationship between the 
militaries of Australia, New Zealand and Fiji. So… I tried as much for us not to be involved in that level of politics… we avoided 
being in direct contact with any of the militaries… [cooperating with the NZDF] may have worked a little bit against our favour in 
terms of the Fiji Government. We might have been seen as an outsider interfering with national responses.” 
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believed foreign humanitarians were at fault. One GoF official described humanitarian-military 
coordination as “very ad hoc” and stated the whole humanitarian system needed to be fixed.484  
Other interviewees reported the humanitarian coordination structure was rejected by the GoF, 
which opted to use national structures and the ‘future operations cell’ instead.485 One NZDF 
participant reflected,  
“There WAS no UN cluster system. [The GoF] went 'No we are not doing that. 
We are running the show and these are our priorities… I think it worked really 
well in that environment, if I’m honest. Whereas the down side to that is they 




iii. Coordination with the Government of Fiji 
 
Coordination was viewed as positive due to State approaches 
All GoF participants described the NZDF’s coordination with NDMO, RFMF, GoF and Ministry 
representatives as ‘good’ or ‘excellent.’ One GoF interviewee even stated the NZDF’s 
coordination was “much better done,” in comparison to their impressions of the Vanuatu 
response.487 Another reported the NZDF was easier to coordinate with, compared to other 
militaries.488 
Interviewees provided a number of reasons for these positive views. NZDF and GoF participants 
felt NZDF-GoF coordination was good, due to the approach taken by the NZDF and DJIATF.489  
This was described as flexible, friendly and respectful of the GoF’s authority and pace. Seven 
interviewees reported this approach resulted in the NZDF having greater autonomy and 
coordination with the GoF.490 One NZDF representative reflected, 
“By the end of the two-and-a-bit months that we were there [the NZDF] were 
operating in a more permissive environment than everyone else because we 
were trusted... Our ability to get information into and out of NDMO was 
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vastly superior to [the ADF]. And that was because of the individuals and the 




Many participants linked this positive coordination to national oversight and the management 
structure applied by the GoF.492 Interviewees reported that many GoF and NDMO officials were 
ex-military or serving RFMF members, which meant the GoF “ran [the disaster response] as a 
military operation.”493 NZDF, GoF and GoNZ interviewees felt this enhanced NZDF-GoF 
coordination in the NDMO, as both sides were culturally similar and familiar with military 
processes, terminology and operations.494  One GoNZ participant reflected this meant it was 
“easy” for the NZDF to embed themselves in the NDMO and “add value without being too 
pushy and overwhelming the local system.”495  
Differences in culture 
In contrast to these views, some participants reported coordination challenges, which were 
linked to differences in culture and organisational structure.496 One NZDF interviewee described 
these as follows: 
“Cultural barriers… there were natural rub points… [Fijian Government] 
centralised a lot of that decision-making, [while the NZDF] tend to 
decentralise… It frustrates us that we can’t sometimes get decisions… and I 
think it probably frustrates the Fijian military and their government sector… 




Tension was often related to the NZDF’s prioritisation of speed, which conflicted with the GoF 
and RFMF’s more ‘easy going’ culture and decision-making.498  
Contrasting perspectives on the impact of politics and interests 
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Although over 70% of all participants discussed either the 2006 coup or political tensions 
between New Zealand and Fiji. Interviewees were divided over whether these factors had 
positive or negative impacts on NZDF-GoF coordination. On one hand, all GoF, GoNZ and NZDF 
participants reported that political tensions did not negatively impact coordination efforts. 
Some even believed these factors resulted in a larger and more effective NZDF response, as the 
GoNZ was trying to rebuild trust and relationships.499 
On the other hand, thirteen civilian interviewees believed historic tensions and politics 
negatively impacted NZDF-GoF coordination.500 Many believed the GoF was suspicious of the 
GoNZ’s support or perceived it as either condescending or motivated by diplomatic interests.501  
This reportedly undermined coordination and trust. It also reportedly delayed decision-making 
around the use of NZDF assets. One INGO representative observed,  
“For me it was just purely suspicion from the host country [Fiji]. Being 
suspicious of the motives of the militaries of New Zealand and Australia… 
that delayed a lot of the decisions made on where to respond.”
502
  
Some believed these factors led to RFMF personnel being tasked to observe NZDF personnel 
and take control over the distribution of NZDF-transported supplies.503 These measures, 
however, had negative impacts on HADR, as will be discussed in Part Three. 
 
iv. Coordination with the affected population 
 
Perceptions tied to outcomes 
Overall, stakeholders’ believed relations and coordination between the NZDF and affected 
population had been extremely positive. May interviewees discussed the extreme 
circumstances communities were in prior to the NZDF’s arrival and believed the population 
would have welcomed any assistance offered. Three stakeholders also felt the mere presence 
of the NZDF lifted the spirits of the affected individuals around them.504  One local 
humanitarian worker commented, 
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“People would sit all day long and begin to stare into space. Because there 
was no houses, EVERYTHING was gone. And when [the NZDF] came in and 
started doing the work with them, that’s when restoration began. 
Psychologically, they sort of came back to their senses.”
505
  
All of the community representatives expressed deep gratitude for the assistance provided by 
the NZDF. Many described NZDF personnel as hard working and believed personnel completed 
tasks which local actors had neither the resources nor capability to finish in such a short time 
frame.506 Stakeholders also provided examples of the depth of feeling outer island communities 
had for the NZDF.507 In one case this saw the affected population putting on a concert and feast 
to thank the NZDF prior to its departure, despite their food shortages and needs. 
 
Contrasting views over the level of communication 
Stakeholders perspectives varied considerably over how communication and coordination had 
been between the NZDF and affected population. For example, 80% of all NZDF, GoNZ and GoF 
interviewees believed the NZDF’s communication with the affected population had been good 
in the TC Winston response. Many felt this was because the RFMF, local chiefs and LOs 
facilitated communication, which reduced language and cultural barriers.508 One NZDF 
interviewees also believed the population were “on the whole really receptive” to personnel 
because locals already had a familiarity and respect for militaries because of the RFMF.509 
In contrast, six community representatives reported that communication was poor or non-
existent between the NZDF and affected individuals.510 One community representative 
reflected, 
“[The NZDF] just came right in, no briefing no nothing, just the government 
officials accompanying them... We just found out along the way… But nothing 
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Some noted NZDF personnel would often only say ‘hello’ to villagers then go straight to work. 
This led some to question whether the NZDF were ordered not to interact.  
Many community representatives and humanitarians linked this to the NZDF communicating 
predominantly with a small number of village headmen or local authorities.512 This meant 
information was not always passed onto villagers and the priority needs of communities were 
not always communicated to the NZDF. 
Contrasting views over how culture impacted coordination 
Perspectives also varied over how cultural factors impacted coordination. Ten interviewees felt 
aspects of the NZDF culture made coordination with the population easier.513 Some of these, 
including community representatives reported that NZDF personnel were more friendly, 
approachable and empathetic than some personnel in the RFMF or other militaries.514 Others 
suggested coordination was enhanced by having personnel had Pacific Island or Maori heritage, 
which made the NZDF more culturally sensitive.515  
In contrast, many locally-based interviewees highlighted examples where NZDF personnel 
demonstrated a lack of cultural understanding.516 When asked about obstacles to coordination 
one community representative exclaimed, “language, culture barriers, politics, EVERYTHING. 
Because [NZDF personnel are] from a different country.”517 These factors reportedly led some 
personnel to act in a culturally inappropriate manner, which embarrassed or frustrated affected 
individuals.518 
Interviewees also believed cultural factors impeded communication between the NZDF and 
population. Some reported community leaders were too embarrassed to make requests of the 
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NZDF or communicate priority needs.519 Others believed communities were too afraid to 
disagree with or critique the NZDF’s assistance.520 One representative reflected,  
“Some [village elders] I think, disagreed with the [NZDF’s] proposed plan… 
they think if they disagree with some of the proposed plan, the New Zealand 
Government will withdraw with the plan… withdraw the money.”
521
  
In some cases this led community representatives to accept NZDF assistance that was not 
always seen as suitable or appropriate for communities.522  
Communities desired greater levels of interaction and accountability 
These observations led five community representatives to suggest the NZDF should either 
directly consult the population or develop a system where communities and females, in 
particular, could provide the NZDF with feedback.523 One participant commented,  
 “The only thing for [the NZDF] to improve is for us to get together and talk… 
explain about this and that… No female came to us… I think there would be a 
lot of [needs] we would bring up to them, like clothes for our children.”
524
 
Part One findings 
The sections above examined the perceptions of TC Winston stakeholders and presented key 
findings. One of these is that the majority of participants felt the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination efforts had were good and had improved, in comparison to the previous HADR 
response. Interviewees gave several reasons for their positive views, which were similar to 
those identified in Vanuatu.525 
Other more unique aspects included the militarisation of the response and the relative freedom 
NZDF personnel were given in the field and NEOC. Some participants believed these factors 
enhanced the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts, in part due to the relative culture and 
organisational similarities between the GoF, RFMF and NZDF. 
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In contrast to these views, interviewees also reported minimal or ad hoc coordination between 
sectors.526 Some participants also felt there had been suspicion and tensions between State 
actors, which impeded coordination efforts.  
These perspectives portrayed a more critical view of the NZDF’s coordination, than was 
expressed in grey literature. Yet over 90% of all interviewees verbalised the desire to 
coordinate more closely with the NZDF and enhance civil-military coordination in future 
responses. 
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Part Two: Obstacles to Coordination 
 
This section reports the four key obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-military coordination, as collated 
from interview data. An overview of these obstacles is presented in Table 3.527  
Key obstacle % Sub-themes and coordination issues  
i.  Domestic    
    Factors 
88% − Sovereignty and national oversight introduced protocol and 
processes, which constrained civil-military coordination. 
− Politics and personal interests impacted trust and relationships. 
− Lack of integration between national and international 
coordination structures. 
− National legislation not updated or applied, which led to 
changes in structure and confusion. 
 ii. Poor   
Communication 
82% − Between the NZDF and: New Zealand civilian actors, 
humanitarian agencies and the affected population. 
− The lack of an all-informed network on Canterbury, unclassified 
email system and constraints due to security restrictions.  
− The use of terminology by NZDF and civilian actors. 
− Cultural misunderstandings and language barriers. 
iii. Lack of 
Understanding 
67% Regarding:  
− The capabilities and roles of the NZDF. 
− The Fijian culture and context, HADR operations and the 
humanitarian principles (exhibited by NZDF personnel). 
− How the NZDF and civilian actors could communicate and 
coordinate NZDF capabilities. 
iv. Organisational 
Culture 
52% − Clashes in priorities, culture and organisational structure 
(between NZDF and civilian actors).  
− High staff rotation (MFAT within country and NZDF/DJIATF staff 
within postings). 
Table 3:  Obstacles to the NZDF’s Civil-Military Coordination in the TC Winston response 
Due to the complexity of these obstacles and the number of sub themes, a more thorough 
analysis of these is included in Annex Four. This presents participant views and examples of the 
obstacles and sub-themes described the table above.  
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Part Two findings 
When triangulated, interviewee data revealed four thematic obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-
military coordination. These were: domestic factors, poor communication, lack of 
understanding, and organisational culture. This order is identical to that which emerged from 
TC Pam interview findings, which strengthens the validity and generalisability of these findings. 
The statistics behind these figures also evidence remarkable consistency across sectors and that 
a high proportion of participants were aware of these obstacles. For example, 64% of all 
interviewees discussed three or more obstacles in their interviews.528  This figure includes those 
from the NZDF and GoNZ sector. Most barriers to coordination were also discussed by 
participants from all five sectors, while nine interviewees reported all four obstacles.529  
As with the previous case study, interviewees identified numerous sub-themes, which were not 
discussed in grey literature. It was also reported that some of these barriers had significant 
negative impacts on civil-military coordination.530 Participants also linked obstacles to each 
other, further suggesting these are interconnected and influencing one another.531  
The majority of interviewees also expressed their desire to openly discuss obstacles, to improve 
future civil-military coordination efforts. Some also raised concerns that post disaster and 
lessons learned reports did not appear to discuss key obstacles, particularly actors’ politics and 
interests.  These views, and the fact that most participants reported obstacles which were not 
identified in grey literature, suggests that published material may not have accurately reflected 
the perspectives of stakeholders.  
 
Part Three: How the Obstacles to Coordination Impacted HADR 
 
Within interviews, participants identified four main impacts which resulted from the obstacles 
identified above. These are detailed below and include: i) HADR was delayed or not delivered, 
ii) assistance was not always suitable for the affected population or context, iii) population 
needs were not met in accordance with humanitarian principles. 
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i. HADR was delayed or not delivered  
 
Seventeen interviewees discussed examples where they felt assistance provided by the NZDF or 
other civilian actors had been delayed or was not delivered because of obstacles to civil-military 
coordination.532  
Many of these related to delays around decision-making, particularly over the identification of 
tasks for the NZDF and the use of its assets. Some participants believed delays were a result of 
national factors, which meant the NZDF’s planning and assistance were delayed while waiting 
for the GoF to identify tasks it could undertake.533 One NZDF representative described this as a 
frustration and a “real challenge,” which at times meant the NZDF was two days from finishing 
a task without having others lined up.534  
Other interviewees believed the NZDF’s culture and hierarchy contributed to this outcome.535 
One GoNZ official felt NZDF personnel were not always encouraged to show initiative, they 
observed,  




The NZDF’s own procedures around the use of assets also reportedly delayed the provision of 
assistance at times. For example, one OGA representative described the process of getting 
building supplies off the Canterbury as “convoluted,” which delayed the delivery of these 
ashore and their use in the response.537  
Humanitarian interviewees also reported they struggled to meet the NZDF’s requirements and 
timeframes to utilise assets.538 One New Zealand humanitarian reflected, 
“If [the NZDF] were able to predict for twenty four to forty eight hours in 
advance, the likely routines and space available… obviously more time. I 
know that there were a number of movements that were next to nothing on 
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A times, this meant the HADR of humanitarian agencies was either delayed or not delivered to 
the affected population. As a result of their observations. 
 
ii. Assistance was not always suitable for the affected population or context 
 
Participants discussed several instances where the NZDF’s assistance had not always suited the 
disaster context or affected population.540 
Some examples related to NZDF assets or the supplies it transported not being considered 
suitable for the outer islands.541  This was believed to be the result of a lack of communication 
between the NZDF, GoF and affected population, as well as the NZDF’s lack of understanding 
about the area of operations. One GoF official believed this was also partly due to the NZDF not 
receiving accurate assessments form the GoF when it first arrived.542 This reportedly meant the 
NZDF duplicated HADR which had already been distributed, in at least two instances. 
Other interviewees believed the NZDF had not always provided gender-specific assistance.543 
Some felt that because the NZDF had deployed without a gender advisor that the needs of 
widows, women and children were not always communicated to the NZDF or adequately met. 
One local humanitarian reflected,  
“Basically [the NZDF are] not doing gendered analysis. You're not asking- 
‘what do men need, what do women need?’... You're then not providing the 
correct provisions… it's not protection with dignity.
544
  
Community representatives also highlighted examples where tasks were completed by the 
NZDF in a way considered unsuitable by the population. Some felt this occurred because 
community leaders were afraid to question or critique the NZDF’s plans or assistance, even 
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when communities felt it was inappropriate.545 One example involved the NZDF reconstructing 
damaged teachers’ accommodation on a school property.546 The demolition of these houses 
was however initiated by the NZDF without the knowledge of the families who lived in them. 
The houses were then rebuilt in an area the teachers felt was inappropriate, as these were too 
closely situated for the large families which would reside in them.547  
Some negative impacts will likely have negative long-term impacts on communities 
In another example a lack of consultation with the affected population had negative long term 
consequences for communities. This occurred when the NZDF dug a rubbish pit in a village to 
dispose of waste and building materials.548 Although well-intentioned, the pit was unknowingly 
dug in the location of a vegetable garden, which was feeding school children and two nearby 
communities.  
This further strained food security and was later a health risk for communities when mosquitos 
began breeding in the pit after the rainy season.549 Community representatives also 
acknowledged that locals wanted to use the materials discarded by the NZDF to rebuild their 
homes, as many could not afford transportation costs or to buy new materials. At the time 
interviews were completed, some families in areas the NZDF operated in were still living in 
tents, as they lacked the finances to rebuild. 
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Twelve stakeholders believed a lack of communication and coordination between the NZDF and 
civilian actors resulted in a ‘gap’ where the affected population’s needs were not met.550 Many 
felt this was because the NZDF focused on public infrastructure, while needs such as 
psychosocial care, protection, private housing and the distribution of non-food items were not 
adequately addressed. One local humanitarian commented, 
“The psychological impact of TC Winston on these people, that particular 
area was not well looked after because the military didn’t focus on that… that 
went missing, that ‘soft [needs]’ gap… And [the affected population] won’t 
tell you this but the things that happened to women and children in the 
shelters is kept well hidden.”
551
  
This report suggests not only that some priority humanitarian needs were not met, but that 
many of these were not reported to authorities or NZDF personnel. 
Assistance was not always focused in areas of need 
Nine interviewees, including over half of all community representatives felt a lack of 
communication between the NZDF and affected population contributed to this outcome.552  
This reportedly meant the NZDF focused more of its assistance on certain islands and villages, 
while other areas received less HADR or “missed out” on supplies.553 Some community 
representatives felt this meant NZDF personnel were not aware of the populations priority 
needs.554 One commented,  
“If [the NZDF] come to the people, they see what the communities really 
want. It’s like… first-things-first. I think repairing of schools and renovations 
of teachers quarters are maybe the third or the fourth things that needed to 
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Care. 2016. Rapid Gender Analysis Tropical Cyclone Winston: Fiji, March 2016. 
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be done…. Like in the village, there are a few widows with no houses… build a 
small shelter just for them. Just to give them hope… That’s what I think.”
555
 
While most of these reports were made by locally-based stakeholders, some New Zealand 
participants also linked negative HADR outcomes to barriers to civil-military coordination. For 
example, one GoNZ interviewee noted, 
“I don't have a good view of how efficient things were… but my sense is that 
things were ‘not very efficient’ and some of the supplies went to places 
[when] they could have been prioritised to other areas.”
556
 
While some NZDF, GoNZ and GoF participants challenged these reports, many of the 
participants reporting the aforementioned issues believed State representatives would not be 
willing to discuss these in an interview. 
Some participants were aware stakeholders were trying to manipulate the NZDF’s HADR  
Eleven interviewees also either raised suspicion or confirmed that unfair distribution had 
occurred in the vicinity of the NZDF or with supplies it had transported.557 Although all believed 
the NZDF were unaware of this, stakeholders reported that this occurred when food and non-
food items were given to local authorities for distribution.558 One community representative 
reflected on their own experience of this, they commented, 
“[Aid] wasn't shared fairly… I mean the villages NEED it… there were the very 
poor… who still live in… the old earth Fijian bure... They were the ones 
devastated, like they needed more help. The help was given more to these 
rich people… And these people, the rich were not giving out.”
559
 
Some participants believed this meant the most vulnerable sectors of the population, such as 
widows and those living in poverty, received less assistance.560 One locally-based participant 
expressed embarrassment and shame at this, commenting that aid was “not used in the right 
way….That’s taxpayer’s money.”561 
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Many negative impacts were not discussed in media or reports  
Seven interviewees reflected that the impacts of obstacles to coordination were not reported in 
the media, lessons learned reports or to the NZDF. 562  Some felt this was due to actors 
protecting their interests.563 This included one local humanitarian, who stated,  
“[The lessons learned report is] not the REAL THING, you have to be here, you 
have to collect data… you have to experience it in order to get the actual 
picture. Because… people will always want to say things to impress… But… 




Other stakeholders believed problems were not discussed for cultural reasons or because 
individuals were afraid there would be negative repercussions if they spoke out.565  This led a 
number of interviewees to highlight the importance of ensuring accountability and observing 
international humanitarian standards during Pacific HADR responses.566 
Part Three findings 
In the sections above, interviewees discussed several negative impacts they believed obstacles 
to civil-military coordination had on HADR. The three major impacts included assistance being 
delayed or not delivered, being unsuitable for the affected population or context, and 
population needs not being met in accordance with the humanitarian principles. Evaluation of 
these reports reveals many interviewees believed multiple obstacles contributed to these 
negative impacts. This draws further attention to the interconnected and dynamic nature of 
obstacles to coordination.  
As in TC Pam interview findings, concerns were raised by participants who felt the priority 
needs of communities were not being met. Unfair distribution was also believed to have 
disproportionately affected the most vulnerable sectors of the population. While not all 
interviewees attributed these outcomes to the NZDF, many linked them to a lack of civil-
military coordination or poor communication between the NZDF and stakeholders. Collectively, 
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these findings suggest some stakeholders did not adhere to their international obligations, in 
the TC Winston response. 
Finally, over 60% of interviewees expressed hesitancy about critiquing the NZDF, GoNZ or GoF’s 
response. Many displayed this through body language or opted not to provide certain details. 
Those who openly discussed their concerns revealed a number of different reasons behind their 
hesitancy.567 These views reinforce the importance of participant confidentiality in this study. 
 
Chapter Five summary 
In the chapter above, TC Winston interviewee findings were examined. These explored how the 
thirty-three interviewed stakeholders perceived the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts, 
obstacles to coordination and the impacts these had on HADR. Findings confirm that 
stakeholders believed the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts were positive and had 
improved upon that seen in TC Pam.  
Interviewee data, however, provided a better understanding of why stakeholders and different 
sectors held these perspectives. In addition to the pragmatic reasons described in literature, 
participants provided similar justification for their views, to TC Pam stakeholders.568 Contextual 
factors also included the culture and organisational similarities between the NZDF and the GoF 
and RFMF officials controlling the response. 
Findings also reveal a discrepancy between grey literature perspectives and those of 
interviewed stakeholders from the same sectors.  For example, participants suggested there 
had been minimal or ad hoc coordination with some sectors.569 Interviewees also identified 
sub-themes and barriers to coordination, which were not discussed in grey literature. Some of 
these had serious negative impacts on the NZDF’s civil-military coordination and actors’ HADR 
were also discussed.570 The most concerning of these reports suggests that humanitarian needs 
were not being met, unfair distribution occurred and these impacted vulnerable sectors of the 
population most.  
A high proportion of interviewees were also hesitant to critique NZDF, GoNZ and GoF’s HADR 
efforts, due to fears there might be negative repercussions. These findings raise a number of 
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concerns. Some surround the fact that the NZDF or GoNZ may not have been aware of 
stakeholder views, all obstacles to coordination or how these were impacting actors’ assistance. 
Others relate to the implications of TC Winston grey literature not accurately depicting civil-
military coordination issues or stakeholder perspectives. 
Finally, the fact that TC Winston and TC Pam interview data contained many similarities 
strengthens the validity of case study findings and suggests they may be generalisable. The 
comparative analysis of these findings is the subject of the following chapter, which compares 





Chapter Six: Making Sense of Chaos 
 
In the previous four chapters grey literature and interview findings were presented. These 
focused on the TC Pam and TC Winston HADR responses and how the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination was portrayed and perceived by stakeholders. This chapter presents final 
conclusions, which were drawn from a comparative analysis of both case studies.571  
Findings are presented in three parts. Each is focused on and answers one of the research 
questions posed in this thesis. Part One examines how stakeholders perceived the NZDF’s civil-
military coordination in past Pacific HADR responses. This compares grey literature stakeholder 
perspectives within those of the sixty eight interviewees. Part Two discusses obstacles to the 
NZDF’s civil-military coordination, which were identified in both case studies. Part Three then 
explores how stakeholders believed these obstacles impacted the HADR provided by actors.  
To provide a greater depth of analysis, the term ‘stakeholder/s’ is used to describe perceptions 
drawn from both grey literature and interview findings, while the terms ‘interviewee/s’ or 
‘participant/s’ are used when referring specifically to the views of interviewed stakeholders.572 
The implications of findings are also discussed in the sections below, as they relate to 
stakeholders and previous literature. A new model is also proposed by the researcher at the 
close of the chapter. This summarises the findings in this study, to help stakeholders better 
understand the complexities of civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR.  
 
 
Part One: How did stakeholders perceive the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in past Pacific 
disaster relief responses? 
 
The following findings emerged from the comparative analysis of stakeholder perspectives: 
i. Stakeholders generally viewed the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts as positive. 
ii. Grey literature portrayed stakeholder perspectives of the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination more favourably than those expressed by interviewees from these sectors. 
iii. Stakeholders believed the coordination mechanisms used in past responses had positive 
and negative impacts on the NZDF’s civil-military coordination. 
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The implications of these findings are briefly discussed below, while a more detailed 
explanation of these is included in Annex Six. 
 
Stakeholders generally viewed the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts as positive in 
past responses 
 
Most stakeholders used words like ‘good’ or ‘great,’ when describing the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination efforts in the TC Pam and Winston responses. These positive perceptions were 
reported in grey literature and interviews. They were also expressed by the majority of 
participants from all five stakeholder sectors and both case studies. This suggests that, in 
general, the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts were viewed favourably by the 
stakeholders involved in past Pacific HADR responses. The triangulation of this data across two 
HADR responses and between stakeholder sectors strengthens this validity of this finding.  
While grey literature provided little clarification on why actors’ held these views, interviewee 
data better explained stakeholder’ reasoning. When collated findings reveal X main reasons the 
NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts are perceived positively by stakeholders. These are: 1) 
the pragmatic and practical benefits of NZDF coordination and HADR, 2) pre-disaster interaction 
between the NZDF and stakeholders, and 3) the characteristics, culture and identity of the 
NZDF. 
The pragmatic reasons behind coordination 
While grey literature provided little clarification on why actors’ held these views, interviewee 
data better explained stakeholder’ reasoning. These perspectives largely related to the practical 
or financial benefits of NZDF involvement in HADR, as well as the ability to more effectively 
meet humanitarian needs.573Perspectives often focused on how these capabilities benefitted 
the stakeholder’s own sector or agency, indicating pragmatic reasons are often behind the 
positive perceptions of stakeholders. 
These and other pragmatic reasons, led many participants to conclude the NZDF and other 
foreign militaries were likely ‘here to stay’ in Pacific HADR. Most believed this was a good thing, 
provided that the military and other stakeholders continued to try and improve their 
coordination efforts and HADR capabilities.  
Stakeholder perspectives were often not related to the quality of coordination 
                                                      
573





An analysis of stakeholder perspectives, however, reveals that grey literature sources often 
concluded that coordination efforts have been good, based on perceived outcomes and 
benefits, rather than the actual quality of civil-military coordination. These factors validate the 
concerns of authors such as Egnell, who suggests many analyses of civil-military coordination 
have “weak historical, empirical and theoretical foundations” (2013, p.238). He also warns that 
actors’ preconceptions and assumptions about civil-military coordination, not necessarily mean 
these efforts have been effective. These findings raise concerns about conclusions within grey 
literature reports and studies, which did not deeply analyse stakeholder views or reasoning.  
Interviewee perspectives challenged conclusions within international literature 
Some of the interviewee perceptions collated in this study were considerably different to those 
reported in other regions and contexts. For example, international studies generally conclude 
that humanitarian stakeholders are hesitant to coordinate with militaries (Byman et al., 2000, 
Abiew, 2003, 2012).574 In contrast, over 70% of all the humanitarian interviewees interviewed 
stated they either wanted to coordinate with the NZDF or desired closer coordination with the 
military in the future.  
The NZDF’s pre-disaster interaction enhanced coordination 
In both responses, participants noted that previous engagement between the NZDF and 
stakeholders made their coordination efforts easier. This was because face-to-face engagement 
enabled representatives to build relationships, understanding and trust, which interviewees felt 
mitigated barriers to coordination. 
In contrast, high proportions of the NZDF and civilian participants involved in the TC Pam and 
Winston responses reported they had minimal or no contact with each other prior to the 
disaster. These interviewees believed this reduced their understanding and ability to coordinate 
effectively. This also led the majority of these participants to recommend increasing civil-
military interaction between stakeholders, prior to HADR deployments. 
These perspectives indicate there is a link between pre-disaster engagement and the NZDF’s 
positive civil-military coordination efforts. These findings support arguments made in previous 
studies, which suggest ‘Janowitzean’ or ‘integrated’ coordination models are more effective, as 
they encourage interaction between military and civilian actors (Egnell, 2006). 
The characteristics, culture and identity of the NZDF aided coordination efforts  
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The NZDF’s characteristics, cultural traits and identity were also frequently discussed by 
stakeholders, as factors which made civil-military coordination easier.575 So too was the NZDF’s 
culture and national identity.576 For example, one local humanitarian interviewee from Fiji 
commented, 
“The Pacific is not a warzone and so the military that are coming are 
neighbours. Especially New Zealand, [the NZDF] is seen across the Pacific as a 
friend of Pacific islanders.”577 
Some participants also reported these cultural and national factors led personnel to adopt a 
‘kiwi’ or ‘can-do attitude’ in Pacific HADR contexts, which civilians found easier to work with.  
Due to these reasons, many participants stated the NZDF was easier to coordinate with or 
better at civil-military coordination than the other foreign militaries deployed in these case 
studies. This may be because interviewees felt the NZDF’s cultural orientation, processes and 
approach were more closely aligned with their own Pacific or civilian cultures, as well as the 
norms guiding HADR.  
While these perceptions may be encouraging for the NZDF, they raise some concerns for other 
foreign militaries.578 This reinforces the need for further research, particularly to better 
understand how stakeholders view the civil-military coordination effort of other militaries in 
Pacific HADR.  
Stakeholder perspectives make a number of new contributions to academia  
These findings make a number of contributions to existing literature. Concerning civil-military 
relations theories, they tend to substantiate Moskos and Downes’ (2000) proposition that the 
NZDF is a postmodern military, which is changing culturally, due to domestic and international 
pressures.579 Interview data also suggest these changes and NZDF’s increasing civilianisation 
may have enhanced the force’s civil-military coordination capability. These findings mirror 
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Hajjar’s (2014) research on the US military. These findings do, however, raise questions about 
the long term implications of these changes, particularly on the NZDF’s other capabilities.580   
Stakeholder descriptions of the NZDF’s identity and culture are also similar to those reported by 
Morris (2017) and Greener (2017).581 These studies concluded that the NZDF had a ‘kiwi’ or 
‘professional’ approach, which helped the force coordinate with stakeholders in deployments. 
Interviewee data in this thesis, however, revealed a greater number of contrasts and 
complexity between stakeholder perspectives, which are discussed in the section below. 
The fact that the NZDF’s characteristics, culture and national identity were perceived to be 
behind why the force was relatively easier to coordinate with, also validates the work of some 
authors. These include contemporary civil-military relations theories, which suggest culture, 
identity and the environment militaries operate in have significant impacts on stakeholders’ 
relationships and effectiveness (Schiff, 1995, Bland, 1999, Jepperson et al., 1996). 
What these findings mean for future civil-military coordination efforts in Pacific HADR  
These positive views of the NZDF and civilian stakeholders’ willingness to coordinate provide a 
unique opportunity for the GoNZ and Pacific region. In particular, the widespread interest in 
improving civil-military coordination and civilian actors working with the NZDF could be 
capitalised on by stakeholders. This is likely to benefit all Pacific HADR stakeholders if these 
efforts enhance coordination efforts and ensure the needs of affected populations are better 







Stakeholder perceptions of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination were portrayed more 
favourably in grey literature, than by interviewees 
 
While stakeholders reported that the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts were generally 
positive, interviewees expressed more critical perspectives of these efforts than those 
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portrayed in grey literature. This was evident across all five stakeholder sectors, with 
participants implying their sector encountered more coordination challenges with the NZDF, 
than were acknowledged in grey literature.   
Findings also revealed several crucial unreported tensions and coordination issues challenges. 
These included ‘ad hoc’ coordination or a lack of interaction between the NZDF and civilian 
sectors. NZDF personnel being perceived as not listening to or disrespecting civilian 
stakeholders. These interviewee perspectives highlight that civil-military coordination issues are 
occurring at multiple levels. This is because they are occurring between national and 
international stakeholders, as well as internally, between the NZDF and New Zealand 
stakeholders at the strategic, operational and tactical level. 
Most tensions emerged over ‘command and control’ issues or ‘civilian control’ 
Examination of these tensions reveals most concerned ‘command and control’ issues or were 
compounded by civilian actors trying to exert leadership over the NZDF. The more serious 
examples of these also had significant negative impacts on the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination. For example, a serious incident occurred between USAR and NZDF personnel in 
Fiji. One OGA interviewee reflected on why they felt the incident escalated. They stated, 
“I’ve had the incident displayed to me verbally by [OGA representatives] and 
also NZDF people… it appears to be one guy who got a little ahead of himself 
in self-importance, matching up with another guy who wasn’t going to have a 
bar of having his people belittled.”
582
 
This tension was ultimately only resolved by USAR and NZDF teams operating independently. 
Concerning issues over civilian control, some GoV participants felt that NZDF personnel 
disrespected local officials. An example of this was when the first NZDF Hercules attempted to 
land, without having provided information the GoV requested. Public servants interpreted this 
as the military trying to take inappropriate control over the national response, by overriding 
procedures. These factors almost jeopardised the WoG HADR response, as the Hercules was 
nearly denied entry into the country.  
The civil-military problematique remains unresolved 
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These findings highlight the complexity of civil-military relations and the challenge of 
maintaining a military which is both effective and subordinate to civilian rule. This relates back 
to the foundational ‘civil-military problematique,’ discussed in Chapter One (Feaver, 1996).583  
The fact that tensions over civilian control were evident in both responses implies that the 
problematique remains relevant in Pacific HADR contexts. This suggests that despite the NZDF’s 
increasingly integrated or ‘Janowitzean’ approach to civil-military coordination being perceived 
favourably, issues over civilian control are still emerging.   
While these findings do not resolve the foundational ‘separation’ vs. ‘integration’ debate, they 
do make a new contribution to academic literature. They reveal, like Sotomayor’s (2010) South 
American case studies, that increased interaction has, in some cases, ‘magnified’ coordination 
issues between the NZDF and civilian stakeholders. This, in combination with the more positive 
stakeholder perspectives expressed above, implies that civil-military integration has had 
multifaceted impacts on coordination. This aligns with Malešič’s (2015) work, which concludes 
that integration can foster both cooperation and the “mutual transfer of values,” or 
“competition, conflict and a clash of organisational cultures” (2015, p.981). 
 
The mechanisms used in past HADR responses had positive and negative impacts on the 
NZDF’s civil-military coordination 
 
The comparative analysis of case studies revealed significant differences in stakeholder views 
over the effectiveness of civil-military coordination mechanisms. In general, stakeholders 
defended the mechanisms established by their own sectors, while critiquing those created by 
other actors. Stakeholder perspectives are described below, as they relate to the mechanisms 
established by the GoNZ and NZDF. While a discussion on the challenges associated with the 
mechanisms of affected governments and international actors is outside the scope of this 
thesis, a more detailed description of these is contained in Annex Six. 
New Zealand coordination mechanisms 
The new DJIATF model  
In both responses, stakeholders reported that the DJIATF enhanced the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination. Participants from the NZDF, GoNZ, OGAs and other New Zealand civilian agencies 
were especially complimentary of the DJIATF’s Commander and Chief of Staff.584 These senior 
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officers were deployed for both TC responses and were considered crucial by interviewees, due 
to their personalities, professionalism and interpersonal skills.585 These individuals cultivated 
close relationships with New Zealand stakeholders, as well as those in the Vanuatu and Fijian 
NEOCs. This was viewed as a key reason why civil-military coordination in the TC Winston 
response had markedly improved.  
DJIATF staff and LOs were also believed to have mitigated some obstacles to civil-military 
coordination, which were observed in the New Zealand High Commissions and NEOCs. 
Limitations placed on the DJIATF, however, meant the unit was not positioned to overcome 
obstacles such as politics and interests. This appears to be because the DJIATF is ultimately 
controlled by MFAT and HQ JFNZ, which interviewees felt were, at times, focused on political 
concerns or remaining diplomatic in HADR responses. For example, one OGA participant stated,  
NZDF interviewees also reported that limitations placed on the DJIATF had impeded its 
effectiveness and civil-military coordination capabilities.586 The small unit was, for example, 
predominantly based in the New Zealand High Commissions, which benefitted senior leadership 
and stakeholders within the WoG response. This also meant the unit’s capability was not 
extended to the JTF or field, where most of the NZDF’s assistance was delivered.  
CIMIC teams  
Grey literature was conspicuously lacking in analyses of NZDF CIMIC teams and their impacts on 
coordination. Interviewees, however, reported a concerning lack of understanding around the 
CIMIC teams role, responsibilities and application. For example, while CIMIC personnel were 
considered to have enhanced the NZDF’s coordination with NGOs, chiefs and communities in 
the TC Pam response, they were reportedly ineffective in Fiji.  
Some participants felt the ineffective use of CIMIC was a result of NZDF and GoNZ leadership 
not understanding the model. These misunderstandings and the misapplication of CIMIC teams 
were also believed to have reduced the effectiveness and suitability of the NZDF’s HADR. One 
NZDF interviewee reflected on this in the context of the TC Pam response, stating,  
“[The NZDF] were responding to direction to deliver things as opposed to 
assessing the need and then delivering whatever was required. It was CIMIC 
on the back foot, rather than the front foot… Or HADR on the back foot, as 
opposed to the front foot.”
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These negative outcomes was also connected to a perceived overlap between DJIATF and CIMIC 
capabilities and roles, which created confusion in both responses. This indicates that despite 
NZDF officials concluding that the Force’s coordination models were successful and should be 
replicated in future HADR responses, there remain issues around how these are applied. 
These perspectives suggests that, at best, NZDF CIMIC teams have been used in an ad hoc 
manner in past Pacific HADR responses and, at worst, CIMIC capabilities are not understood or 
being appropriately deployed. These findings are similar to those reported in international case 
studies, which have concluded that CIMIC models are often applied in an ad hoc manner by 
militaries, particularly in non-combat contexts (Haugevik and de Carvalho, 2007, Soeters et al., 
2014, Smith, 2015). 
Re-examining the way the NZDF does CIMIC 
The interviewee perspectives above are similar to those reported in Jacobs-Garrod’s (2010) 
thesis. This examined three NZDF peacekeeping deployments prior to 2010 and found that 
NZDF and NGO personnel lacked an understanding of the force’s CIMIC doctrine and 
protocol.588 These findings suggest the author’s recommendation, that the NZDF develop a 
Civil-Military Affairs doctrine and create a specialist unit to undertake CIMIC tasks, has only 
partially been followed with the creation of the DJIATF.  
These views also imply an examination of how the DJIATF and CIMIC teams facilitate civil-
military coordination in Pacific HADR, would be valuable. This would likely help the NZDF 
achieve GoNZ priorities, which include enhancing the military’s interoperability and HADR 
capabilities (NZDF, 2011).589  
Interviewee reflections on these models were also similar to those reported in Reaves and 
colleagues’ (2014) examination of the US Navy’s disaster engagement response in the Pacific.590 
This highlighted weaknesses in the application of the model, particularly between the military 
and locally-based stakeholders. Considering most interviewees reported the NZDF’s 
coordination efforts were exceeded those of other militaries in Pacific HADR, these findings 
may also encourage other States to examine their own civil-military engagement models. 
The FRANZ arrangement  
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Grey literature and interview data also exposed coordination issues associated with the FRANZ 
arrangement. For example, the rapid deployment and major role of FRANZ militaries gave their 
governments’ substantial control over military tasks and overall response coordination, in both 
responses. Some humanitarian and affected government participants, however, reported that 
the NZDF’s rapid response was, at times, detrimental to coordination. This was because it 
placed extra strain on national structures. It also meant the NZDF’s assets and aid were not 
always suitable for the Pacific HADR context.  
Many interviewees suggested the NZDF’s rapid deployment to Vanuatu and Fiji were motivated 
by either political interests or the desire for visibility. Several participants considered this 
distasteful and an affront to the humanitarian principles. GoV participants, in particular, 
believed this frustrated their coordination efforts and led some officials to resist or hesitate 
utilising FRANZ support. 
Pacific stakeholder concerns 
These findings support Vachette’s (2013) work, which suggested that Pacific Island countries 
were concerned about ex-colonial nations overpowering local leadership. They also raise similar 
concerns about State sovereignty and the possibility of affected nations rejecting HADR, as 
were discussed by Barber (2009) and Seekins (2009). The fact that one GoV representative 
nearly denied the first NZDF Hercules entry into Vanuatu demonstrates this scenario is not 
unrealistic. This stresses the value of FRANZ partners seeking out the approval of affected 
governments prior to deployment, as well understanding national processes.  
The fact that Pacific Island nations have discussed the development of a regional civil-military 
response structure is, however, encouraging for FRANZ stakeholders. This presents an 
opportunity for stakeholders to re-examine and improve upon existing regional mechanisms. 
Part One summary 
In the sections above, an analysis was presented on how stakeholders perceived the NZDF’s 
civil-military coordination in past Pacific HADR responses. In the first section positive 
perceptions were examined. These reveal that, in general, the NZDF’s civil-military coordination 
efforts are viewed favourably by stakeholders. Most views were, however, more based on the 
perceived benefits of NZDF support, rather than the actual quality of civil-military coordination. 
The discrepancy between grey literature and interviewee perspectives was also examined. This 
analysis revealed interviewed stakeholders were generally more critical of coordination efforts. 
They also reported significant tensions that were not detailed in literature, most of which 




Stakeholder perspectives also varied considerably over the effectiveness of existing 
coordination mechanisms. These findings suggest the NZDF and other HADR stakeholders may 
want to re-examine how their civil-military coordination models are applied and function in 
Pacific HADR, to better enhance coordination. The specific obstacles these models may want to 
mitigate are discussed below. 
 
Part Two: What, if any, were the obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-military coordination                  
in past responses? 
Four key obstacles to coordination were identified in both case studies 
 
Collectively, the sixty-eight interviewed stakeholders reported that four thematic obstacles 
impeded the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in the TC Pam and Winston HADR responses. In 
order of significance these were: 1) domestic factors, 2) poor communication, 3) lack of 
understanding, and 4) organisational culture. While aspects of these were discussed in grey 
literature, most of the in-depth understanding of these barriers was drawn from interview data, 
which were remarkably similar in both case studies. 
Almost identical obstacles were reported in both responses  
Several factors strengthen the validity of these findings and their generalisability. Each obstacle 
was reported by a high proportion of interviewees.591 The participants who identified these 
obstacles also represented a broad range of stakeholders, including the NZDF, States, 
humanitarian agencies, civilian institutions and the affected population. Obstacles were also 
ranked in the same order by interviewees, in both the Pacific HADR responses. This 
triangulation and consistency implies these research findings may be useful for stakeholders 
which deploy in future Pacific HADR contexts. 
Many were considered common obstacles to civil-military coordination 
These obstacles are similar to those reported in other international case studies. Poor 
communication, a lack of understanding, and organisational culture issues are, for example, 
consistently identified as barriers to coordination in peacekeeping and complex environments 
(Beauregard, 1998, Mockaitis, 2004, Scheltinga et al., 2005, Rietjens et al., 2009). These 
findings, therefore, contribute to existing literature, by revealing that common obstacles to 
civil-military coordination remain relevant in Pacific HADR contexts.  






Findings also counter the arguments of authors such as Ferris (2012), Metcalf and colleagues 
(2012), which suggest that civil-military coordination is less contentious and easier in non-
combat contexts. This is likely because many aspects of these barriers relate back to the 
inherent differences between militaries and civilian actors, which are not necessarily mitigated 
by a change in context. These findings imply that simply operating in a HADR environment does 
not mitigate these obstacles, even when stakeholders support the NZDF’s involvement and 
believe civil-military coordination is appropriate. 
Obstacles to coordination impacted stakeholders in different ways 
While previous studies have generally focused on military-humanitarian coordination, this 
study demonstrates how obstacles are impeding civil-military coordination with other sectors 
of stakeholders. Findings also reveal that the NZDF’s coordination with, the GoNZ, affected 
governments, humanitarian actors and communities are impacted in different ways. This is 
reflected in the variation among sub-themes, which were often reported by different sectors.592   
While barriers to the NZDF’s coordination with the GoNZ and large INGOs tend to align with 
previous studies, a range of previously unreported sub-thematic obstacles were identified 
(Rietjens et al., 2009, Pramanik, 2015, Arancibia, 2016).593 In both past responses, for example, 
GoNZ and New Zealand civilian interviewees reported that the Canterbury’s communication 
systems were not designed for HADR or civilian use, which impeded information sharing. 
Stakeholders from affected governments, communities and smaller humanitarian agencies also 
described sub-themes which are largely specific to the Pacific or national context. These 
concerned the impacts of the colonial history in the region, as well as differences in culture, 
HADR approaches and the prioritisation of needs.  
These findings suggest civil-military coordination in the Pacific is being impacted by unique 
factors, which some stakeholders may be unaware of. This also suggests that despite many 
interviewees perceiving that the NZDF’s characteristics and culture are helping to mitigate 
some barriers to coordination, these factors are not eliminating all obstacles. 
 
Why were obstacles to coordination reoccurring? 
 
The fact that studies by Jacobs-Garrod (2010) and Jones (2011) identified similar obstacles to 
the NZDF’s civil-military coordination suggests these may have been impeding military 
deployments for a substantial length of time. The findings above therefore raise questions 
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around why obstacles continued reoccurred in both responses, despite the GoNZ’s publicised 
intentions to improve the NZDF’s interoperability and HADR capabilities. 
Interview data provided greater clarification on why participants felt civil-military coordination 
issues reoccurred in both the TC Pam and Winston responses. These are discussed below.  
There was a lack of interaction between the NZDF and HADR stakeholders 
Many participants felt obstacles to coordination were repeating in each Pacific HADR response 
due to general a lack of interaction between the NZDF and civilian actors. This reportedly 
impeded stakeholders’ ability to build relationships, trust and understanding of one another. 
Both NZDF and civilian interviewees connected this lack of engagement to NZDF posting 
routines, which rotated every two or three years. The high turnover of military and civilian 
representatives in HADR roles was also considered a contributing factor.  
Some interviewees expressed frustration about the lack of relationship handover within the 
NZDF, institutions and between individuals. One OGA participant stated,  
“That’s the age old ‘three-years-then-the-defence-force-change-seats,’ just 
when you think you're getting to something. The worst part can be... if 
everybody changes from the [civil-military coordination] team in that three 
years and puts a whole new team in, then there is no relationship handover 
and you need somewhere in that space, that. It's very difficult.”
594
 
The aforementioned factors reportedly meant HADR and civil-military coordination experience 
was built up among a small number of NZDF personnel, but not transferred defence-wide. 
These concerns were similarly raised by Byman (2000), who argued these factors and sporadic 
attempts by militaries to engage with the relief community, impeded civil-military coordination.  
Relationships and trust are prioritised by Pacific-based stakeholders 
Interviewees also stressed the importance of relationship-building in the Pacific region. Some 
linked this to most Pacific Island cultures being community-based and prioritising relationships 
and trust, over speed and task completion. These differences led to frustration and, at times, 
tension between the NZDF’s culture and that of Pacific-based stakeholders.  
These findings demonstrate the NZDF’s coordination efforts have been impeded by 
organisational culture differences, similar to those reported in previous studies (Gourlay, 2000, 
Abiew, 2003, Franke, 2006). Participant views also support Lanier’s (2000) theory, which argues 
that New Zealand’s ‘cold-climate’ culture is likely to clash with ‘hot-climate’ cultures, such as 






Pacific Islands.595 Aspects of the NZDF’s internal culture may also have amplified these 
differences in national culture. This is because military personnel are trained to be task 
orientated and prioritise speed over factors Pacific islanders feel are important.  
‘Cold-climate’ vs. ‘hot-climate’ perspectives on the NZDF’s cultural awareness 
The fact that NZDF participants appeared unaware of cultural misunderstandings and Pacific-
based stakeholders, at times, reported that personnel had behaved inappropriately, suggests 
personnel may not be aware of these issues. These findings mirror those of Rubinstein and 
colleagues (2008), who found that US military personnel lacked an understanding of local 
culture and were unaware when local actors found their actions disrespectful.  
There was also a noticeable divide between Western or foreign stakeholders, which perceived 
that the NZDF was relatively culturally aware, as opposed to those raised in Pacific Islands or 
other cultures, who noted cultural offences or misunderstandings. These contrasting views may 
partly explain why most participants from ‘cold-climate’ cultures, who were also those 
publishing grey literature, believed and reported that NZDF personnel were culturally aware. 
Training and exercises do not necessarily mitigate existing obstacles 
In addition, several participants questioned the effectiveness of methods being used to mitigate 
obstacles to civil-military coordination. For example, some felt that exercises, such as Southern 
Katipo, failed to include key stakeholders, did not realistically depict the Pacific HADR context 
and, at times, involved minimal civil-military interaction. One NZDF interviewee reflected, 
“Humanitarian exercises are in my opinion a waste of [pause]... not a waste 
of time [smile]… that was only a ‘personal opinion’… exercises are very 
difficult to replicate for a land force. It's mainly just clearing roads delivering 
purifying water… That sort of stuff can be done at the tactical level anytime… 
It’s the PLANNING EXERCISES which are the issue. So humanitarian exercises 
at the OPERATIONAL planning [level], like a Command Post Exercise or CPEX, 
would be more beneficial than a physical tactical humanitarian exercise.”
596  
These views reinforce Fogarty’s (2014) study findings, which emphasised the need for more 
multi-agency training and realism in NZDF military exercises. They also imply an examination 
into how stakeholders are currently attempting to mitigate obstacles, would be valuable. 
The drive to improve coordination   
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Across both case studies and the five key stakeholder sectors, almost all participants expressed 
the desire to improve the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR. Most felt this was 
crucial for future responses and would require collective effort, training and exercising. Some 
believed the relatively small number of stakeholders in New Zealand and Pacific HADR was an 
advantage, as it made these options achievable. One OGA representative commented, 
“The more opportunities we get to do that [civil-military] training and 
working together and [building] understanding... that's the way forward… 
Exercising is expensive... and [New Zealand has] four a half million, for 




In contrast to these perspectives, interviewees, including some NZDF participants, felt military 
and civilian leadership did not always encourage efforts to improve interoperability. In 
particular, participants deployed at the operational and tactical level felt leadership were often 
unaware of or did not support their attempts to improve civil-military coordination.598 This was 
linked to a lack of time, resources and interest and highlights the important role the GoNZ and 
Pacific Island governments will likely need to play in this field. 
Considering the widespread desire to enhance coordination and establish new civil-military 
mechanisms in the Pacific, all stakeholders would benefit from taking advantage of this existing 
momentum. In particular, these findings presents a valuable opportunity for the GoNZ, MFAT 
and NZDF to dialogue with Pacific Island Governments, civilian and humanitarian actors about 
how future coordination efforts might be improved. 
 
The identified obstacles were complex, dynamic and interconnected 
 
A comparative analysis of case studies also reveals that the four thematic obstacles to 
coordination were dynamic, complex and interconnected.599 These findings emerged from 
interview data, as most participants contributed poor coordination to multiple obstacles or 
factors. This provides greater understanding about the complexity of civil-military coordination 
and the challenges this poses for stakeholders and researchers. 
The complexity and breadth of domestic factors in the Pacific  
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Interestingly, the most frequently discussed obstacles in both case studies were domestic or 
contextual factors. Most were related to complex issues, such as State sovereignty, tensions 
between civilian and military control, national and international actors, as well as politics and 
interests. This finding presents a new contribution to academic literature, as most of these 
factors have not been analysed in the context of civil-military coordination or Pacific HADR. 
Many interviewees believed these obstacles were common within Pacific HADR. This was 
reportedly due to affected governments taking on the challenging task of coordinating a large 
international response and meeting extensive humanitarian needs, with limited human and 
financial resources. In Vanuatu and Fiji, these factors made national coordination structures 
and actors vulnerable to being overpowered by foreign stakeholders and militaries.  
These observations relate back to concerns about civilian control, State sovereignty and 
disaster politics, which were detailed in Chapter One (Feaver, 1996, Katoch, 2006, Pelling and 
Dill, 2010). Like the work of Pelling and Dill (2010), these findings also highlight the connections 
between national and international structures and political systems, in Pacific HADR. 
Many obstacles were dynamic and interconnected 
Interview data also implies that many of the obstacles and sub-thematic issues are connected. 
This was demonstrated by participants frequently describing more than one obstacle, when 
they explained why coordination issues occurred. For example, over half of all interviewees 
linked poor civil-military coordination efforts to a lack of understanding, communication and 
differences in culture.  
For example, when a GoV interviewee reflected on the incident which nearly led to the NZDF 
Hercules aircraft being denied entry into Vanuatu, they described all three obstacles. First, 
there was a lack of communication between the NZDF, GoNZ and GoV, which meant the 
military had not provided the affected government with the information they requested, prior 
to landing. Second, the public servant interpreted the NZDF’s speed of departure and failure to 
provide information as an act of disrespect and an attempt to bully officials into accepting 
foreign assistance.  
The impacts of history and culture on civil-military coordination 
Some Pacific-based participants also viewed the behaviour described above, and other 
coordination issues, as a result of the region’s colonial history, previous interaction with FRANZ 
partners and the impact this had on culture.600 These factors reportedly led to two common 
reactions in HADR responses. One was that the affected population and officials would not 
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disagree openly or question anything ‘white’ foreign said with authority. The other was that 
local stakeholders would ‘rebel’ or resit foreign advice and assistance, to maintain autonomy 
and their respect. 
Similar observations were noted in Barber’s (2015) analysis of the TC Pam response. The author 
described several cultural misunderstandings and offences between local and international 
representatives in the HADR response. The grey literature report explained, 
“In Vanuatu as throughout Asia Pacific, and much of the world, government 
authorities expect to be respected. The importance of ensuring that no one 
‘loses face’ is ingrained in the national psyche, as is what is referred to locally 
as the ‘bigman syndrome’ – the expectation by men in senior positions that 
they will be accorded a degree of deference” (Barber, 2015, p.19). 
These findings highlight cultural factors and perspectives the NZDF and other FRANZ militaries 
need to be aware of. This is particularly because the NZDF’s organisational culture and 
approach to HADR, which is driven towards responding rapidly in emergencies and with 
incomplete information, can be interpreted as disrespectful by other stakeholders. 
The dynamic impacts of stakeholder concerns and national oversight 
In addition, stakeholder concerns and suspicions compounded obstacles to the NZDF’s civil-
military coordination. Examples of this occurred when the GoV and GoF interpreted the rapid 
response of foreign actors and militaries as overwhelming, or a challenge to State sovereignty. 
This led affected governments to try and exert more national control over the NZDF and 
international HADR response. 
Although NZDF, GoNZ, affected government and a small number of INGO stakeholders reported 
the GoV and GoF’s control measures were effective, most participants felt these negatively 
impacted the NZDF’s civil-military coordination. Both governments, for example, placed a small 
number of officials in control of identifying and approving tasks for the NZDF to undertake. 
Interviewees observed that this overwhelmed national officials, which created logistical and 
coordination bottlenecks. It also meant other civilian and humanitarian stakeholders had little 
contact with the NZDF and frequently did not know how to contact or utilise the force’s assets. 
Some of the links between obstacles were alluded to in previous studies 
The findings above deepen our understanding of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination by 
presenting the first analysis of how the force’s efforts are perceived by stakeholders in the 
Pacific. Although this is a new contribution to academia, the links between some obstacles were 




Greener’s (2017) research, for example, reported how international stakeholders viewed the 
NZDF’s coordination efforts in peacekeeping deployments and identified ‘areas for further 
development.’ These included that there was a clear differential between NZDF senior officers 
and inexperienced soldiers, which were less professional and more challenging for actors to 
coordinate with. Stakeholders he interviewed also reported difficulties communicating with 
soldiers or young personnel, personnel behaviour was, at times, considered disrespectful or 
inappropriate.  
The wider application of thesis findings 
The similarities between Greener’s (Greener, 2017) findings and those above, imply the 
obstacles identified by interviewees in this study may also be impeding the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination other contexts, such as peacekeeping. While this argument needs to be verified 
with further research, it is recommended the GoNZ and NZDF either collect stakeholder 
feedback in independent studies or in a way which ensures individuals can openly discuss issues 
and provide constructive criticism.  
The dynamic nature of these obstacles has, however, interesting implications which present an 
excellent opportunity to enhance future coordination efforts. This is because mitigating one 
obstacle to civil-military coordination may also have dampening impacts on others, or 
interrelated issues. Consequently, stakeholders may benefit from investigating how the 
obstacles identified in this study, might be mitigated in future NZDF deployments. 
 
Part Two summary 
The sections above answered the second research question. These analysed the obstacles to 
the NZDF’s civil-military coordination within past Pacific HADR responses. Findings reveal the 
same four thematic obstacles impeded coordination in both responses. When the reasons 
behind their persistence were explored, these included a general lack of civil-military 
interaction, relationship-building and trust issues, and training or exercises not necessarily 
mitigating obstacles.  
Interestingly, there were also considerable differences between how interviewees from ‘cold-
climate’ and ‘hot-climate’ cultures viewed the NZDF’s cultural awareness. This highlights the 
importance of actors not assuming they are culturally aware, simply because they and other 
‘cold-climate’ stakeholders believe this to be true. 
Findings also evidenced the complex, dynamic and interconnected nature of the identified 
obstacles. These factors reinforces the conclusions of authors like Rietjens (2014), who argue 




challenging to research. With a better understanding of these obstacles, their impacts on HADR 
are explored below. 
Part Three: How do stakeholders believe obstacles to civil-military coordination impacted the 
HADR provided by actors? 
 
The sections below report findings drawn from collating TC Pam and Winston grey literature 
and interview data. While grey literature highlighted generic issues and impacts on HADR, 
interviewees clarified how these impacted specific actors and the affected population.  
The following key findings emerged from the comparative analysis of HADR responses and are 
discussed below: 
i. Stakeholders in both responses reported similar negative impacts on HADR. 
ii. Most of the impacts on HADR were not discussed in grey literature.  
iii. International humanitarian obligations are not being met by stakeholders. 
These findings provide a greater understanding of how stakeholders feel obstacles to civil-
military coordination are impacting the NZDF’s and other actors’ HADR. They also make a new 
contribution to academia, as they present the first independent examination of how the 
identified obstacles are impacting Pacific HADR. 
 
Stakeholders in both TC responses reported similar negative impacts on HADR  
 
Interviewees from the TC Pam and Winston responses provided remarkably similar examples of 
how the aforementioned obstacles coordination impacted HADR. Examples included assistance 
being delayed, not delivered and not being suitable for the affected population or context. 
A number of concerning findings were reported by participants in both case studies. These 
included that the ‘soft’ or priority humanitarian needs of affected communities were not met 
by stakeholders. Reports that HADR was unfairly distributed or was focused on certain islands 
and communities were also alarming. As were examples which suggest these injustices 
impacted the most vulnerable or poorest sectors of affected populations most severely. 
These findings raise crucial questions for the NZDF and HADR stakeholders.601 One of these is 
why some community representatives, in both responses, felt the NZDF did not focus or meet 
their priority needs. Another is how obstacles to civil-military coordination were able to 
contribute to negative HADR outcomes, such as the most vulnerable sectors of the population 
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being those most impacted by unfair aid distribution. In particular, these individuals were 
women, widows, youth and those already disadvantaged by poverty.  
Stakeholders believed four key reasons were behind negative HADR outcomes  
Interviewees provided four main reasons for why these outcomes occurred. These related to: a) 
the way NZDF tasks were identified and allocated, b) the lack of interaction between the NZDF 
and humanitarian actors, c) a lack of stakeholder accountability in Pacific HADR responses, and 
d) an overall shortage of HADR funding.  
Concerns raised about NZDF task identification and allocation 
In both responses, NZDF tasks were identified and approved by affected Government and MFAT 
officials. This meant the NZDF predominantly completed repairs to public infrastructure, 
buildings and cleared debris, during the initial response. Affected community members, 
however, reported their highest priorities as food, water, shelter and psychosocial support, 
while the NZDF operated in their vicinity. In some cases, participants reported that these needs 
remained unmet or were not addressed for months after the cyclone.  
The NZDF did not deploy gender advisors 
A small number of interviewees also noted that the NZDF did not appear to deploy gender 
advisors in either the TC Pam or Winston response. This reportedly contributed to the lack of 
communication between the NZDF and affected populations. Humanitarian and community 
participants also felt this meant the needs of widows, women and children were not always 
communicated to the NZDF or adequately met. 
These findings raise concerns about whether the needs of women and the most vulnerable 
were addressed by the NZDF. This is particularly concerning, due to PDNAs reporting that these 
sectors of the population were disproportionately affected after the TC Pam and Winston 
disasters (GoV, 2015c, GoF, 2016b). 
A lack of NZDF-humanitarian interaction contributed to negative outcomes 
Interviewees in both HADR responses also connected negative outcomes to the general lack of 
NZDF-humanitarian interaction in the field. This was linked to civilian and humanitarian actors 
not operating in the NZDF’s vicinity. In particular, humanitarian participants felt this meant the 
‘soft’ needs, such as psychological care, were not met in the NZDF’s vicinity. Some participants 
mistakenly believed the NZDF was addressing these humanitarian needs. Others presumed the 
NZDF would not focus on ‘soft’ needs, either due to military tasks being assigned by 




These findings mirror those in other international studies. These suggest that militaries, in 
general, lack an understanding of HADR and how to meet humanitarian needs (Metcalfe et al., 
2012). They also support the arguments of some authors, such as Miller and Barbera (2014), 
which suggest militaries often provide goods and services without considering the impact these 
may have on local actors. Previous research also links similar negative outcomes to military 
objectives, which are usually being task or time-focused, rather than focusing on development 
or humanitarian factors (Heaslip et al., 2016, Dandeker and Gow, 1999, Gibb, 2015, Miller and 
Barbera, 2014).  
Interviewees provided different reasons for the military-humanitarian separation  
Participants gave different explanations for the separation between the NZDF and humanitarian 
stakeholders. These included a lack of logistical capacity and funds, a lack of awareness about 
where the NZDF was operating, and affected governments either unintentionally or deliberately 
orchestrating a separation between these actors. While interviewees provided evidence and 
details which supported their perspectives, the verification of these claims is beyond the scope 
of this study.  
These perspectives do, however, indicate that principles within the Oslo Guidelines may be 
inappropriate in the Pacific context.602 The NZDF, for example, did provide ‘indirect assistance’ 
to the population and was tasked to undertake ‘infrastructure support,’ as recommended by 
the Oslo Guidelines (UN OCHA, 2007).603 These and other recommendations aim to ensure a 
separation between military and humanitarian actors. This did not, however, result in 
humanitarian needs being met in Vanuatu or Fiji.  
The need to re-evaluating roles in Pacific HADR 
Collectively, these findings highlight the need to re-evaluate how the roles and responsibilities 
of military, humanitarian and civilian stakeholders are allocated and coordinated in Pacific 
HADR responses. These arrangements would ideally aim to ensure humanitarian needs are met.  
Several NZDF and humanitarian participants discussed this need. These suggested that military 
and civilian actors focus on their strengths and work together. Among the recommendations 
most supported was the creation of Memorandums of Understanding between actors or the 
NZDF deploying with INGO and NGO staff to meet soft needs in outer islands. 
In general, there was a lack of accountability in HADR responses 
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Another major reason behind negative outcomes was the lack of stakeholder accountability and 
the tracking of assistance. In both the TC Pam and Winston response, aid distribution was 
principally controlled by national, provincial or village authorities. National actors also lacked 
functional information management and data reporting systems, particularly around how and 
where foreign assistance was distributed.  
While placing the affected nation in control of the response is in line with international law, 
such as UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, interviewees reflected this made foreign  
assistance vulnerable to the impacts of domestic politics and personal interests (UN General 
Assembly, 1991, Annex 1.4).604 Some participants reflected on this and reported that the 
manipulation of aid in Pacific HADR responses was now so widespread, some stakeholders no 
longer complained about it. One INGO interviewee commented, 
“[Unfair distribution] used to be a problem when I was [in my previous 
humanitarian role]… it would make the papers immediately. But now it’s so 
common! It’s like- ‘Yeah yeah, it’s fine’ - It’s becoming acceptable you know? 
These malpractices are happening… because… the disaster law is not being 
followed by the very people who have been placed there to run the 
operations. So if these guys are taking advantage of the disaster law and 
disaster plan, anything else that happens after that wouldn’t surprise me.”605 
These findings raise serious concerns for the wider field of Pacific HADR, as they suggest 
systemic obstacles may be impeding coordination and the fair distribution of assistance. This 
indicates, similarly to Pelling and Dill’s (2010) studies, that ‘disaster politics’ has had a negative 
impact on civil-military coordination and the HADR provided in the Pacific.  
These reports also highlight the difficult position NZDF and other foreign military personnel may 
be place in, when deployed under the direction of State officials. The GoNZ and NZDF may, 
therefore, want to train personnel how they should respond in circumstances where other 
stakeholders are not adhering to their international obligations. 
Insufficient funding meant all humanitarian needs could not be met 
Finally, a substantial shortfall in overall response funding was reported in both the TC Pam and 
Winston responses.606 In consequence, despite the best efforts of governments and 
stakeholders, not all humanitarian needs could be met. Considering the increasing scale of 
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humanitarian needs in Pacific HADR, this highlights the importance of identifying and 
addressing priority needs, especially for the most vulnerable sectors of the population. 
Affected governments and populations called for more listening 
Some interviewees also reflected that, at times, assistance was given ‘too fast’ and without 
asking affected governments or communities what their needs were. These observations led 
participants to calls for ‘more appropriate’ aid from the NZDF, rather than more of it. This also 
led some to criticise the suitability of some of the assets, equipment and aid the NZDF 
transported to Vanuatu and Fiji. Humanitarian interviewees, in particular, considered this an 
inefficient use of the funds the GoNZ allocated for these HADR responses. 
The similarity between these findings and those of aid recipients in Anderson and colleagues 
(2012) study, suggest key messages in the book ‘Time to Listen,’ may also be relevant in the 
Pacific HADR context. For example, while all community representatives expressed their 
gratitude for the NZDF’s support, some expressed disappointment about the actual assistance 
provided. These views mirror the perspectives of aid recipients worldwide.607 Anderson’s 
research suggests this is the result of both unrealistic community expectations and the 
processes of the international aid system undermining its intended effectiveness. 
 
International and humanitarian obligations were not met by stakeholders 
 
As a collective, the findings in Chapters Two to Five demonstrate the NZDF and other 
stakeholders did not meet all their international obligations in past HADR responses. 
Particularly in accordance with to the UN Resolutions, guidelines and humanitarian laws they 
are signatory to. These areas for improvement are described below. 
Assistance was not provided in accordance with the humanitarian imperative 
While grey literature provided few details about negative HADR outcomes, interview data 
suggests the NZDF’s assistance was not provided in accordance with the humanitarian 
imperative or principles in each case study. This is because these require stakeholders to 
provide assistance based on the greatest humanitarian needs to “alleviate human suffering 
amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster” (ICRC, 1994, Sect 1). This 
indicates that despite stakeholders viewing the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts and 
HADR favourably, military tasks were not aligned with the priority needs of communities. 
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Findings also link the NZDF either indirectly or directly to negative impacts, such as unfair aid 
distribution, which was undertaken by locally-based actors. A number of NZDF participants, 
however, challenged this conclusion, instead stating that personnel “listen to what's needed 
and [] apply fair and unbiased aid wherever we can.”608 Their reasoning often related to 
personnel being told by governments that they were addressing the most important needs. For 
example, one interviewee reflected, 
“By following those [Oslo] guidelines, of that All- of-Government approach - 
and MFAT basically set the tasks - [NZDF personnel] ARE remaining unbiased. 
We are only doing our government's bidding… which I can see ‘potentially’ on 
the outside, could also be seen as being biased… But we allow the NDMO to 
set the priorities… and we go out and try to meet them…. I do one-hundred 
percent [believe NZDF can be impartial and neutral]… If I went and told my 
guys that they can't consider the work they're doing humanitarian, they 
would have a FIT. And I don't think it’s right and I don't think… those [Oslo] 
guidelines are set up to really take into account how people on the ground 
FEEL, who are actually helping to deliver all this aid.609 
These views reinforce the challenges faced by NZDF personnel operating under civilian control. 
They also indicate the GoNZ may want to re-examine how NZDF priorities are identified and 
undertaken in Pacific HADR responses, to ensure the humanitarian principles are met. 
There was a lack of focus on the most vulnerable 
The findings in this study are concerning, considering GoNZ and NZDF policies and guidance 
material clearly outline their obligations. A review of MFAT’s (2012b) ‘Policy and Strategies for 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Risk Reduction,’ for example, emphasises that actors 
within a WoG response will: 1) respect national government authority, 2) respond to requests 
for humanitarian assistance based on assessed needs, availability of resources, security of 
access to affected populations and the ability to determine New Zealand’s effectiveness and 
impact, and 3) focus on vulnerable people. Interview data in this study, however, suggests 
there are areas for improvement in each of these key requirements.  
Stakeholders did not apply a ‘Women, Peace and Security’ approach 
Interviewee reports also confirm grey literature  reports, that UNSCR 1325 obligations are not 
being met by stakeholders (CARE International, 2017, Oxfam, 2018). For example, neither HADR 
deployment was undertaken according to the recommendations in the GoNZ’s (2015) ‘National 
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Action Plan’ for UNSCR 1325. The NZDF also did not utilise gender advisors in either HADR 
response, despite its guidance documents stating the force will ensure “all relevant aspects 
relating to [Women, Peace and Security] are considered during planning and implemented 
during any HADR activity” (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.12).  
Reports that the ADF’s civil-military coordination was enhanced by the deployment of gender 
advisors, suggests the NZDF might also benefit from adopting a UNSCR 1325 approach.610 This is 
particularly relevant, considering female community representatives and humanitarian 
interviewees felt women’s perspectives and needs were not accounted for in NZDF decision-
making processes.611  
The benefits of meeting international obligations 
These findings suggest the NZDF and civilian stakeholders should explore how they might be 
able to work together, to ensure greater accountability in Pacific HADR. The complexity of these 
obstacles and their impacts suggests this will be more effective if New Zealand and Pacific 
Island leadership support efforts to improve civil-military coordination and actors’ assistance. 
Ultimately, this is in the vested interests of all stakeholders, who benefit both directly and 
indirectly from ensuring that international obligations and humanitarian needs are met.  
Most of the impacts on HADR were not discussed in grey literature  
 
In general, grey literature sources either did not discuss the negative impacts of obstacles to 
civil-military coordination, or only alluded to these. For example, the HQ JFNZ lessons learned 
synopsis emphasised that Host Nation officials may have “different priorities to the GoNZ” and 
that there may be a “tendency for local officials to channel support to their own areas of 
interest first” (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). The internal report, however, provided no analysis on how 
these factors actually impacted HADR or the affected population.  
In contrast, interviewees provided greater clarification on how coordination issues negatively 
impacted HADR. Over 20% of all participants, for example, linked negative HADR outcomes to 
the obstacles to civil-military coordination identified in this study. Examples of these were also 
given by over XX% of all humanitarian and XX% of all community representatives. Taking into 
consideration the detailed statements of these participants and the fact that most stakeholders 
would likely be unwilling to acknowledge these facts, these relatively high figures strengthen 
the validity of findings.  
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Some stakeholders were more willing to discuss negative impacts and outcomes 
Of all the interviewed stakeholders, those from locally-based humanitarian agencies, OGAs and 
affected communities were the most willing to discuss the negative impacts on HADR, provided 
their confidentiality was ensured. A small number of NZDF, GoNZ and GoV interviewees did, 
however, discuss or suggest these outcomes may have occurred.  
Why were the impacts of obstacles to coordination not discussed in grey literature? 
The significant difference between grey literature and interviewee perspectives begs the 
question of why this occurred. Collated interview data suggests there were three main factors 
behind this discrepancy. These relate to concerns about: a) publication bias, b) weaknesses in 
methodology and data collection, and c) stakeholders’ being unwilling to critique State actors. 
Publication bias 
An analysis of grey literature sources demonstrates the majority of stakeholder views were 
published by either GoNZ or NZDF sources.612 The second largest source of these perspectives 
was drawn from UN or INGO reports.613 NZDF, GoNZ and larger humanitarian participants, 
however, tended to express more positive views of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination. They 
also often report that obstacles either did not have negative impacts on coordination or that 
these were less serious concerns than other civilian actors believed.  
In contrast, the more critical perspectives of affected governments, communities and locally-
based civilian stakeholders were often absent or underreported in grey literature. This meant 
many of their concerns were not include in analyses, while the positive perspectives of State 
actors, the UN and international players, dominated the field. 
The vested interests of stakeholders 
Over 30% of all interviewees suggested coordination issues and negative impacts were not 
discussed by stakeholders due to the vested interests of actors.614 In particular, interviewees 
believed reports published by States, the UN and SPC tended not to report serious coordination 
issues or the resulting negative impacts. This was reflected on by one humanitarian 
representative, who commented, 
“Deployments come with a lot of fanfare… each of the governments 
throughout post-TC-Winston had a lot of public relations about the 
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 The GoNZ, NZDF and UN agencies have, for example, invested considerable time and money into coordination mechanisms. 
INGOs also often receive GoNZ or UN funding to undertake Pacific HADR. These stakeholders also gain visibility, funding and 




humanitarian service delivery. But unfortunately, as in any conflict or crisis 
situation, IF there are problems, they don't get told. They don't get 
PUBLICISED. So we don't know [if there were civil-military coordination 
problems]. It wasn't being published.”
615
 
These findings suggest grey literature in this field may have intentionally focused on the 
positive outcomes of civil-military coordination, while issues were underreported. This 
highlights the importance of conducting empirical research, which ensures a broad range of 
stakeholder feedback is collated and verified for accuracy. 
Weaknesses in methodology and data collection  
Methodological weaknesses were also discovered, similar to those discussed in Chapter One. In 
addition to the lack of inclusion of stakeholder perspectives, most grey literature reports 
contained minimal analysis of civil-military coordination, obstacles and impacts. These issues 
were also discussed by interviewees from both case studies.  
Lessons learned reports were not viewed as accurate or practically helpful 
In particular, participants reflected on the lack of accuracy and practical relevance of lessons 
learned reports. For example, one GoF participant stated, 
“We had a lessons learned [report] done… it's not very helpful at all… I 
started looking at those things and thinking, they were so VAGUE… Because 
[the SPC] didn't have the perspective… do you know why? Because THEY 
weren't coordinating, they weren't part of it, they were outside and then SPC 
were asked to do… the lessons learned.”
616
 
These views highlight the importance of ensuring information gathering and analyses are 
completed by suitable stakeholders. They also raise questions about the validity of the findings 
in grey literature.  
A lack of data to determine priorities 
Similar issues related to the lack of accurate data available and PDNAs being published often 
months after the initial response.617 This meant the NZDF and other stakeholders lacked the 
information needed to determine priorities and where humanitarian needs were most critical.  
These factors also meant stakeholders could neither confirm, nor deny that unfair distribution 
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or other negative impacts occurred with State provided data. This supports the use of a 
qualitative methodology in this thesis, to draw findings from actual stakeholder experiences.  
These findings pose a challenge for those operating in post-disaster environments and 
researchers examining grey literature. This is because the information being reported may not 
be accurate, yet stakeholders are still required to address priority needs and meet their 
international obligations.  
Stakeholders were often hesitant to critique State actors 
Finally, several interviewees reported that stakeholders did not openly discuss coordination 
issues or provide the NZDF with constructive criticism. Some felt their views would either be 
refuted by State actors or not be listened to. Others feared they or their institutions would 
receive negative repercussions, such as the reduction or transferral of GoNZ funds and support. 
Many Pacific-based interviewees were worried the NZDF’s logistical support would be 
withdrawn or the military might not deploy the next time their country had a disaster, if they 
critiqued the NZDF’s coordination or response.  
The cultural and historical reasons behind hesitation 
In particular, participants from affected countries or Pacific backgrounds found it 
uncomfortable critiquing the NZDF. Some acknowledged this was due to cultural reasons, with 
many interviewees reporting they were too shy or embarrassed to give the NZDF negative 
feedback, after all the military did. Participants also connected this to the colonial history of the 
Pacific region, which meant many local islanders would not openly challenge or question white 
foreigners. For example, a community representative in the TC Pam response explained this as 
follows,  
“It is more cultural. When [Ni-Vanuatu] see a white person they say ‘Aah, he 
or she's coming to do something [important] so I might as well stay away 
from him or her.’"
618
 
These findings mirror those of other aid recipients, as reported by Anderson and colleagues 
(2012).619 These researchers observed that participants often began interviews by citing 
positive experiences and expressing their gratitude. This was, however, consistently followed by 
a deeper analysis of how aid had not worked and recipients felt this could be improved.  
Interviewee hesitation also validates Greener’s concerns that NZDF personnel who were 
directly seeking feedback from stakeholders might create a context within which “certain views 
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might be more or less likely to be expressed” (2017, p.99). This highlights a challenge for the 
GoNZ and NZDF, as the feedback they are given may not be an accurate reflection of 
stakeholder perspectives. These concerns further emphasise the value of conducting an 
independent study, as an ‘insider researcher.’  
State stakeholders were also hesitant to critique the NZDF  
While most participants who represented State agencies opted not to discuss the negative 
impacts of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination or denied these occurred, a small proportion 
acknowledged these in interviews. Some of these suggested their positions might be 
jeopardised, if superiors were aware of their openness in interviews. This reinforces the need to 
apply human ethics considerations and protect participant confidentiality in this study.620 
Of the NZDF participants who discussed negative HADR outcomes, many felt there was little 
personnel could do, to counter the influences of politics and interests in Pacific HADR. These 
challenges were discussed by one NZDF interviewee as follows, 
“Navigating that chiefly system… [it] is obviously male-dominated and very 
difficult to understand…. The other thing too is that… politicians are very, very 
corrupt. So they will favour certain parts of delivering aid… to where their 
family is… So there is a lot of that going on… they are trying favour 
themselves… I think actually towards the end [of the response] personnel did 
hear that some of the aid was not getting out to the people… they didn’t hear 
that it wasn’t going to the women and children SPECIFICALLY, but it is 
something we need to be very concerned with. But there is a balance... That is 
their culture. How do we go and impose ourselves?”
621
 
These perspectives reveal the difficult position NZDF and other foreign military staff may be 
placed in, when deployed under the direction of political actors. This particularly relates to the 
tension between obeying strategic leadership and the requirement to meet international and 
humanitarian obligations.  These obligations are the focus of the following section. 
Politics and interests make it difficult for some actors to speak out  
Similar challenges have been examined in international studies. These suggest military 
personnel either find it difficult to, or in reality cannot, adhere to the humanitarian principles 
(Weir, 2006). Authors argue this is because militaries are ultimately controlled by political 
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actors and, therefore, will pursue national interests, even in HADR (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2009, 
Gordon and Donini, 2016, Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2016). 
These findings also reinforce those within an unpublished study undertaken by the researcher 
(Roddis, 2016).622 This suggested that while new NZDF HADR models were mitigating some 
obstacles to civil-military coordination, they were unable to counter the negative influences of 
politics and interests. The evidence given by interviewees also challenges previous conclusions 
about civil-military coordination in HADR being less politically charged or complex than 
peacekeeping or combat environments (Ferris, 2012).  
 
Part Three summary 
The sections above answered the final research question, through examining how stakeholders 
believed obstacles to civil-military coordination impacted actors’ HADR. The negative impacts 
on HADR were remarkably similar in both case studies. An analysis of this data also evidenced 
the NZDF and other stakeholders did not meet all their international legal and humanitarian 
obligations in these Pacific HADR responses. Examples of these instances were described as 
‘areas for improvement,’ to help stakeholders enhance their future HADR responses. 
The reasons why most of negative outcomes were not reported in grey literature, but were 
discussed by some interviewees, were also analysed. Interviewee views indicated complex 
reasons, such as fear, culture, politics and interests made stakeholders hesitant to critique the 
NZDF, State actors and civil-military coordination efforts, in general.   
This lack of open discussion among stakeholders highlights a major challenge faced by the NZDF 
and researchers, when trying to uncovering the truth. While these findings are complex, the 
author has developed a model which summarises the findings in this thesis, to help 
stakeholders better understand the complexity, challenges and outcomes of civil-military 
coordination efforts. This is discussed in the chapter conclusion below. 
 
Chapter Six summary 
The chapter above presented findings of the first independent examination of the NZDF’s civil-
military coordination in Pacific HADR. Many of the conclusions above made a new contribution 
to academic literature, which addressed many of the gaps in literature discussed in Chapter 
One. These findings further demonstrate there was much unknown about how stakeholders 
perceived the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts, how obstacles were impeding 
coordination in Pacific HADR and the impact these had on the assistance provided.  






In answering the thesis research questions above, many complexities were uncovered. For 
example, while stakeholder perspectives about the NZDF and its coordination were generally 
positive, interviewed stakeholders provide more constructive criticism and, at times, reported 
significant tension between the NZDF and civilian actors. Ultimately, these findings reveal the 
portrayal of stakeholder perspectives in published grey literature, did not accurately represent 
the views of those involved in these responses.623  
Another key finding which emerged from interview data was that the four thematic obstacles 
to the NZDF’s civil-military coordination were complex, dynamic and interconnected. This 
presents both a challenge and opportunity for the NZDF and Pacific HADR stakeholders. This is 
because the dynamic nature of obstacles means that reducing the impacts of one obstacle will 
likely also have dampening effects on other negative outcomes.  
Similar complexity was observed in Part Three, which examined the impacts of these obstacles. 
This evidenced that the obstacles to civil-military coordination where either directly or 
indirectly contributing to negative impacts on HADR and among affected communities. The 
most concerning reports included the serious mismanagement of HADR, unfair distribution and 
that ‘soft’ or priority humanitarian needs were not met by stakeholders. 
Findings also indicate the NZDF and other stakeholders did not fully adhere to international or 
humanitarian law within either response, identifying ‘areas for improvement’ for future Pacific 
HADR responses. The reasons why this and other negative impacts were not discussed in 
literature were also discussed. Stakeholder perspectives emphasised, above all, the difficult 
position NZDF personnel can be placed in, under the direction of political authorities in HADR. 
Collectively, these conclusions highlight the on-going challenge of solving the ‘civil-military 
problematique.’ This involves ensuring that the NZDF is subordinate to civilian rule and an 
effective military. In the context of Pacific HADR, this means adhering to New Zealand’s 
obligations under international and domestic law, as well as meeting humanitarian needs. 
A new model is proposed to explain civil-military coordination factors and their outcomes 
The complexity of these findings support the conclusions of other authors, which argue the field 
of civil-military coordination is “too complex to be approached with explicit conceptual frames 
or standard instruments” (2014, p.129). This challenge and the new information uncovered in 
this study, led the researcher to develop a diagram to explain these findings (see Figure 8).  
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This model aims to help stakeholders better understand the complexities of civil-military 
coordination and, particularly, how perspectives, obstacles and mechanisms interact to 
produce outcomes. The diagram can be used to evaluate past civil-military coordination efforts, 
or to anticipate future challenges, prior to deploying or operating with different stakeholders. 
 
Figure 9: Diagram explaining the interactions between civil-military coordination variables 
 
Within the diagram, the column on the left explains how human factors, such as ‘quality of 
communication,’ ‘levels of understanding’ and ‘trust between actors,’ are dynamic. This is 
signified by the arrows indicating how these factors are interconnected and impact each other.  
Depending on the stakeholders involved, these variables can either impede or promote civil-
military coordination. This is illustrated by the second column, which indicates how ‘contextual 
factors’ both internally (within a WoG response) and externally (in the broader deployment 
context) impact and are impacted by human factors. These factors are also interconnected, as 
they impact upon each other and stakeholders’ levels of coordination. 
The third column depicts how internal and external civil-military coordination is often 
facilitated through coordination mechanisms. While these aim to mitigate obstacles to 




which impact their functionality. This is expressed in the fourth column, which highlights the 
combined outcomes of all the aforementioned factors. As revealed in this thesis, these 
outcomes can be perceived differently, depending on the stakeholders concerned. 
 
An explanation of the model and its application 
To demonstrate how this diagram works and can help stakeholders enhance their coordination 
efforts, it will be applied to events which were reported in this study.624 For example, the 
reflections of a community representative in the TC Winston response, which are described in 
the prologue.625 The interviewee discussed a number of outcomes, including a) the NZDF 
building teacher housing in a location considered inappropriate by the community, b) 
accidentally digging a rubbish pit in the village vegetable garden, and c) leaving this unfilled. 
Collectively, these factors had negative impacts for the affected community. These included 
health repercussions, as the pit pooled water and became a breeding ground for virus-carrying 
mosquitoes.626 The most impoverished in villages were also impacted, as they later had to 
retrieve the NZDF’s discarded building materials from the pit, to rebuild their houses.627  
When the proposed diagram is applied to these events, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
NZDF’s approach are identifiable. For example, while the community had a high level of trust in 
the NZDF, poor communication and a lack of understanding were reported between the 
affected population and the NZDF (column one of the diagram).628 These human factors were 
interconnected with contextual factors (column two). This was an outcome of the NZDF’s lack 
of understanding about the HADR context and external factors, such as the size and social 
construction of Fijian families, which resulted in their inappropriate design and location. 
Personnel also did not understand the financial situation of affected locals or the likelihood 
most would be living in tents up to two years later, if they could not rebuild their own housing. 
The civil-military coordination mechanisms applied also displayed some weaknesses (column 
three). This was because, as opposed to the NZDF utilising CIMIC teams or gender advisors, 
communication was facilitated through predominantly male LOs and chiefs. This meant some 
                                                      
624
 The model could also be applied in a hypothetical scenario by stakeholders, such as Samoa, to attempt to anticipate possible 
weaknesses in coordination or strengths to capitalize on, in a future response context.  
625
 These are described on page ii to iv, within the prologue. They concern events within the TC Winston response. 
626
 Dengue fever and Zika virus are spread via day-biting mosquitos. There are no preventive vaccines or antiviral treatment. 
Dengue fever causes a feverish illness, headache, and severe muscle pains, which require medical care. Danger signs include 
prolonged vomiting, blood in the vomit, and a blotchy rash. Zika Virus symptoms include mild fever, headache, muscle and joint 
pain, nausea, vomiting, and general malaise.  The virus can also be transmitted from a pregnant woman to her foetus. 
627
 This was because many families had little left after the cyclone and could not afford the high cost of transporting building 
materials to their isolated island. 
628




community perspectives were not shared with the NZDF. Some individuals also felt they could 
not critique the NZDF, as they were either too embarrassed or did not know who to talk to. 
Collectively, the aforementioned factors contributed to the negative outcomes discussed by the 
interviewee (column four). They also led some community members to feel the NZDF had not 
focused on their priority needs, which were residential housing, rather than teachers’ 
accommodation, which would have otherwise been rebuilt at the government’s expense. 
This analysis of events, aided by the proposed diagram, can also be used to help the NZDF and 
other stakeholders identify where civil-military coordination efforts could be improved.629 
Other past deployments could also be examined, applying the diagram to coordination 
between different stakeholders and in contexts other than HADR. Ultimately, this helps simplify 
the complexity of civil-military coordination and identify where stakeholders could mitigate 
anticipated obstacles to coordination, while capitalising on their strengths.  
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Conclusion: Moving forward- together 
 
In the introduction of this thesis the urgent need for this study was examined. Within the 
Pacific region, the frequency and intensity of natural disasters is continuing to increase, along 
with the scale of humanitarian needs these leave behind. Yet despite the major involvement of 
the NZDF and other foreign militaries in these HADR responses, no independent research has 
examined how the NZDF’s civil-military coordination is functioning in this context.  
This general lack of robust, empirical research into subjects such as civil-military coordination, 
Pacific HADR and the NZDF’s interoperability, was explored in Chapter One. Perhaps most 
concerning was that few studies have examined how stakeholders and, in particular, affected 
populations perceive civil-military coordination efforts and actors’ assistance. Most conclusions 
were also drawn from grey literature, such as lessons learned reports, which contain minimal 
analysis of obstacles to coordination or their impact on HADR. These methodological 
weaknesses present a major problem, as stakeholders must first be aware of civil-military 
coordination issues and obstacles, to mitigate these and improve upon past HADR responses. 
To address these gaps in literature, three research questions were posed. 630 A comparative 
case study was then undertaken, on the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts in the 2015 TC 
Pam response, in Vanuatu, and the 2016 TC Winston response, in Fiji. Data were triangulated 
from two sources, these being grey literature and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders. 
This design aimed to better understand why discrepancies existed among stakeholder 
perspectives. It also enabled the different views of five key HADR sectors to be contrasted and 
compared, which provided a greater depth of analysis.631  
In Chapters Two and Four grey literature findings were examined. These revealed that most 
sources portrayed stakeholder perspectives of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination in the TC 
Pam and Winston responses, in a positive light. Many gaps were, however, identified in grey 
literature. These largely concerned a lack of clarification around how obstacles actually 
impacted civil-military coordination and the assistance provided.  
In contrast, the interview findings in Chapters Three and Five were more critical of coordination 
efforts. Interviewees also provided more in-depth explanations and examples of barriers to 
coordination and their impact on HADR. These revealed that many of the broader coordination 
issues reported in grey literature had also impacted civil-military efforts and actors’ assistance. 
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For instance, the influx of foreign actors and militaries in the TC Pam response reportedly 
overwhelmed national structures and created tensions between the NZDF and local 
stakeholders. In turn, the GoF’s belief that national actors were disrespected and foreign actors 
had taken too much control over the response, impacted the dynamics of the Fijian response. 
These factors led the GoF to take a strong, centralised approach to humanitarian and military 
assistance, which resulted in a conspicuously militarised TC Winston response.  
These implications and the answers to the research questions were discussed in Chapter Six. 
This revealed case study findings were remarkably similar in many ways, implying conclusions 
may be generalisable, to help enhance future civil-military coordination efforts in Pacific HADR 
responses. Key similarities included positive and negative stakeholder views of the NZDF’s civil-
military coordination, as well as on the major unreported tensions between actors. The same 
four thematic obstacles also impeded the NZDF’s coordination and had serious negative 
impacts on HADR, in both responses. Perhaps most concerning, these findings suggest 
stakeholders are consistently not meeting priority humanitarian needs and are, therefore, not 
adhering to their international obligations in Pacific HADR contexts.  
Due to the complexity and dynamic nature of these civil-military factors, a new model was also 
proposed from thesis findings. This aims to help stakeholders better understand how 
perspectives, obstacles and mechanisms interact to produce positive and negative outcomes. 
Importantly, the diagram can also be used to evaluate past civil-military coordination efforts, or 
to anticipate future challenges with different stakeholders or in other deployment contexts. 
This makes a significant new contribution to the field of civil-military coordination, through 
providing a practical way stakeholder can now view, analyse and hopefully enhance their 
coordination efforts. 
In conclusion, this thesis has uncovered some crucial implications for the Pacific region and its 
stakeholders. Some findings indicate current civil-military coordination models and mechanisms 
may need to be re-examined in the Pacific HADR context. Others suggest past grey literature 
and lessons learned documents have not accurately portrayed all stakeholder perspectives, the 
major obstacles to coordination or their impact on affected populations. These findings 
suggests increasing actors’ accountability, as well as their ability to provide the NZDF and State 
actors with feedback, will likely help stakeholders improve future HADR responses.  
Finally, the widespread desire to improve future civil-military coordination efforts and meet 
humanitarian needs presents an encouraging opportunity for actors to work together and 
achieve these aims. Ultimately, this is in the interests of all stakeholders, as each will benefit 






Annex One: Interview guide  
1. Introduce yourself and thank participant for their willingness to participate. 
2. Re-brief. 
As a requirement of my degree, I’m conducting a research project on civil-military 
coordination and specifically the New Zealand Defence Force and its role in disaster relief 
operations in:  Cyclone Pam (Vanuatu: 2015), and Cyclone Winston (Fiji: 2016). 
The aim of this research is to identify obstacles which may be impeding civil-military 
coordination in relief operations and how future relief responses might be improved. All 
information gathered is confidential and your identity will not be made public without 
your consent. To ensure this, pseudonyms will be used in any published material and your 
personal details will be obscured after interviews are transcribed, unless you would 
prefer to speak in your public role/under your own name.  
3. Check that they have read the Information Sheet/completed Consent Form. 
If you choose to take part in this study, your involvement in this project will include an 
audio recorded interview. The interview is expected to take about 45 minutes. As a follow-
up to this investigation, you will be asked to read a written transcript of the interview to 
ensure the information is correct and that you are happy for this information to be used. If 
this is impractical you may give your verbal consent for the transcript to be used. 
Participation is voluntary and can withdraw at any stage. If you withdraw, I will remove any 
information provided up until the interview transcript is approved. Do you prefer to speak 
under your official title/name in this project? Options range from use of name to 
confidentiality.  










Semi-Structured Interview: Key subject areas 
Opening question: In your view/in your experience/from your observations/reflecting on the 
response in Vanuatu or Fiji… could you describe your role in the disaster relief effort in 
Vanuatu/Fiji and any interaction you had with the New Zealand Military (or civilian actors) 
during the relief effort? What was your overall impression of the NZDF (or civilian actors)? 
1. Inter-agency relations: how would you describe the relationship between you/your org. and 
the NZDF (or civilian actors) throughout the effort? Do you feel you/your organisation 
trusted the NZDF (or civilian actors)?  
 
2. Humanitarian principles and understanding: are you aware of the NZDF’s humanitarian 
principles and processes? Do you think these were adhered to?                                    Are you 
familiar with the Civil-military (Oslo) guidelines? If so, do you think these were adhered to? 
If not, do you believe the NZDF was used as a last resort? 
 
3. Information management: did you receive any information from the NZDF (or civilian 
actors), e.g. written documents, assessments or photography? How was the information 
flow/sharing during the effort? 
 
4. Flexibility: how flexible was the NZDF/military personnel you had contact with in the effort? 
Do you feel the organisation and personnel adapted well in the relief effort? 
 
5. Communication: how did you feel communication was between the NZDF (or civilian actors) 
and you/your organisation during the response? 
 
6. Disaster Politics: Do you feel politics may have impacted civil-military coordination or the 
assistance provided? If so how? 
 
7. Obstacles to civil-military coordination: in your experience what were the obstacles to civil-
military coordination in disaster relief? Could you provide examples? 
 
8. Effectiveness of NZDF assistance: how effective do you think NZDF assistance was? 
Timeliness, Appropriateness, Efficiency, Absorptive capacity, Coordination, Costs 
 
9. Lessons learned: Did you/your organisation/community conduct lessons learned in real time 
or following the event? How do you personally think disaster relief could be improved in the 
future? 
 
10. Do you have anything further you would like to add/comment on? Are there any questions I 




Semi-Structured Interview guide: Ni-Vanuatu 
Tangkiu tumas from we yu save rere blong interview ia about experience blo yu long taem blong 
cyclone Pam long hao we givhan e bin kam. 
Opening kwesten: Yu save talem wannem nao wok blong yu long taem we givhan e bin kam 
afta long cyclone Pam mo tu wannem wei nao yu bin wok tugeta wetem Niu Zilan soldia long 
taem blong givhan ia? 
Wannem nao tingting blong yu about Niu Zilan soldia? 
 
1. Inter-agency relations: Inta-agency rileisen: wannem nao yu save talem about frensip blong 
kampany/komunity wetem Niu Zilan soldia tru aot long taem we oli traem givhan? 
Yu ting se kampani/ komunity e bin trastem Niu Zilan Soldia?  
 
2. Humaniterian loa mo andastanding: Yu kat save long Niu Zilan solidia humaneterian loa mo 
hao we I wok? Yu ting se oli been wok folem ol loa ia? Yu kat gudfala save about ol wei blo 
usum soldia mo ol givhan blo civil denfens long taem blong givhan long disasta (wetem ol 
rul blong hao blong mekem I happen) Spos yes, yu ting se oli bin folem loa ia? Spos no, yu 
beliv se Niu Zilan soldia oli bin useful nomo from se e nomo kat nara givhan mo tu yu ting se 
e bin kat nara kauntri we e bin save tekem ples blong Niu Zilan soldia long side blo givhan 
olsem? 
 
3. Infomesen manejmen: Yu bin resivim eni infomesen e kam lo Niu Zilan soldia olsem written 
dokiumen, assemen or photo? Hao nao infomesen e flow or hao hao noa oli serem 
infomesen long taem blong givhan? 
 
4. Rere blong Jenis: hao rere nao ol Niu Zilan soldia yu wok wetem oli jenis blo saveh wok 
wetem yu long taem blong givhan? 
 
5. Komunikesen: wannem nao tingting blong yu about komunikesen bitwin Niu Zilan soldia 
wetem yu/kampany/ komunity long taem blong givhan? 
 
6. Disasta politik: Yu ting seh politik e bin kat sam control long hao Niu Zilan e bin wok wetem 
yu/kampany/komuniti long taem blong givhan? Yu ting ting form politik e bin afectem hao 
weh oli bin givhan? Spos yes, hao? 
 
7. Obstacles to civil-military coordination: in your experience what were the obstacles to the 
New Zealand Military’s coordination with you/your community/non-military actors in 
disaster relief? Could you provide examples?  
Samting we e blokem civil-soldia givhan: Long experience wan nem nao ol samting weh I 
stoppem Niu Zilan soldia blong givhan long yu/kampany/komuniti long taem blong disasta 





8. Gudhan blong NZDF assistance: Wannem tingting blong yu long gudhan blong Niu Zilan 
Solidia? Long side blong timing, wok stret, wok enaf, amaun blong wok wetem cost? 
 
9. Wannem yu lanem: Yu/kampani/komuniti I bin lanem lessen long taem ia after long disasta? 
Hao nao long tinting blong yu yu ting se olgeta long disasta givhan bae oli nid blong impruv 
lem long future? 
 
10. Yu kat nara samting moa weh yu wantem talem? Ikat nara kwesten weh mino askem? 
Ikat any kwesten we mi askem we yu bin fraet blong ansarem? 
 
-I don’t understand  
Mi no andastanem 
 
-Can you give me another example of that? 
Yu save givim wan nara fasin weh e sowem? 
 
-Could you elaborate? 
Yu saveh talem smol mo blong mi save? 
 
-Could you be more specific?  
Yu save talem wanem stret? 
 
-How does this compare with your experience elsewhere? 
Hao nao emia e kompea wetem experience blo yu lo wan nara ples? 
 
-Thank you very much for sharing your experiences with me. 




Fijian Semi-Structured Interview guide: Na Taro ni Vakadidike  
Vinaka sara vakalevu na nomuni lomasoli mo ni vakaitavi e na veitarotarogi qo. 
Dola ni taro: Na cava beka na I tavi o ni vakacolati kina e na veivuke ni Cagilaba o Winston.? Ni a 
bau cakacaka vata kei iratou na mataivalu ni Niu Siladi ? Na cava na nomuni nanuma baleti 
iratou na mataivalu ni Niu Siladi e na veivuke eratou mai vakayacora vei ira na vakaleqai e na 
ravuravu ni cagilaba o Winston. 
 
1. Veimaliwai vakamatacakacaka: E a vakacava tu na veimaliwai se na cakacaka vata ni 
nomudou tabana kei na mataivalu ni Niusiladi e na veivuke ni cagilaba o Winston.? O ni bu 
vakila ni o ni  bau rawa ni nuitaki iratou na mataivalu ni Niusiladi. 
 
2. Yavutu ni veiqaravi/ veivuke : O ni bau kila na lawa se na yavutu ka vauca na nodratou 
veiqaravi na mataivalu ni Niusiladi? E a ratou bau vakamuria Vinaka na nodratou yavutu na 
mataivalu ni Niusiladi? Ni sa bau rogoca se wilika na ka e vakatokai na Oslo guidelines ( Na 
lawa virikotori ka vauca na kena vakayagataki na nona I yaya e dua na mataivalu ka via 
veivuke vei ira e ra vakaleqai ). E a bau vakamuri Vinaka na Oslo Guidelines se sega? Ke 
sega, o ni vakabauta, ni mataivalu ni Niusiladi e otioti beka ni vanua e kerei kina na veivike 
se so tale beka na matanitu e ra via veivuke mai. 
 
3. Vakayagataki ni tukutuku: E ratou bau veitaratara mai vei kemudou na mataivalu ni Niusiladi 
( vola tukutuku, veitaba) . E bau rawarawa na kena veiwaseitaki na I tukutuku e na gauna ni 
vaiqaravi vei ira na vakaleqai e na cagilaba o Winston. 
 
4. E a vakacava na rawarawa ni veiqaravi vata kei na mataivlau ni Niusiladi. Ni bau vakila beka 
ni a rawarawa vei iratou nodratou mai veiqaravi I Viti.  
 
5. Veiwasei tukutuku: E a vakacava tu na kena vakadewataki na I tukutuku mai vei iratou na 
mataivalu ni Niusiladi ki vei kemudou. 
 
6. E vakacava na politiki: e vukea beka se vakabera na kena qaravi nai tavi ni veivuke  mai vei 
iratou na mataivalu ni Niusiladi. 
 
7. Na cava beka e a vakalatilati e na nodratou cakacaka vata na mataivalu ni Niusiladi kei na 
veitabana vakacakacaka e Viti? 
 
8. E vakacava sara tu mada na yaga ni nodratou veivuke na mataivalu ni Niu Siladi vakabibi ena 
kena:  vakaoti totolo, -kei na veiganiti, -monataki, -vakailavotaki - 
 
9. I) Na lesoni a vulici rawa ni sa mai cava na veiqararvi ni oti na cagilaba? i) E so beka na 
malumalumu e a laurai e na veiqaravi qoka? 
 
10. E so tale naka ni via tukuna se dua na taro?  E dua beka na taro au a taroga e a dredre 
nomuni  sauma? – Au sega ni taura rawa - Ni rawa ni vakatautauvata qo kei na dua na ka sa 
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in Pacific Disaster Relief Operations 
Hello, halo (Bislama) and bula (Fijian), 
My name is Kendra Roddis, I am a postgraduate student from the Centre for Defence and 
Security Studies, Massey University and am completing a research project on civil-military 
coordination within Pacific disaster relief. My Master’s thesis focuses on the New Zealand 
Defence Force’s assistance in Vanuatu (Cyclone Pam: 2015) and Fiji (Cyclone Winston: 2016) 
and aims to identify how coordination and military assistance could be improved in future relief 
efforts within the Pacific. This research is being supported by the New Zealand Defence Force, 
Ministry of Defence and High Commission in both Vanuatu and Fiji. 
I am incredibly passionate about this topic as an ex-New Zealand Defence Force Officer who 
was deployed in the 2010 disaster relief effort in Haiti, has since worked in the humanitarian 
field and grew up in the Cook Islands. These experiences gave me an in-depth understanding of 
the challenges of disaster relief and the view that we must listen and learn from one another to 
improve future responses. 
As part of my research I am hoping to interview a range of those involved in the Cyclone Pam 
and Winston relief efforts to hear about their experiences with the New Zealand Defence Force 
and how they think coordination or assistance in future relief efforts could be improved. 
Interviews would be about 45 minutes with all identities and information kept confidential 
(further information enclosed below). 
Please let me know if you would be willing to take part in this research. With the frequency and 
intensity of natural disasters increasing in the Pacific I hope that collectively we can improve 
both the New Zealand Defence Force’s assistance and future relief efforts.  
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INFORMATION SHEET 
My name is Kendra Roddis and I am the principal investigator of a Master’s research project 
being completed with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University. This 
research investigates civil-military coordination within Pacific disaster relief efforts and focuses 
on the New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF’s) involvement in the Cyclone Pam (Vanuatu: 2015) 
and Cyclone Winston (Fiji: 2016) responses.  
 
As part of this research I wish to interview key individuals who would be willing to share their 
perspective and experiences surrounding these relief efforts. As an identified candidate, you 




The objectives of this research are to: 1) identify obstacles which may be impeding the NZDF’s 
coordination with civilian actors in relief operations, 2) identify how civil-military coordination 
may be impacting the assistance provided to the affected community, and 3) produce 




This study will involve a minimum of 40 interviewees, with at least ten participants selected 
from each of the following sectors: 1) the NZDF and New Zealand Government, 2) New Zealand 
civilian relief actors, 3) international civilian relief actors, and 4) representatives from the 
affected communities. This sample size is designed to report a broad range of views and 
experiences from within relief efforts. Potential participants will be identified by snowball 




Interviews are likely to take about 45 minutes and will be semi-structured. These will be audio 
recorded or hand written and conducted by myself in either in a public location or office. 





You may be assured of the confidentiality of data gathered in this research: a consent form will 
be completed prior to the interview, which ensures that your identity will not be made public 
without your prior consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, pseudonyms and 
identifying numbers will be used in any published material instead of names, unless you prefer 
to speak in your public role. 
 
You will receive a copy of the transcribed interview to check for accuracy and you may delete 
any part of the interview before you agree to its use in this study. You may choose to receive a 
copy of your recorded interview and/or a summary of the project findings by contacting the 
researcher via the email or telephone number at the bottom of this sheet. You will be asked to 
complete an authority for the release of transcript data once you have had the opportunity to 
review, edit or amend the transcript.  
 
All interview recordings will be deleted at the conclusion of this study (25 Feb 2018). Hard 
copies of transcribed interviews will be stored securely both electronically and in a locked filing 
cabinet before being destroyed after a period of five years. Only the researcher, supervisor and 




You are under no obligation to accept this invitation. If you decide to participate, you have the 
right to: 
• decline to answer any particular question; 
• withdraw from the study at any time; 
• ask for the recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview; 
• ask any questions about the study at any time during participation; 
• provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used unless you 
give permission to the researcher; 
• be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is concluded. 
 
Your Next Step 
If you agree to participate in this study, you need any more information or have any questions 
about participating in this research please contact me before 25 May 2019 on:  
[section removed] 
If you have any additional questions about this project or you are concerned about the conduct 
of this research please contact my academic supervisor Dr Anna Powles- Massey University 
[section removed] 
 
This project has been evaluated by peer review and judged to be low risk.  Consequently, it has 
not been reviewed by one of the University’s Human Ethics Committees.  The researcher(s) 
named above are responsible for the ethical conduct of this research. 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research that you wish to raise with someone 






Taem Disasta E Straek: Civil-Military Coordination Long Pacific Disasta Riliv Operasen 
INFOMESEN SIT 
Nem blong mi Kendra Roddis mo mi mi prinsipol investiketa blong wan Master’s resej projek 
weh bae komplit wetem center blo difens mo sekiuriti stati, long Massey University.  
Risej ia emi blong investiketem civil-soldia givgivhan long pasifik disaster givhan mo tu focus 
long Niu Zilan defens fos weh involve long taem blong Cyclone Pam (Vanuatu 2015) wetem 
Cyclone Winston (Fiji: 2016) long taem blong givhan. 
 
Olsem part blong resej ia mi wantem interview ol main man weh oli likem blong serem tingting 
wetem experience blong olgeta long taem blong givhan ia. Olsem wan kanditet, mifla invitem 




Objektiv blong resej ia emi blong: 1) Finem aot ol samting weh e save blokem mo tu spos weh e 
bin save mekem ol samting e tekem taem or stopem Niu Zilan defens fos wetem ol man blong 
help long taem blong kivhan, 2) Finem hao ol civil-soldia givhan e bin afektem ol givhan weh e 
bin kam long komunity, mo tu 3) kivim tingting lo hao nao bae givhan long future e save kam 
kut.  
 
Man Weh E Tek-Part 
 
Stati ia bae e involvem 40 or moa man blong interview, wetem samples 10 lo each sekta: 1) 
Long Niu Zilan defens fos wetem gavman, 2) Niu Zilan Civilian givhan sekta, 3) intanasonal civil 
givhan wokman, 4) representetiv  blong ol komuniti weh cyclone e afektem olgeta. Size blong 
report ia e plan blong serem bifala tingting long lukluk mo experience long taem blong kivhan. 
Aot long ol man weh bae oli tek-part bae oli  jusum sam long olgeta dipen long ripot blong 
olgeta blong mekem wan kutfala riten repot blong finem aot olgeta weh oli wok wetem Niu 
Zilan fos. 
 
Wei Blong Mekem Projek 
 
Interview ia bae tekem samples 45 minit mo bae folem lelepet wan plan blong kwesten weh I 
rere finis. Ol interview ia bae oli rikotem voice or bae oli raetem, weh bae mi wan mi mekem 
long wan pablik ples or long ofis blong mi. Ol interview ia bae oli saveh mekem tru long telefon 




Yu saveh trastem seh ol infomesen weh mi kolektem e tabu blong nara man e saveh tajem : Bae 
mi kivim wan pepa long yu bifo interview ia weh bae protektem infomesen abaot yu bae e no 
ko long pablik spos weh yu no wantem. Blo protektem identity blong yu olsem ol nem blong yu 
bae mi yusum ol saen or namba nomo blo riplesem nem blong yu anles yu wantem.  
 
Bae yu risivim wan kopi blong interview blong jekem bakaken mo yu saveh karem aot eni part 
blong interview bifo bae oli save yusum long stati ia. Yu saveh askem blong risivim wan kopi 
blong ol rekot blong interview or wannem nao resej e finem tru long kontak blong reseja ia tru 
long email or long telefon namba lo bottom blong pepa ia.  
 
Bae mifla jas askem blong yu komplitim wan form blong rilisim ol infomesen afta weh yu kat 
Janis blong lukluk blo jenisim sam samting long infomesen weh yu bin kivim. 
 
Evri interview rekoting ia bae oli dilitim long en blong resej ia (25May 2019). Ol kopi nm weh oli 
pritim long pepa wetem ol interview weh oli writem long pepa bae oli kipim kut long pepa 
wetm long komputa file finis bae oli jas distroyem afta long 5 yias taem. Bae resejer, supavaesa, 
transcriba nomo bae oli kat akses long ol rekoting wetem ol riten infomesen. 
 
Right Blong Man Weh E Tek-Part 
 
Yu kat raet blong no akseptem invetesen ia. Spos yu wantem tek-part, yuk at raet blong: 
• No ansarem wan kwesten weh yu no wantem ansarem; 
• Kamaot long sesej ia long eni taem; 
• Askem blong bae oli ofem rekota long eni taem long interview; 
• Askem eni kwestem abaot resej ia eni taem long taem blong resej ia; 
• Kivim infomesen seh yu no wantem blong bae oli yusum nem blong yu long resej ia,bae 
oli yusum nomo spos yu kivim raet long reseja; 
• Bae yu kat akses long ripot blong wanem nao oli bin finem tru aot long resej ia taem 
weh e finis. 
 
Neks Step Blong Yu 
 
Spos yu akri blong tek-part long stati ia, spos yu wantem eni moa infomesen or kat eni kwesten 
aboat tek-part long resej ia, plis kontaktem me bifo 25 May 2019. 
Spos yuk at eni nara kwesten abaot projek ia or wari abaot rison blong resej ia plis contaketem 
akatemik supavaesa Dr Anna Powles- Massy University  
Projek ia bae mifla tokboat wetem ol wokman fren wetem bae mifla tokboat wetem low risk. 
Bae wan long ol university’s Human Ethic Commitiess bae no lukluk tru long projek ia. Ol reseja 
ia nomo bae oli blamem spos eni sam I no stret or ko kut. 
 
Spos you kat eni wari long resej ia weh yu wantem tokbaot wetem naraman mo no wetem 
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Na yacaqu o Kedra Roddis. Au cakava tiko na noqu Masters ena tabana ni Defence and Security 
Studies ena Massey University. E tiki tiko ni noqu vuli meu na vakayacora e dua na vakadidike 
kau sa digitaka na ulutaga e volai toka qori e cake. 
Na vakadidike qo e vakatabakidua kina veivuke ni mataivalu ni Niu Siladi ena cagilaba o Winston 
in Viti ena 2016 kei na cagilaba o Pam I Vanuatu ena 2015. 
E tiki tiko ni vakadidike qo meu na vakatarogi ira eso era loma soli mera wasea na nodra a 
vakaitavi ena vakatorocake taki na bula ni laba oti na cagi 
Nai Naki ni Vakadidike 
1) me laurai na veikabeka e vakalatilati kina nodrau cakacaka vata na I mataivalu ni Niu Siladi 
kei na veitabana e Viti ka ra vakaitavi ena veiqaravi ni oti na cagilaba. 
2) me laurai na veikabeka e vakadredretaka se vakaberabera taka na nodra vukei na lewe ni 
vanua 
3) me laurai na veigaunisala e rawa ni vakatorocake taka se vakavinakataka na veiqaravi ena 
gauna e dau yaco kina na leqa  
I ra na Vakaitavi 
Na vakadidike qo ena gadrevi tiko kina e lewe 40 mai na tabana ni 1) Matanitu kei na Mataivalu 
ni Niu Siladi, 2) o ira na cakacaka vaka matanitu ni Niu Siladi ena 3) na mata ni veivuke mai na 
veivanua tani tale eso, 4) nodra mata o ira era ravuti ena cagilaba.  
 
Tuvatuva ni Vakadidike 
 
Na veitarotarogi ena via taura toka e 45 na miniti. Au na katona, ka au na vola talega vaka i 
vola. Au via yalataka niu na qarauna vinaka na maroroi ni tukutuku koni na solia tiko. Ena sega 
ni vakayagataki na yacamuni dina vakavosara ke o ni veivakadonui kina. 
Ena soli vei kemuni e dua nai lavelave ni saumi taro mo ni rawa ni vakadeuca ke dua na ka o ni 




Kevaka o ni gadreva me dua talega na nomuni lavelave ni vakadidike, mo ni qai veitaratara ga 
mai ena naba ni talevoni se na email e koto qori era.  
O ni na kerea tale tikoga moni na solia na nomuni veivakadonui ni oti na veitarotarogi. 
 
Nomuni Dodonu 
E tiko vei kemuni na dodonu: 
• ke ni sega ni via sauma e dua na taro 
• vakasuka mai na vakadidike oqo 
• kerea me kua ni katoni vakalivaliva  
• taroga e dua ga na taro oni via taroga me baleta na vakadidike 
 
Kevaka oni vakadonuya moni na vakaitavi ena vakadidike se oni na gadreva eso tale na 
vakamacala, kerea moni qai veitaratara mai ni se bera na 25 ni May 2018 ena: 
 
Ke mani dua tale na taro se tiki ni vakadidike qo oni gadreva me vakamatatataki, ni qai 





Annex Three: Consent forms  
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM - INDIVIDUAL 
 
I have read the Information Sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me.  My 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further 
questions at any time. 
 
I agree/do not agree to the interview being sound recorded. 
 
I agree/do not agree to my official title or name being used in connection with my interview. 
 
I wish/do not wish to have my recordings returned to me. 
 
I understand that my privacy will be protected and that all information will remain confidential 
unless I have given prior consent. 
 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information Sheet. 
 















Taem Disasta E Straek: Civil-Military Coordination Long Pacific Disasta Riliv Operasen 
 
PARTICIPEN TEK-PART FOM 
 
Mi bin ritim finis infomasen sit ya mo tu oli been explenem lo mi ditel blo study ya. Mi ansarem 
kwesten ia lo stret stret tingting  blo mi, mo tu mi andastan seh bae oli save askem mi sam mo 
kwesten long enitaem. 
 
Mi akri/ no akri se interview by oli saun rekotem. 
 
Mi akri/ no akri se bae oli yusum title or nem blong mi lo interview ya 
 
Mi wantem/ no wantem se bae ol rekoting blong mi bae mas kambak lo mi. 
 
Mi andastan se oli protektem privacy blong mi mo tu ol infomasen oli tabu mo mi nomo mi save 
kivim raet blong hu bae save yusum. 
 
Mi akri blo tek-part lo stati ya anta lo ol rule weh infomasen sit ya e talem. 
 
Saen:  Date:  
 







Na I vola ni nomuni veivakadonui mo ni vakatarogi 
 
Au sa wilika oti na I vola ni vakamacala ka sa vakamatatataki tale ga vei au na vakadiddike e mai 
caka. Au vakadinata tale ga ni sa saumi Vinaka na veitaro au a taroga kau kila tale ga ni  na rawa 
ni u na taro tale ke dua tale na ka au via kila. 
 
Au vakadonuya/sega ni vakadonuya na kena katoni vakalivaliva na noqu na saumi taro. 
 
Au vakadonuya/sega ni vakadonuya na kena vakayagataki na yacaqu kei na noqu I tutu 
vakacakacaka e na noqu na vakatarogi qo. 
 
Au vinakata/ sega ni vinakata me na vakau mai vei au e dua na I lavelave ni veitarotarogi qo 
 
E sa vakadeitaki vei au ni na maroroi Vinaka na itukutuku au na solia ka na sega ni na 
vakaveitaliataki 
 
Au sa vakadonuya meu na vakaitavi e na vakadidike qo, ka na vakamuri Vinaka na I tuvatuva sa 
virikotori e nai vola ni vakamacala. 
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TRANSCRIBER’S CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
 
I………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… (Full Name - printed)                     
agree to transcribe the recordings provided to me. 
 
I agree to keep confidential all the information provided to me. 
 
I will not make any copies of the transcripts or keep any record of them, other than those 
required for the project. 
 













Sovereignty and national oversight  
A large proportion of stakeholders discussed examples where they felt domestic factors had 
negatively impacted the NZDF’s civil-military coordination. Challenges concerning sovereignty 
or national oversight were, for example, described by nineteen stakeholders.632 These related 
to the GoV’s desire to protect its sovereignty and leadership over the response, which some felt 
had been undermined by international actors or militaries taking too much control.633   
Many believed this led the GoV to apply a strong centralised approach, protocol and 
restrictions, which impeded actors’ ability to coordinate with the NZDF.634 Humanitarian actors 
in particular reported they received little information from the GoV on how they could 
coordinate with the NZDF and some stated they were restricted from operating in the same 
areas.635  One interviewee commented,  
“[Humanitarian actors] were not given permission to go out into regions 
[where the NZDF was]… to provide support… and they were very frustrated by 




National capacity  
Nineteen interviewees also believed challenges surrounding Vanuatu’s national capacity 
negatively impacted civil-military coordination efforts.637 Many felt national coordination 
mechanisms such as the NDMO and NEOC were overwhelmed or overtaken by incoming 
international actors.638 One GoV reflected on these challenges as a long term issue which 
needed to be addressed. They stated,  
“It's not so much necessarily the New Zealand Military that failed, but the 
system generally… in fairness to the NDMO what they really need is just one 
                                                      
632
 Interview: 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33. 
633
 Interview: 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 28. 
634
 Interview: 1, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 25. 
635
 Interview: 1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. 
636
 Interview: 1. 
637
 Interview: 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31. 
638




group coming in to help 'em [with coordination]. And that's going to be true 
for the next twenty years.”
639
 
The centralisation of the national system also placed further strain on the small number of local 
individuals who were in charge of decision-making and coordination. One participant described 
this as a “flood channelling through a pinhole,” which led to bottlenecks in the system.640 This 
impeded decision-making surrounding the use of NZDF assets, the approval of tasks the military 
would undertake and communication between the NZDF and civilian actors.  
Politics and interests  
Challenges surrounding politics or interests were also highlighted by seventeen stakeholders.641 
These were perceived to have negatively impacted the NZDF’s coordination with civilian actors 
in a range of ways. For example, NZDF-GoV coordination was believed to have been 
undermined by suspicions about actor motivations. On one hand this related to concerns that 
the GoV or local officials might be manipulating or directing NZDF assistance according to 
personal interest, not humanitarian need.642 On the other hand, GoV officials were concerned 
that NZDF assistance was being used to gain visibility or was being dictated by GoNZ 
interests.643 One GoV interviewee highlighted this was less about the NZDF response and more 
about the politics behind the deployment, they commented,  
“I don't think the military people were distrusted, I think there was an 




Stakeholders also felt the lack of interaction between the NZDF and humanitarian actors was in 
part due to actor interests and politics. Surprisingly, this had little to do with humanitarian 
actors’ adherence to the humanitarian principles, as only one humanitarian interviewee 
confirmed that their agency had avoided direct contact with the NZDF for this reason.645 
Stakeholders instead believed the GoV’s suspicions about humanitarian actors and their 
interests led it to isolate these actors, which contributed to the lack of information 
humanitarians received about the NZDF and the resulting lack of coordination.646 
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Domestic politics and personal interests were also reported to have reduced interaction and 
communication between the NZDF and the affected population. In one example a community 
representative recounted how Ni-Vanuatu were told that the NZDF was assisting certain 
communities at the behest of a political official. They stated, 
“[The official’s associates] were frightening people. The people had things 
they wanted to talk about or raise [with the NZDF] but at the same time… the 
people have their own self conscience… ‘Oh I didn't vote for him. So if I took 
this from [New Zealand] I'm cheating.’”
647
 
As a result, members of the affected community who had not supported this candidate 
believed they would not or did not deserve NZDF support. This not only reduced interaction 





Physical communication issues 
A wide variety of communication issues were reported to have impeded coordination between 
civilian stakeholders and the NZDF in the TC Pam response. Some challenges, such as physical 
communication issues caused by power outages and a lack of cell phone reception, were 
reported by over half of all stakeholders. These reduced actors’ abilities to contact the NDMO 
to receive information about the NZDF, as well as communicate with the Canterbury and 
personnel while they were operating in the islands.  
This particularly impacted humanitarian actors, 70% of which reported that communication and 
information sharing between their sector and the NZDF was poor in the response.648 This meant 
organisations had little awareness of where the NZDF was operating, how their agencies could 
utilise NZDF assets or coordinate with personnel. For example, one local humanitarian who was 
working on an island prior to the NZDF’s arrival commented, 
“Nobody told me the New Zealand army was coming. [The NZDF] came in and 
asked if anybody was coordinating on the island.”
649
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Another reported that their organisation distributed over 70% of their relief supplies before 
they heard the NZDF was operating in the same area.650 This ultimately meant their 
organisation could have spent more money on aid, had they been able to use NZDF assets and 
reduce their transportation costs.  
Terminology 
 
With respect to the NZDF’s coordination with the GoNZ, MFAT and OGA’s, terminology issues 
were frequently reported.651 One GoNZ representative believed this was the greatest challenge 
they had encountered with the NZDF, which led to misunderstandings and confusion at times. 
They commented,  
“The translation of NZDF speak, all of the acronyms… you know AC this and 
AC that. Good GRIEF! [Interviewee smiles]... Just ease us into it a bit more. 
Going full-on military right from the start was perhaps a bit too much.”
652
 
Communication and information sharing on HMNZS Canterbury 
Significant communication issues were also reported on the Canterbury.653  Seven interviewees 
highlighted that the vessel lacked an unclassified, civilian-friendly communication system.654 
This meant that some MFAT and OGA representatives were unable to use the email system due 
to security restrictions.  One OGA representative reflected,  
“Com’s was one of the things we found particularly difficult… from the ship 
[Canterbury] and off… When civilians want to send stuff to other places it's 
just a hopeless thing. That's been recognised.”
655
 
Issues with the vessel’s data band also meant both NZDF and civilian actors were at times 
unable to send reports and documents to actors in Port Vila and New Zealand.656 At times this 
impeded actors’ ability to plan and provide assistance, such as when DJIATF staff were unable 
to send the Canterbury blueprints of local facilities to repair.657 
Poor communication with the affected population 
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As discussed in Part One above, over 70% of community representatives felt there was poor 
communication between the NZDF and affected population.658 The majority of these reported 
they were not informed of the NZDF’s arrival, which needs the military would address, or how 
the affected population could communicate with NZDF personnel.659 Many also believed this 
lack of communication meant NZDF personnel had not understood or focused on the priority 
needs of affected communities.660  
Reasons behind this poor communication included language and cultural barriers, as well as the 
NZDF predominantly coordinating with only a small number of representatives in affected 
areas.661 In some cases stakeholders believed communication issues also related to NZDF 
personnel lacking an understanding of the local context, culture and how communities should 
be approached. One GoV official described an example where this occurred, they recounted,  
“[The NZDF soldier] had a list of things he wanted to say to the [outer island] 
communities… [a local] had to translate them into Bislama for him because… 
someone had said… ‘Well it's no good turning up and talking to them in 
English, they won't understand what you're saying.’ And [the NZDF soldier] 




Lack of understanding 
 
Civilian lack of understanding 
A total of twenty three stakeholders described a lack of understanding as an obstacle to the 
NZDF’s coordination. Fifteen of these reported that civilians lacked an understanding of the 
NZDF’s capabilities, roles, assets and operations.663 This was reported to have been exhibited by 
the GoV, NDMO, MFAT, OGAs, humanitarian actors and affected population.  
At times this meant civilian actors made requests of the NZDF which were seen as unfeasible or 
required military personnel to work long hours or overnight to achieve these.664 In one example 
a New Zealand humanitarian actor demanded the use of a NZDF asset “straight away” to 
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transport relief supplies, which was not possible due to military procedures and limitations.665 
The NZDF interviewee reflected, 
“It was just a lack of knowledge. Yes we've got equipment and we've got 
resources in country, but they are just not at the disposal [of any civilian]… 
like a taxi service. You can't just ring them up [smile].”
666
  
This lack of understanding led almost half of all civilian stakeholders to feel their ability to 
utilise NZDF assets or support had at some period been delayed or impeded.667 
NZDF lack of understanding  
A similar number of stakeholders felt the NZDF lacked knowledge about civilian concepts.668 
These included the capabilities and roles of civilian actors, humanitarian principles and 
structures, HADR, as well as local culture, context and systems.  Although most interviewees 
believed this was a defence-wide issue, four stakeholders observed a lack of understanding 
about these concepts was particularly evident among the NZDF’s junior ranks.669 This was also 
acknowledged by one NZDF representative, who stated,  
“Certain people at the high level have… understanding [in the NZDF]. It is 
probably that some of the lower level ones that don't. Captain equivalents 




Local and humanitarian stakeholders in particular felt the NZDF’s assistance and ability to 
coordinate with their sectors would improve if the military had a greater understanding of the 
coordination structures and protocol they operated by.671 One New Zealand humanitarian 
participant commented, 
“If the [NZDF] are going to get involved, there needs to be a much greater 
awareness of humanitarian principles at rank-and-file sort of level… an 
awareness of not just the principles, but also the [humanitarian] ways of 
working, the clusters and coordination… and things like the core 
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humanitarian standards, Sphere [Standards] and those kind of guidelines, 
and ‘how do you interpret those?’”
672
 
Lack of understanding about Oslo Guidelines  
Among interviewees, there was also a widespread lack of understanding about the Oslo and 
APC-MADRO Guidelines. Only nine of the thirty-five TC Pam participants reported having heard 
of these Guidelines or the principle of ‘last resort.’ These figures were low among all sectors, 
with only one GoNZ, one INGO and three New Zealand civilian interviewees reporting an 
awareness of the Oslo Guidelines.673  
All three NZDF participants, however, demonstrated a basic to thorough understanding of the 
UN Guidelines.674 The operational and strategic roles of these personnel, however, may have 
skewed these figures to a higher proportion than might be expected among more junior ranks. 
In total, only four participants felt these guidelines and the principle of ‘last resort’ was 
appropriate in the context of Pacific HADR.675 Interviewees also expressed confusion about how 
the principle of ‘last resort’ should be interpreted, due to a perceived lack of resources in the 
Pacific region and Vanuatu response. 
Lack of understanding about military models 
A general lack of understanding was also reported about NZDF CIMIC teams. This particularly 
concerned the role and capabilities of CIMIC teams, as well as how these integrated with the 
new DJIATF model and local structures.676 This was reflected on by one NZDF interviewee, who 
observed, 
“There was not a clear understanding of what CIMIC could provide in terms 
of liaison and assessment… there’s very little… integration I suppose, or at 
least demonstration of that [CIMIC] capability… the CIMIC teams didn’t come 
with a ‘how-to’ so [NZDF personnel and civilians] didn’t know what to do.”
677
 
This lack of understanding was believed to have contributed to weak linkages and a lack of 
communication between CIMIC teams, the DJIATF and NDMO. It was also reported that some 
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actors perceived CIMIC teams as “unnecessary” in the HADR response.678 This largely reduced 
the role of CIMIC teams to conducting assessments in the outer islands and coordinating in an 
ad hoc manner with local actors and NGOs.  
 
Organisational culture  
 
Structure, protocol and hierarchy  
Of the nineteen stakeholders who discussed organisational culture issues, 90% discussed how 
the NZDF’s structure, protocol or hierarchy made civil-military coordination more 
challenging.679 Many highlighted the innate differences between military and civilian cultures, 
which had significant impacts on how each approached HADR. One GoNZ official reflected,  
“I think there will always be some differences between civilian and military 
responses… simply because of their different structures and operational 
rules… you know a military response is going to be more rigid just because of 
the chain of command approach and the hierarchical approach... But it had 
been causing some frustration.”
680
 
Procedures and restrictions placed on the NZDF 
 
A common theme behind frustration was that civilians felt the NZDF’s procedures and decision-
making processes were at times slow or unsuited to the HADR context. Both GoV and OGA 
stakeholders described the lengthy processes and procedures the NZDF undertook prior to 
deploying assets in the outer islands.681 Civilian and humanitarian actors also found the NZDF’s 
procedures for utilising assets challenging.682 This meant that despite the extra cost, some 
humanitarian actors opted use civilian transport over the NZDF, as it was easier.683 
NZDF personnel were also reportedly frustrated by some of the restrictions placed on 
personnel in Vanuatu.684  This included daily input from HQ JFNZ and requirements which at 
times limited flexibility and the coordination efforts of the DJIATF and JTF. One NZDF 
interviewee described an example of this, they reflected, 
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“[HQJFNZ] was putting these restrictions on [the DJIATF], even though they 
had said their [transportation] options were very limited… and basically not 
allowing them the freedom to operate effectively. Which meant the 
reconnaissance into [Epi] island was shortened, wasn't as effective.”
685
  
Culture clashes with local actors 
Significant organisational culture issues were also reported between the NZDF and Vanuatu-
based actors such as the GoV, public servants, affected population and local humanitarian 
representatives.686 Many felt this was because the Melanesian or Ni-Vanuatu culture clashed 
with the NZDF’s more rigid structure and prioritisation of speed, which led to frustration on 
both sides.687 One OGA reflected, 
“Within Defence Force it's fairly structured and rigid... When you have to go 
back into some degree of horse trading with a civilian who is a Pacific 
Islander and [they say]… ‘Do you know it’s a SUNDAY and I don't want to do it 
today?’... [NZDF personnel] might go back into the office and beat [their] 
head against a computer, but that's ok… I do think the challenges that 




Some GoV officials also linked organisational culture issues with the command and control 
issues they encountered with the NZDF.689 When reflecting on their experience with the NZDF 
one GoV representative stated,  
“It’s so difficult to work with the [New Zealand] military because they have a 




This contributed to the tension which almost led to the first NZDF Hercules aircraft being 
denied entry into the country. It also created frustration and delays over use of NZDF assets and 
the identification of tasks, with one official reporting that it was three days before the GoV was 
able to utilise NZDF assets in the initial response.691   
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Annex Five: Obstacles to the NZDF’s coordination in TC Winston - Interviewee 
findings 
Domestic factors  
 
Sovereignty and national oversight  
Twenty four stakeholders highlighted challenges which stemmed from the GoF’s national 
oversight or the desire to protect its sovereignty.692 Many observed that the GoF took an 
authoritative approach to the response, as well as over foreign militaries and international 
assistance.693  This was seen as a consequence of the TC Pam response, where the GoF felt 
national systems had been undermined by foreign actors.694  
National coordination structures and the protocol introduced by the GoF were however 
believed to have impeded the NZDF’s coordination with other civilian sectors. International 
humanitarian stakeholders in particular felt GoV decisions led to a separation between the 
NZDF and themselves, which reduced their interaction.695 One INGO representative reflected 
on why this occurred, they stated, 
“The political wheel I guess that’s trying to establish itself because of the 
sovereignty of the country that’s being affected… [The Government is] trying 
to shoosh off everybody that’s not involved from the international bit. So it 




Politics and interests  
Thirteen stakeholders provided examples of how politics or interests negatively impacted the 
NZDF’s civil-military coordination.697 Some related to previous political tensions between the 
GoNZ and GoF, which arose after the 2006 coup and sanctions New Zealand had placed on Fiji. 
Interviewees felt these led the GoF to be suspicious of NZDF support and intentions, which 
delayed decision-making around the use of assets and identification of tasks.698 Some also 
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believed these delays were a demonstration of political power by the GoF, either to 
demonstrate independence or as retribution for past sanctions.699 
These previous political tensions also led some humanitarian stakeholders to avoid direct 
contact with the NZDF. One INGO representative stated,  
“The first two weeks it was quite sensitive because I completely understood 
the nature of relationship between the militaries of Australia, New Zealand 
and Fiji. So… I tried as much for us not to be involved in that level of politics… 
we avoided being in direct contact with any of the militaries… [cooperating 
with the NZDF] may have worked a little bit against our favour in terms of the 





Stakeholders also believed a range of political factors and interests were behind the lack of 
humanitarian presence in the Lau Island group and therefore civil-military coordination with the 
NZDF.701 Some felt humanitarian actors chose not to go to the Lau group due to their interests, 
either because of transportation costs or the fact they might receive less visibility alongside the 
NZDF.702 Others believed the island group was denied humanitarian support because of the 
political rivalry between the current Prime Minister Bainimarama and the former Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase.703  This was because Qarase was ousted by Bainimarama in 2006 and 
at the time of TC Winston continued to maintain domestic support and a leadership position in 
the Lau Island group.704 One humanitarian stakeholder reported that some agencies were 
ordered not to go to the Lau island group, they reflected on the consequences of this, 
“The political stuff… denied other humanitarian actors… that were ready to… 
support the general operations and in this case give the New Zealand Defence 
Force officers a hand in the Lau group. Denied them the opportunity to do 
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that. Therefore denying the people that were affected by the disaster the 




Poor communication  
 
A high proportion of stakeholders in each civilian sector reported that communication or 
information sharing issues had impeded their ability to coordinate with the NZDF. This included 
86% of community representatives, 80% of New Zealand civilians, 70% of humanitarian 
stakeholders and 60% of GoF officials. 
 
Communication issues related to changes in national structure 
A number of the communication and information-sharing issues identified were believed to 
have stemmed from national structures.706 One GoF representative acknowledged that Fijian 
officials generally “don't really give information unless it's a need-to basis” and that some of 
those in charge of coordination in the NDMO were “not very communicative.”707 Other 
interviewees reported there was a “big gap in terms of record keeping and planning,” which 
meant the data reported in Suva did not always reflect what was occurring on the outer 
islands.708 As a result, many stakeholders felt the NZDF and civilian actors had not always 
received adequate information to coordinate or about the communities they were trying to 
assist.709  
Humanitarian actors in particular felt changes in national coordination structure and the 
application of the future operations cell reduced their communication with the NZDF.710 When 
asked about the level of communication they had with the NZDF, one local humanitarian 
replied- 
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“Zero. There WAS no communication…. the New Zealand military, their 
coordination is with the Fiji military it has nothing to do with the civil and so 
there is a complete disconnection.”
711
   
In consequence, some humanitarian agencies reported that they did not know how to utilise 
assets or coordinate with the NZDF.712 Others commented they had not received information 
about where the NZDF was operating or which community needs they were meeting.713 
 
Terminology use  
With respect to the NZDF’s coordination with New Zealand civilian actors, terminology issues 
were often reported.714 Although most felt these were fairly easily overcome, they were 
reported to have led to some misunderstandings and delays in the initial response. This was 
reflected on by one OGA interviewee, who recounted, 
“I think it took me about two days to understand the terminology, acronyms 
[laughter]... Defence have got a big string of acronyms and a language that 
other [relief actors] don’t understand… their briefings are the same…There 
was a lot of jargon and each person had a position… and there was a lack of 
understanding of what they actually did.”715 
 
Communication and information sharing on HMNZS Canterbury 
Eight stakeholders also discussed communication issues on the Canterbury.716  Some of these 
related to NZDF security processes, which meant some MFAT or OGA representatives were not 
allowed to use the NZDF email system or enter the operations and planning room on the 
Canterbury.717 Others related to a lack of internet connectivity and bandwidth on NZDF ships, 
especially in the outer islands. One GoNZ official discussed how this delayed decision-making 
and the approval of tasks. They stated,  
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“In terms of the IT facilities on board the Canterbury… that was REALLY 
frustrating because of internet connections and so on, it took twice as long as 




This not only impeded NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination between the Suva High 
Commission and the outer islands, but also communication to strategic leadership based in 
New Zealand. 
 
Lack of understanding  
 
Civilian lack of understanding 
Of the twenty two stakeholders who identified a lack of understanding as an obstacle, thirteen 
discussed examples where civilians lacked knowledge about the NZDF’s role, capabilities, assets 
and operations.719  Interviewees believed this was demonstrated by representatives from 
MFAT, OGAs, humanitarian agencies, the GoF, NDMO and the affected population.  
In some cases high proportions of civilian stakeholders acknowledged this lack of 
understanding. This included over half of all humanitarian and GoF interviewees, with one local 
humanitarian representative reflecting,  
“I don't know how the New Zealand military or even the Fiji military is wired… 
How they respond to that kind of assistance, or their relationship to the 
government and how they respond in those times of need. I have no idea at 
ALL how they work.”
720
  
Stakeholders believed this lack of understanding frustrated both civilian and NZDF 
representatives.721 This occurred when civilian actors felt they were unable to coordinate with 
the NZDF effectively or utilise assets, which reduced their ability to assist the affected 
population. In contrast, NZDF representatives reported this led actors to make inappropriate or 
unrealistic demands of the NZDF.722 This reduced the JTF’s effectiveness in achieving its own 
tasks and at times required military personnel to work long hours. 
 
NZDF lack of understanding  
                                                      
718
 Interview: 37. 
719
 Interview: 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 58. 
720
 Interview: 44. 
721
 Interview: 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55. 
722




Eighteen interviewees also felt that some NZDF personnel lacked an understanding of civilian 
concepts and structures.723 These concerned the capabilities and roles of civilian actors, HADR 
operations and coordination structures, the humanitarian principles, Fijian culture and political 
context. Although a general lack of understanding of these concepts was reported by most 
stakeholders, some felt this was more prevalent among the NZDF’s junior ranks.724 A number of 
interviewees connected this to a lack of HADR specific training and experience. This was 
acknowledged by one NZDF representative, who reflected,  
“So save for the actual [DJIATF] headquarters... I don’t think anyone did [have 
humanitarian training]. Yeah not a good understanding of… how 
humanitarian assistance works, how the cluster forms, what their reporting 




Many stakeholders believed the NZDF’s lack of understanding reduced the effectiveness of its 
assistance and ability to coordinate with civilian actors.726 Local humanitarian stakeholders in 
particular felt the NZDF was not aware of organisations that wanted to coordinate with it and 
could have provided the military with local expertise, connections or helped it meet needs.727 
Some were also concerned that the NZDF had not deployed with a gender advisor and believed 
personnel were not aware they were legally obligated to have one under UN SCR 1325.728 They 
felt this limited interaction with women in communities and worried this resulted in widows, 
women and children not having their needs communicated or adequately met by the NZDF. 
Lack of understanding about Oslo Guidelines  
While a slightly higher proportion of TC Winston participants were aware of the Oslo and APC-
MADRO Guidelines, compared to the previous case study, this only totalled twelve of the thirty-
three interviewees. These figures were spread among all sectors, with only two GoNZ, four 
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INGO, three New Zealand civilian and one GoF interviewee reporting an understanding of these 
Guidelines or the principle of ‘last resort.’729  
Half of the NZDF participants reported a basic to thorough understanding of these 
Guidelines.730 This lower ratio, compared to the previous case study, may reflect the broader 
spectrum of personnel interviewed. This was because some personnel represented those 
operating at the tactical level. 
Only six participants felt the Oslo guidelines were appropriate in the context of Pacific HADR, 
following an explanation of the principle of ‘last resort.’731 Among those reporting an 
understanding of this principle, participants interpreted ‘last resort’ differently. For example, 
some considered the NZDF was used as a last resort in the TC Winston response, due to a 
perceived lack of logistical support. Others did not, believing there were other civilian options 
available and the NZDF’s departure was too fast to have investigated these.732  
Lack of understanding about military models 
A general lack of understanding was also observed around the application of the DJIATF and 
CIMIC models and how these integrated with civilian and local systems.733 Some NZDF 
interviewees believed this was due to a broader lack of understanding about how CIMIC should 
be structured and employed by the NZDF. One commented,  
“CIMIC is 100% the thing that [the NZDF] do wrong… For every one of our 
allied nations the nine shop… is CIMIC. For [the NZDF] it’s finance…  All 
partner nations have understood the importance that CIMIC plays… We 
haven't done that yet… the problem is the understanding of what CIMIC is, 
what it does and what it brings to you is really lacking.”
734
 
This lack of understanding was believed to have contributed to CIMIC teams being used 
ineffectively in the response. This was reflected on by one NZDF interviewee who perceived 
that the military “deployed CIMIC too late and in too few numbers to Fiji to be effective.”735 
 
Organisational culture  
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Structure, protocol and hierarchy  
Of the stakeholders who identified organisational culture as an obstacle to coordination, the 
majority described issues connected to the NZDF’s structure, hierarchy or procedures.736 Many 
discussed the inherent differences between military and civilian cultures, which often led these 
actors to have contrasting priorities and approaches. Interviewee perspectives varied over how 
these organisational culture differences could be mitigated or even if this was possible or 
desirable.737 One GoNZ official reflected, 
“The military is not like [civilian organisations], it’s very structured and 
hierarchical… Siloized… more machine-like and less organic… [Figuring] out 
how you are a little bit more organic [in HADR] would be really good… 




Procedures and restrictions placed on the NZDF 
 
Within interviews a number of civilian stakeholders expressed frustration over the NZDF’s 
decision-making structure or procedures.739 These were perceived as convoluted or slow, which 
some felt were unsuitable in the HADR context, where needs and tasks were time-critical.740 
Examples related to the processes which needed to be followed before military assets could be 
utilised or supplies transported. Others felt the NZDF’s two to three day planning cycle was 
restrictive, as information was being received and needed to be acted on at less than twenty 
four hours’ notice.741 One OGA participant described how this impacted civil-military 
coordination and their response. They stated,  
“We struggled a little bit with the culture of the NZDF… it was … hard to get 
decisions made, hard to get goals achieved at a quick time frame, which is 
needed in a humanitarian response… when you’ve got people who are only in 
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a country for [a short period] and want to get the maximum amount of work 




One GoNZ official believed the military’s hierarchical structure meant the NZDF was “flexible on 
a macro-level but not on a micro-level”.743 They felt this resulted in personnel at the lower ranks 
not being encouraged to show initiative, which reduced their ability to coordinate with civilian 
actors and the effectiveness of assistance. 
 
Culture clashes with New Zealand civilian actors 
Although five NZDF and GoNZ interviewees felt organisational differences had minimal or no 
impact on civil-military coordination, 70% of other New Zealand stakeholders disagreed.744 Five 
stakeholders reported significant tensions between NZDF personnel and those from OGAs such 
as USAR.745 This was believed to be the result of contrasting leadership styles, views on 
‘command and control’ and the fact that the NZDF and USAR had similar skillsets but different 
operational paces and priorities.746 
A number of the issues encountered were believed to have stemmed from the NZDF’s 
hierarchical structure. Stakeholders felt this led to some civilian representatives being excluded, 
ignored or disrespected by some personnel as their authority was not recognised.747 An 
example of this was described by one OGA representative, they recounted,  
“The NZDF has the rank orientated structure which led to conflict scenarios 
which could have escalated… an example was a representative at the time 
held [a high rank in an OGA], which was the same as Lieutenant Colonel… and 
one day he went to do a visit … and put his uniform on. And the way he was 
treated [by NZDF personnel] was SIGNIFICANTLY different [laughter].”748  
This frustrated civilian representatives and was believed to have contributed to some choosing 
to operate independently of the NZDF when they felt their personnel were not being 
respected.749 Some stakeholders believed this reduced the effectiveness of the response, as 
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civilian actors had significant HADR experience and skills which could have been used more 
effectively in cooperation with the NZDF.  
 
Culture clashes with humanitarian actors 
Stakeholders felt this obstacle particularly undermined NZDF-humanitarian coordination.750 
This occurred because humanitarians were intimidated by the NZDF’s culture, structure or 
found military procedures confusing or challenging. In some cases these cultural differences led 
humanitarian organisations to avoid coordinating with the NZDF or use civilian transportation 
instead, as they felt this was easier.751 This scenario was described by one local humanitarian, 
who described their first impression of the NZDF as follows,  
“You know it scares us… you know these guys are very efficient you hear them 
talk and when they do their briefing [laughter] … after the meeting I said [to 
the other humanitarians] ‘aye guys, let’s just stay out of Koro, stay out of 
Vanuabalavu’ it’s easier, you don’t have to mess with these guys.”
752
  
In hindsight stakeholders would however perceive the lack of NZDF-humanitarian coordination 
in the Lau group had negative impacts on the affected population.753 This was because they felt 
the NZDF had not been trained to meet the soft needs of individuals, which meant these were 
not adequately met in some communities.754 
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Annex Six: Comparative Analysis findings 
Research Question One: How did stakeholders perceive the NZDF’s civil-military coordination 
in past Pacific disaster relief responses? 
The pragmatic reasons behind coordination 
Many stakeholders considered the NZDF’s coordination efforts appropriate 
Many stakeholders reported that the NZDF’s logistical support was the most valuable capability 
offered by the military. Interviewees felt this was due to the geographical challenges faced in 
the Vanuatu and Fijian archipelagos. The lack of national resources and logistical capacity in 
these HADR responses also reportedly compounded transportation issues. These practical 
benefits led many Pacific-based interviewees to consider the NZDF’s involvement in HADR and 
coordination with civilians ‘appropriate’ in past responses. 
These logistical and resource challenges also led several participants to argue that civilian 
stakeholders needed NZDF or foreign military support to rapidly meet the humanitarian needs 
created by Category 5 cyclones.755 For example, one OGA participant recalled their reaction to a 
humanitarian who criticised their coordination with the NZDF. They reflected,  
“One of the comments said to me was – ‘well you're just defence force in 
different uniform then.’ And I said – ‘well, no. We are a government-led 
response and therefore [the NZDF] are the ones that get us IN to do what 
we're doing...’ So we could be considered as… aligning ourselves with the 
devil in the way of [the NZDF], but in a practical sense. But without the 
assets… and some of the logistical capability [the NZDF have], how would we 
HONESTLY get to these places in a timely fashion, if at all?”
756
  
Similar justifications for coordinating with the NZDF were provided by many Pacific-based 
interviewees, including many from the humanitarian sector. 
These pragmatic perspectives mean NZDF involvement in HADR is likely here to stay 
In particular, affected government and Pacific-based humanitarian interviewees reflected on 
the financial benefits of coordinating with the NZDF. This concerned NZDF support being 
offered at no cost to HADR stakeholders, which was crucial considering logistical and funding 
shortfalls in the region. One humanitarian reflected on why this meant the NZDF was likely to 
be increasingly involved in future Pacific HADR responses. They stated, 
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“For one thing. Boys love toys. Lots of these Pacific Island leaders are men, 
and when these men see the green planes and ships coming they say ‘of 
course! Come, come, come.’ They will always appreciate the assistance 
coming from [New Zealand and Australia].”
757  
These and other pragmatic reasons, led many participants to conclude the NZDF and other 
foreign militaries were likely ‘here to stay’ in Pacific HADR. Most believed this was a good thing, 
provided that the military and other stakeholders continued to try and improve their 
coordination efforts and HADR capabilities.  
The NZDF’s pre-disaster interaction enhanced coordination 
 
In both responses, participants noted that previous engagement between the NZDF and 
stakeholders made their coordination efforts easier. The force’s pre-disaster interaction with 
MFAT and OGAs, for example, reportedly enhanced coordination at the strategic level. 758 The 
use the same DJIATF personnel in both responses also reportedly improved coordination 
between the NZDF, New Zealand civilian actors, humanitarians and affected governments. This 
was because face-to-face engagement enabled representatives to build relationships, 
understanding and trust, which interviewees felt mitigated barriers to coordination. 
Humanitarian participants also reported that previous NZDF-humanitarian interaction had been 
a catalyst for positive coordination. For example, participants in the 2015 and 2016 responses 
reflected on a civil-military workshop.759 This was attended by NZDF, humanitarian and Pacific-
based NDMO staff and reportedly increased understanding about each other’s institutions, as 
well as humanitarian and Pacific HADR systems.  
In contrast, high proportions of the NZDF and civilian participants involved in the TC Pam and 
Winston responses reported they had minimal or no contact with each other prior to the 
disaster. These interviewees believed this reduced their understanding and ability to coordinate 
effectively. This also led the majority of these participants to recommend increasing civil-
military interaction between stakeholders, prior to HADR deployments. 
These perspectives indicate there is a link between pre-disaster engagement and the NZDF’s 
positive civil-military coordination efforts. These findings support arguments made in previous 
studies, which suggest ‘Janowitzean’ or ‘integrated’ coordination models are more effective, as 
they encourage interaction between military and civilian actors (Egnell, 2006). 
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The characteristics, culture and identity of the NZDF aided coordination efforts  
The NZDF’s characteristics, cultural traits and identity were also frequently discussed by 
stakeholders, as factors which made civil-military coordination easier.760 With respect to 
characteristics, most interviewees reflected on the NZDF relatively small size. This was believed 
to enhance the military’s flexibility and ability to build individual relationships with certain 
stakeholders. Participants also felt the NZDF’s condensed command structure meant personnel 
were less rigid and hierarchy-focused than those in other militaries.  
Concerning the NZDF’s culture and identity, some participants linked the NZDF’s relative 
flexibility and friendliness to its ethnic makeup. They connected this to the large proportion of 
Maori and Pacific Island personnel within the force. New Zealand’s national identity and culture 
were also commonly discussed factors. For example, one local humanitarian interviewee from 
Fiji commented, 
“The Pacific is not a warzone and so the military that are coming are 
neighbours. Especially New Zealand, [the NZDF] is seen across the Pacific as a 
friend of Pacific islanders.”761 
Some participants also reported these cultural and national factors led personnel to adopt a 
‘kiwi’ or ‘can-do attitude’ in Pacific HADR contexts, which civilians found easier to work with.  
Civilian stakeholders felt the NZDF was easier to coordinate with than other militaries 
Due to these reasons, many participants stated that the NZDF was easier to coordinate with or 
better at civil-military coordination than the other foreign militaries deployed in these case 
studies. This may be because interviewees felt the NZDF’s cultural orientation, processes and 
approach were more closely aligned with their own Pacific or civilian cultures, as well as the 
norms guiding HADR.  
While these perceptions may be encouraging for the NZDF, they raise some concerns for other 
foreign militaries, which were described less favourably by interviewees.762 This reinforces the 
need for further research, particularly to better understand how stakeholders view the civil-
military coordination effort of other militaries in Pacific HADR.  
Stakeholder perspectives make a number of new contributions to academia  
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These findings make a number of contributions to existing literature. Concerning civil-military 
relations theories, they tend to substantiate Moskos and Downes’ (2000) proposition that the 
NZDF is a postmodern military, which is changing culturally, due to domestic and international 
pressures.763 Interview data also suggest these changes and NZDF’s increasing civilianisation 
may have enhanced the force’s civil-military coordination capability. These findings mirror 
Hajjar’s (2014) research on the US military. These findings do, however, raise questions about 
the long term implications of these changes, particularly on the NZDF’s other capabilities.764   
Stakeholder descriptions of the NZDF’s identity and culture are also similar to those reported by 
Morris (2017) and Greener (2017).765 These studies concluded that the NZDF had a ‘kiwi’ or 
‘professional’ approach, which helped the force coordinate with stakeholders in deployments. 
Interviewee data in this thesis, however, revealed a greater number of contrasts and 
complexity between stakeholder perspectives, which are discussed in the section below. 
The fact that the NZDF’s characteristics, culture and national identity were perceived to be 
behind why the force was relatively easier to coordinate with, also validates the work of some 
authors. These include contemporary civil-military relations theories, which suggest culture, 
identity and the environment militaries operate in have significant impacts on stakeholders’ 
relationships and effectiveness (Schiff, 1995, Bland, 1999, Jepperson et al., 1996). 
What these findings mean for future civil-military coordination efforts in Pacific HADR  
These positive views of the NZDF and civilian stakeholders’ willingness to coordinate provide a 
unique opportunity for the GoNZ and Pacific region. In particular, the widespread interest in 
improving civil-military coordination and civilian actors working with the NZDF could be 
capitalised on by stakeholders. This is likely to benefit all Pacific HADR stakeholders if these 
efforts enhance coordination efforts and ensure the needs of affected populations are better 
met in future responses. 
 
Stakeholder perceptions of the NZDF’s civil-military coordination were portrayed more 
favourably in grey literature, than by interviewees 
 
Stakeholder concerns about ‘ad hoc’ coordination or a lack of interaction were not published 
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Interestingly, the most significant tensions between the NZDF and civilian stakeholders either 
appeared to be downplayed or were not reported in published grey literature sources. Many 
interviewees, for example, reported a lack of interaction and communication between the 
NZDF, humanitarian actors and the affected population. This ‘ad hoc’ or improvised 
coordination was often observed at the tactical level, between the NZDF, OGAs and 
humanitarian agencies, but was not reported in grey literature. Considering coordination in the 
field and outer islands is where HADR is crucial for meeting population needs, these unreported 
findings are particularly concerning. 
Major civil-military tensions were also not reported or deeply analysed  
Serious tensions between the NZDF and civilian stakeholders were also openly discussed by 
participants, but were not reported or analysed in published literature. The internal HQ JFNZ 
lessons learned synopsis also contained little mention or analysis of the major issues raised by 
NZDF, OGA and MFAT interviewees. For example, tensions over civilian control were not raised, 
with it reported that MFAT LOs were “very beneficial and easy to work with” (HQ JFNZ, 2016, 
p.8). In addition, the only allusion to an incident between USAR and NZDF personnel was that it 
was “unclear who was in overall command” when representatives operated in integrated teams 
(HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.10).  
The major unreported civil-military tensions are, therefore, reported below, along with why 
interviewees felt these occurred. 
NZDF personnel were perceived to have not listened to or disrespected civilian stakeholders 
In both case studies, participants recalled examples where they felt some NZDF personnel had 
disrespected civilian stakeholders or had not listened to their perspectives. Some of these 
related to NZDF personnel undermining MFAT and affected government officials. Perspectives 
varied over whether this behaviour was unintentional or intentional. One GoNZ interviewee 
described an example of the latter, in the TC Winston response. They stated, 
“[MFAT] were trying to utilise NZDF resources in an efficient and appropriate 
way to service the affected communities. Having [NZDF personnel] say ‘oh 
yes… I'll take that into consideration’ … but then not following through… 
because they have really only focused on their [internal] tasking… is not 
helpful to the overall objective of the exercise.”
766
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Examples of personnel appearing to intentionally ignore civilian views or leadership were 
predominantly observed in the field. This contrasted with NZDF personnel based in High 
Commissions, as all interviewees reported DJIATF staff had respected MFAT leadership.  
Civilian stakeholders believed the NZDF’s organisational culture compounded tensions 
Several civilians connected the reportedly inappropriate behaviour of NZDF personnel to the 
military’s organisational culture. This meant personnel prioritised the rapid completion of HADR 
tasks, over showing respect for civilian leadership or their perspectives.  
Participants also noted that NZDF personnel were rank-orientated, which meant some 
personnel dismissed civilian opinions. For example, one OGA interviewee reflected on an 
incident which happened in Fiji. They recounted, 
“Potentially there [were] opinions in the room not being listened to… an 
example was, at the time, [an OGA representative with a high rank] which 
was the same as Lieutenant Colonel… went to do a visit… and put their… 
uniform [with rank slides] on. And the way they were treated [by NZDF 
personnel] was significantly different [participant laughs].”767 
Some Participants believed NZDF personnel thought they were more experienced, better 
trained for emergencies or more capable of leading operations than civilians. These views were, 
however, contested by participants, who reported that some of the deployed civilian 
representatives had decades of experience in national and international HADR responses.  
Some coordination issues were compounded by leadership and procedural requirements 
In contrast, NZDF interviewees contributed civil-military tensions to other factors. Some 
reported frustration at the rapid rotation of MAFT staff. This reduced the situational awareness 
of MFAT LOs, as well as their ability to establish relationships and effectively lead WoG 
stakeholders at the tactical level. Some MFAT staff were also observed to be inexperienced or 
unsuited to the roles they were allocated. These views suggest it may be beneficial for MFAT to 
re-evaluate the rotation and selection of staff in future HADR responses.  
NZDF participants also reported that security or procedural requirements constrained their 
ability to coordinate with civilians. Many of these were given by strategic-level civilian or 
military staff, which reportedly lacked an understanding of the HADR or Pacific context. One 
NZDF representative reflected on an example of this in the TC Pam response. They reflected, 
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“[Personnel] were getting constant phone calls from HQ JFNZ… getting 
direction of how to operate… I remember a phone call between [X and Y]
768… 
I had to ask the rest of the staff [overhearing the conversation] to leave… 
[X’s] knuckles went white [with] frustration. You had [X] ringing [Y] telling him 
that he can't use different assets and… the plan [X] has got, [Y] doesn't like. 
That is the old STRATEGIC SCREWDRIVER coming right from the top. It 
frustrated them because they were sent there to do a specific role, and yet 
they were being controlled by Wellington.”
769
  
These frustrations are similar to those reported by other foreign military staff. For example, 
Miller and Barbera’s (2014) research revealed misunderstandings and poor communication 
between US military units and political actors, which impeded coordination. 
A small number of civilian interviewees also supported these perceptions. One OGA 
representative reflected,  
“I think that where [coordination] falls apart perhaps is just people 
understanding what the operational capability is of each agency…. at the 
strategic group, you’ve got a lot of people who have probably never been out 
the door, policy wise, business analysts you know, managers and directors 
who have probably never been in [a NZDF] asset of any shape or form, or 
deployed into a [Pacific Island] country.”
770
 
The interviewee perspectives above highlight that civil-military coordination issues are 
occurring at multiple levels. This is because they are occurring between national and 
international stakeholders, as well as internally, between the NZDF and New Zealand 
stakeholders at the strategic, operational and tactical level. 
Most tensions emerged over ‘command and control’ issues or ‘civilian control’ 
Examination of the tensions above reveals most concerned ‘command and control’ issues or 
were compounded by civilian actors trying to exert leadership over the NZDF. The more serious 
examples of these also had significant negative impacts on the NZDF’s civil-military 
coordination. For example, a serious incident occurred between USAR and NZDF personnel in 
Fiji. One OGA interviewee reflected on why they felt the incident escalated. They stated, 
“I’ve had the incident displayed to me verbally by [OGA representatives] and 
also NZDF people… it appears to be one guy who got a little ahead of himself 
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in self-importance, matching up with another guy who wasn’t going to have a 
bar of having his people belittled.”
771
 
This tension was ultimately only resolved by USAR and NZDF teams operating independently. 
Concerning issues over civilian control, some GoV participants felt that NZDF personnel 
disrespected local officials. An example of this was when the first NZDF Hercules attempted to 
land, without having provided information the GoV requested. Public servants interpreted this 
as the military trying to take inappropriate control over the national response, by overriding 
procedures. These factors almost jeopardised the WoG HADR response, as the Hercules was 
nearly denied entry into the country.  
The civil-military problematique remains unresolved 
These findings highlight the complexity of civil-military relations and the challenge of 
maintaining a military which is both effective and subordinate to civilian rule. This relates back 
to the foundational ‘civil-military problematique,’ discussed in Chapter One (Feaver, 1996).772  
The fact that tensions over civilian control were evident in both responses implies that the 
problematique remains relevant in Pacific HADR contexts. This suggests that despite the NZDF’s 
increasingly integrated or ‘Janowitzean’ approach to civil-military coordination being perceived 
favourably, issues over civilian control are still emerging.   
While these findings do not resolve the foundational ‘separation’ vs. ‘integration’ debate, they 
do make a new contribution to academic literature. They reveal, like Sotomayor’s (2010) South 
American case studies, that increased interaction has, in some cases, ‘magnified’ coordination 
issues between the NZDF and civilian stakeholders. This, in combination with the more positive 
stakeholder perspectives expressed above, implies that civil-military integration has had 
multifaceted impacts on coordination. This aligns with Malešič’s (2015) work, which concludes 
that integration can foster both cooperation and the “mutual transfer of values,” or 
“competition, conflict and a clash of organisational cultures” (2015, p.981). 
 
The mechanisms used in past HADR responses had positive and negative impacts on the 
NZDF’s civil-military coordination 
 
National coordination mechanisms 
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In both responses, national legislation placed the affected government in charge of 
coordination, but failed to detail how foreign military assistance would be facilitated. 
Interviewees reported that this left many non-State stakeholders confused about how to 
communicate with the NZDF or utilise the military’s logistical support. These findings are 
concerning, as coordination and speed are particularly crucial in the initial phase of HADR. 
New mechanisms were perceived positively by State actors, but not other stakeholders 
Due to the factors above, affected governments established their own civil-military 
coordination mechanisms.773 These were perceived positively by most NZDF, GoNZ and affected 
government interviewees, as they gave State actors more control over the NZDF. In contrast, 
the use of government LOs, chiefs and village headmen as facilitators limited non-State 
stakeholders’ actual interaction and communication with the NZDF.  
This arrangement, however, led to a separation between civilian actors and NZDF personnel. 
This led most civilian participants, with the exception of UN and large INGO representatives, to 
feel they were ‘out of the loop.’ One INGO representative reflected the success of their 
coordination efforts largely came down to knowing High Commission staff in country. 
The need to establish civil-military coordination mechanisms in the Pacific 
These findings suggest civil-military coordination mechanisms are encountering similar issues to 
those reported in previous Pacific HADR studies. For example, these have discussed a general 
lack of clarity in legislation and policies to regulate coordination, as well as increase the local 
capacity of NDMOs (Soldateschi, 2011, IFRC, 2016, Connors and Ayobi, 2016). They also 
emphasise the importance of establishing effective civil-military coordination mechanisms in 
the Pacific, before disasters occur. 
These factors highlight the need for further research into how ‘localisation’ can actually be 
achieved in the Pacific, while ensuring all stakeholders are able to take part in or benefit from 
civil-military coordination.  
International and regional coordination mechanisms 
Issues connected to humanitarian coordination 
Stakeholders reported several coordination issues associated with the humanitarian 
coordination systems applied in the TC Pam and Winston responses. Some reported that the 
GoV and GoF were reluctant to use UN structures, such as the cluster system and CMCoord 
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officers. This was reportedly because these were considered foreign, inappropriate for the 
Pacific HADR context or took control away from national actors.  
Interviewees in both case studies described why they felt humanitarian coordination models 
had negatively impacted the NZDF’s civil-military coordination efforts. Some felt these 
mechanisms led to a separation between military and civilian stakeholders. Others felt they 
resulted in national and international coordination structures operating independently in 
Vanuatu and Fiji, which impeded local and humanitarian agencies ability to coordinate with the 
NZDF. 
Local actors resisted foreign models 
Pacific-based interviewees also reported that affected governments and actors were often 
suspicious of and resistant to foreign control over HADR responses. One INGO participant 
reflected on this, they stated,  
“When the two disasters happened the [affected] governments quickly just 
shut the door on international assistance. Including the UN coming to play 
their role…. And it is typical of … how the Pacific handles its business when 
shit hits the fan. It just shuts itself off, chases everybody out and then tries to 
deal with the whole thing itself… It closed out the international arm for, I 
think two weeks, and the international planning is happening in total 
isolation from the national one and the two were never sitting together until 
the recovery stage I think, when both countries asked for money.”
774
 
Several interviewees suggested this separation between national and international structures 
and actors negatively impacted actors’ ability to coordinate with the NZDF. 
 
There was minimal understanding about guidelines 
In addition, less than one third of all interviewees had an understanding of the UN Oslo or APC-
MADRO Guidelines. Similar figures were reported in both case studies, although the proportion 
of participants who did report some understanding was higher among the NZDF and GoNZ 
sector. 775 These low proportions, particularly considering participants were selected for their 
expertise in Pacific HADR, suggests the Oslo and APC-MADRO guidelines are generally not 
understood or applied by stakeholders. 
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Following an explanation of these guidelines, most participants expressed concerns about their 
relevance and appropriateness in Pacific contexts. This was due to the specific geographical and 
logistical challenges faced in Pacific HADR. These reasons led many to feel the early deployment 
of foreign militaries and high levels of civil-military coordination were appropriate. In contrast, 
only 15% of all interviewees believed the Oslo Guidelines and the principle of ‘last resort’ were 
suitable. One New Zealand humanitarian explained their reasoning, commenting, 
“The whole thing of ‘last resort.’ That clearly is NOT the case in the Pacific 
and the use of military assets is growing… I think that is problematic…. it 
makes too many assumptions… There's too much of a… you know, ‘everybody 
loves a kiwi’ type thinking. And while [the NZDF] are largely very well 
respected, I think it's an assumption rather than a tested law… I have heard 
many times that… we use military as a ‘first resort’ because they are the only 
ones that have assets available. Which is clearly untrue… there are various 
civilian C130's and heavy lift capability in the region. Although it is possibly 
more EXPEDIENT to use the defence force.”776 
These findings provide the first analysis of how the Oslo guidelines are viewed by Pacific-based 
stakeholders. They also reinforce the concerns of Wolf (Wolfe, 2017, Lacey-Hall, 2015)  and 
Lacey-Hall (Wolfe, 2017, Lacey-Hall, 2015), including that local actors and affected governments 
can be resistant to UN mechanisms. Metcalf (2012) and Bollettino’s (2016) studies also revealed 
that the Oslo Guidelines were often misunderstood or not adhered to by actors. Stakeholders 
may, therefore, want to examine the application of existing guidelines in Pacific HADR and 
consider developing regional memorandums to regulate civil-military coordination.  
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